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ABSTRACT 
 
 
THE OTTOMAN-RUSSIAN RELATIONS 
BETWEEN THE YEARS 1774-1787 
 
Özer, Abdürrahim 
M.A., Department of International Relations 
Supervisor: Associate Prof. Hakan Kırımlı 
August 2008 
 
In this work, the diplomatic relations between the Ottoman Empire and 
Russia during the late 18th century will be analyzed. This study will cover the 
period from 1774 to 1787, starting with the signing of the Treaty of Küçük 
Kaynarca, ending with the declaration of the Ottoman-Russian war of 1787-1792. 
During this thirteen years period, there was an intense rivalry between the 
two empires, most importantly over Crimea and also over the Caucasus and the 
Balkans. There were many instances during which the two empires came to the 
brink of a new war. As a consequence of the international politics of the period, 
Russia and the Porte were remained relatively alone in their struggle and the Great 
Powers of Europe isolated from the collision of these two empires because of their 
hostilities among each other.  
 iv
This period witnessed the beginning of Russia’s superiority over the 
Ottoman Empire and the conflicts between these two Empires paved the way to a 
new war in 1787. 
Key words: The Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, Ottoman-Russian relations in 
the 18th century, Greek Project, the Crimea, the Caucasus, the Balkans. 
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ÖZET 
 
 
1774-1787 OSMANLI – RUS MÜNASEBETLERİ 
 
Özer, Abdürrahim 
Master tezi, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. Hakan Kırımlı 
Ağustos 2008 
 
Bu çalışmada, 1774 yılında Küçük Kaynarca antlaşmasının imzalanması 
ile başlayıp, 1787 yılında ikinci Osmanlı-Rus harbinin ilanına kadar geçen onüç 
yıllık sürede, Osmanlı Devleti ve Rusya İmparatorluğu arasındaki diplomatik 
ilişkiler açıklanmaya çalışılmıştır.   
Bahsi geçen dönemde iki imparatorluk Kafkasya, Balkanlar ve bilhassa 
Kırım üzerinde ciddi bir nüfuz mücadelesine girişmişler ve yeni bir savaşın 
başlaması ihtimali sürekli canlı kalmıştır. Dönemin uluslararası politikasının bir 
sonucu olarak Avrupa’nın büyük devletleri kendi aralarındaki husumetlerden 
dolayı Osmanlı ve Rusya arasındaki rekabete uzak kalmışlardır. Sonuç olarak, 
Osmanlı Devleti ve Rusya, aralarındaki mücadelede, başka dönemlere nazaran, 
yalnız kalmışlardır.  
 vi
Bu dönem, Rusya’nın Osmanlı Devleti’ne karşı üstünlüğü ele geçirmesine 
tanıklık etmiş ve iki imparatorluk arasındaki sorunlar 1787 yılında yeni bir 
savaşın başlamasına sebebiyet vermiştir. 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Küçük Kaynarca Andlaşması, 18. yüzyıl Osmanlı-
Rus İlişkileri, Kırım, Kafkasya, Balkanlar 
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CHAPTER I 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 In this thesis, the Ottoman-Russian diplomatic relations from the Treaty of 
Küçük Kaynarca on 21 July 1774 to the declaration of the second Ottoman-
Russian war in August 1787 will be analyzed. The significance of this thirteen 
year period in the mutual histories of these two Empires and its place in the 
international context will be highlighted. 
Russia of the 18th century was a constantly rising power on the eastern 
borders of Europe. Reform-minded and energetic rulers, together with the help of 
European specialists, transformed the Empire of Ivan the Terrible into a Great 
Power of Europe. Catherine the Great, though she also had a great place in all 
Russian History, was one of the most important figures among the Tsars and 
Tsaritsas of the 18th century. She had recognized the ideas of enlightenment and 
for 34 years struggled for both to improve the internal well-being of Russia and 
increase its the role in European politics. On the other hand, the Ottoman Empire 
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had been transformed from a mighty Empire into an obsolete one, which needed 
urgent reform and modernization.  
This inter-war period, which lasted for thirteen years from 1774 to 1787, 
was one of the interesting episodes in the history of the Ottoman-Russian 
relations. One of the most important achievements of Catherine the Great was the 
annexation of the Crimea into the Russian Empire which greatly strengthened 
Russia’s position against the Porte and paved the way for the future Russian 
domination of the Black Sea via certain cities and ports like Sebastopol, Kherson 
and Odessa. Russian trade in the Black Sea visibly flourished following this 
period. Russian penetration into the Balkans and the Caucasus also took a new 
shape during her reign. The establishment of the Russian protection over the 
Georgian Kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti aimed to protect the Russian interests and at 
the same time to increase the Russian role in the region. For the first time, the 
local reaction to Russia’s militaristic advance gained a united form in 1785 under 
the leadership of Imam Mansur.  
Situation of the Balkans had differed from the Crimea or the Caucasus since 
it was heavily Christian populated and the Russians applied the strategy of 
provoking these people against the Sultan to increase their influence further. The 
Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca allowed Russia to open consulates in the ‘necessary’ 
places. These consulates were supposed to regulate the Russian trade relations 
with the Porte and to protect the Russian merchants in the Ottoman territories. In 
reality however, the Russian consuls engaged in igniting the feelings of discontent 
among the Christian subjects of the Sultan in every corner of the Empire and 
especially in the Balkans. 
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Although the Ottomans tried to balance the activities of Russia, in all these 
three regions the efforts of the Porte did not bring fruitful results. Despite all the 
efforts of the Porte, Crimea was lost in 1783 while at the same time Russia 
established its suzerainty over the Kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti. Hospodars of 
Wallachia and Moldavia were being chosen from among the loyal Phanariots of 
the Constantinople to balance the presence of the Russian agents. They were 
frequently deposed which resulted in instability in the region, paving the way for 
further Russian intervention. An exception to the failed Ottoman efforts could be 
the Ferah Ali Pasha mission to Soğucak. He was commissioned to Western 
Caucasus to improve the relations between Constantinople and the local tribes, 
namely Circassians, and partly succeeded in doing so.  
Over the Balkans, this period had witnessed one of the grandiose projects 
of expansion and conquest, namely the Greek Project. Although it could not be 
realized due to a number of reasons, the mere anxiety it caused was enough to 
concern the Porte and the other countries of Europe.  
Last but not the least, the international politics of this period allowed 
Russia to expand at the expense of the Ottoman Empire. The Great Powers of 
Europe were in conflict among each other and in some cases they even needed 
Russian support which gave Russia an advantegous position and eased Russia’s 
hand against the Ottoman Empire.  
In such a period, on the one hand, the Ottoman Empire struggled for its 
integrity by preserving the status quo, and on the other, the Russian Empire 
followed aggressive and expansionist policies. Although these thirteen years were 
relatively peaceful for Russia and the Porte, the roots of the Ottoman-Russian war 
of 1787-1792 was embedded in the unresolved conflicts of this period. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
THE OTTOMAN-RUSSIAN RELATIONS DURING 
THE FIRST HALF OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 
AND THE TREATY OF KÜÇÜK KAYNARCA 
 
 
 
2.1 A Brief Introduction to the Russo-Ottoman Relations 
 
The beginning of Ottoman-Russian relations is usually related to the first 
official document sent through the Crimean Khanate to Constantinople in 1492; 
however, the enmity between the two empires intensified with the conquests of 
the khanates of Kazan and Astrakhan by Ivan the Terrible (1546-1584) in the mid-
sixteenth century.1 Although until the beginning of the eighteenth century, the 
balance of power was still in favor of the Ottoman Empire, as a result of a series 
                                                 
1 For detailed information on the roots of Ottoman-Russian relations and rivalry see Halil İnalcık, 
“Osmanlı-Rus Rekabetinin Menşei ve Don-Volga Kanalı Teşebbüsü (1569),” Belleten, vol. 8, no. 
46 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1948), pp. 350-401. Also see Akdes Nimet Kurat, Türkiye ve İdil 
Boyu: 1569 Astarhan Seferi, Ten-İdil Kanalı ve XVI-XVII. Yüzyıl Osmanlı-Rus Münasebetleri 
(Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Basımevi, 1966). 
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of military setbacks in the last quarter of the seventeenth century, the Ottoman 
Empire lost considerable strength. Simultaneously, Peter the Great (1682-1725) 
initiated a period of daring reforms and increased the importance of his country as 
a regional power.2 The second half of the eighteenth century witnessed the 
emergence of Russia as a great power, a process which had a major impact on 
European power politics.3 There were three major obstacles in the way of Russia 
before it could claim some sort of regional hegemony. These were the Ottoman 
Empire (together with the Crimean Khanate), Poland and Sweden. From the 
beginning of the 18th century, the Russian Empire was frequently at war with 
these states, and towards the end of the century, the balance of power gradually 
shifted in the favor of the former. It would be accurate to say that while the 
decisive defeat of Sweden in the Great Northern War, which ended in 1721 with 
the treaty of Nystadt, secured the northern front of Russia, the process of the 
partition of Poland after more than half-a-century greatly contributed to Russia’s 
expansion towards the west and involvement in European affairs. Lastly, the 
annexation of the Crimean Khanate provided the Russia’s southern advance and 
gave the Russian Empire the upper hand regarding its relations with the Ottoman 
                                                 
2 For a general overview of the rise of the Russian Empire from the fifteenth to the eighteenth 
century see, Carol. B. Stevens, Russia’s Wars of Emergence 1460-1730 (London: Pearson, 2007). 
3 For general information about European politics and international relations in this period see, 
Jeremy Black, Eighteenth Century Europe 1700-1789 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990), 
pp.276-327,  Matthew Smith Anderson, Europe in the Eighteenth Century 1715-1783 (New York: 
Longman, 1987), pp. 210-379, Franco Venturi, The End of the Old Regime 1768-1776: The First 
Crisis (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1989) trans. Burr Litchfield, Franco Venturi, The 
End of the Old Regime 1776-1789 I: The Great States of the West (New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1991) trans. Burr Litchfield, Franco Venturi, The End of the Old Regime 1776-
1789 II: Republican Patriotism and the Empires of the East (New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 1991) trans. Burr Litchfield, F.C. Schlosser, History of the Eighteenth Century and of the 
Nineteenth Century till the Overthrow of the French Empire vols. 3-5 (London, 1844-1845) trans. 
D. Davison. The issues of Annual Register also contain invaluable information about this period. 
The chronicle was starter by Edmund Burke and it was first published in 1758. Among the various 
chapters of the chronicle, there is an important section devoted to the history of European and 
World politics of that year. See, The Annual Register, or a View of the History, Politics, and 
Literature, For the Year(s) 1768-1787 (London, 1788-1805). 
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Empire. After almost two centuries, the dominance of the Ottomans in the Black 
Sea ended in favor of Russia.  
 
 
2.2 The Russian Empire during the 18th century4 till the Russo-Ottoman 
War of 1768-1774 
 
The Russian Empire entered the 18th century under the rule of an energetic 
and reform-minded Tsar, Peter the Great. He initiated a series of military and 
bureaucratic reforms to strengthen and westernize the country. To this effect, he 
invited a number of German and other European experts to modernize Russia, 
which also served as a background to the later German influence in the Russian 
Empire during the reign of the Empresses5. The benefits of these reforms were felt 
shortly after.  
The Russian expansion during the 18th century was a result of practical 
political concerns. Protection against hostile states, expanding Russian hold over 
natural resources, and extending its agricultural plains were some of the 
motivations for Russia’s expansion. In any case territorial expansion at the 
expense of neighboring states was perceived as something that strengthens the 
expansionist power.6  In fact, another motivation for Russian expansion, first 
towards the east and then towards the south, was to control the river ways. Since 
                                                 
4 For detailed information on the Russian Empire in this period see, Aleksandr B. Kamenskii, The 
Russian Empire in the Eighteenth Century: Searching For a Place in the World (London: M.E. 
Sharpe, 1997) trans. and ed. David Griffiths, Isabel de Madariaga, Politics and Culture in 
Eighteenth-Century Russia (New York: Longman, 1998), John P. LeDonne, The Grand Strategy of 
the Russian Empire, 1650-1831 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004). 
5 Anna Ivanovna (1730-1740), Elizabeth (1741-1762), and Catherine the Great (1762-1796). 
6 Muriel Atkin, Russia and Iran, 1780-1828 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1980), 
p. 22.  
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Russia’s prosperity was mostly dependent on the rivers, it has been a primary 
objective of the Russian foreign policy, to control these river ways and their 
connections to the sea.7 While Russia managed to control Volga and its exit to the 
Caspian Sea during the 16th century, access to the Baltic and the Black Sea can be 
achieved only during the 18th century. “Nevertheless, all three seas were either 
landlocked (the Caspian) or approached the ocean through narrow exits (in the Baltic the 
Sound, in the Black Sea the Straits of Constantinople) easily blocked by foreign fleets. 
Russia’s position as a maritime and commercial power was always under threat because 
of this basic geographical fact.”8 
As a reward of joining the anti-Ottoman alliance at the turn of the century, 
Russia signed a separate peace, the treaty of Istanbul in 1700 with the Porte. 
Important terms of this treaty included the Russian annexation of the fortress of 
Azov and the right to have a permanent consulate in Constantinople.9 Besides, 
Russia was no longer going to pay the annual tribute to the Crimean Khanate, 
which can be understood as the formal ending of the Tatar supremacy over 
Russia.  
Sweden and Poland allied themselves against Russia but were defeated in 
1709, in the famous Battle of Poltava. Ivan Mazepa, Hetman of the Cossacks, was 
also involved in this anti-Russian coalition. As a result of Russian victory, the 
Cossacks were deprived of their autonomy to choose their own leaders, since 
Peter the Great did not want to take any further risks in the future. After defeating 
Poland and Sweden, Russia was draft into a new war against the Ottoman Empire. 
                                                 
7 “The account of inland navigations in Russia is astonishing. According to Cox’s tour, a water 
carriage is completed for four thousand five hundred miles, three times the length of Great Britain, 
extending from Petersburgh to the Chinese frontiers.” The Times, Thursday, Sep. 20, 1787; pg.2; 
Issue 854; col. D. 
8 Dominic Lieven, Empire: Russia and its Rivals (London: Yale University Press, 2000), p. 206.  
9 Pyotr A. Tolstoy was to become the first permanent Russian Ambassador to Constantinople 
between the years 1701–1714.  
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The main cause of this war was the provocation of Charles XII of Sweden, who 
fled to the Ottoman Empire after the defeat he suffered at the hands of Peter the 
Great. Additionally the ruling class of the Crimean Khanate was frustrated, since 
they had not received their annual tribute for over ten years. This was also 
perceived as a chance by the Porte to compensate for the loss of Azov (1700).  
Consequently, the Ottoman Empire declared war upon Russia on 21 
November 1710. Peter the Great did not summon a great army for this campaign, 
for he relied on the promises of the Hospodars of both Wallachia and Moldavia.10 
In June 1711, both armies reached the banks of the Prut River. Since the Ottoman 
army, approximately 130,000 men strong, crossed the Danube and entered 
Wallachia before the Russians, Constantin Brâncoveanu immediately switched his 
allegiance and remained neutral during the campaign.11 This was a major blow to 
the Russian war plans. Although Peter the Great attempted to retreat, the Russian 
army was cornered by the armies of Grand Vizier Baltacı Mehmed Pasha and the 
Crimean Khan Devlet Geray II. The situation was hopeless for Peter the Great and 
he had no chance but to accept the terms of the Porte. “In a letter dated 10 July, 
Peter instructed the Senate that he expected to die or be taken prisoner, in which 
case he was not to be treated as their sovereign.”12 However, Baltacı Mehmed 
Pasha could not fully benefit from this fragile situation of the Tsar. As a result of 
the negotiations, the fortress of Azak was to be returned to the Ottoman Empire, 
Russia’s southern fleet was to be destroyed and Russia had to pull its Ambassador 
                                                 
10 The Russian army in this campaign was composed of 40,000 infantry and 14,000 cavalry. This 
number was going to be multiplied when joined with the armies of the Principalities. While 
Dimitrie Cantemir had promised 10,000 men, Constantin Brâncoveanu of Walachia promised a 
force of 30,000. As a result, total strength of the Russian army was planned to be 94,000 in total. 
See Robert K. Massie, Peter the Great: His Life and World (New York: History Book Club, 
1999), pp.550-551. 
11 Stevens, p. 267. 
12 Ibid, p. 268. 
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back from Constantinople.13 Peter the Great, once he safely returned to St. 
Petersburg, was reluctant to comply with the terms of the treaty. However, when 
the Ottomans once again declared war on Russia, both sides came to agree on a 
new peace treaty and Treaty of Edirne was signed on 18 October 1713. 
Although Prut seemed like a setback for Russia, it was a minor one when 
compared to the achievements of Peter the Great. After a long lasting campaign, 
in 1721, Peter the Great defeated Sweden in the Great Northern War and 
established Russia’s supremacy in the Baltic Sea, which was vital for the trade 
with northern Europe and England. In addition, Peter the Great led a campaign 
toward the Caucasus and Persia in 1720s, during which he invaded the western 
shores of the Caspian. Russian armies advanced through the Derbend Pass down 
to Persia, where they reached the city of Resht, located on the southern shores of 
the Caspian Sea. However, these latter conquests did not endure. 
Russia and the Ottoman Empire fought another major war during the first 
half of the 18th century, during the years 1735-1739.14 In 1736, a Russian army 
under the command of General Burkhard Christoph von Münnich, after breaking 
the defenses at Orkapı (Perekop), captured Bahçesaray, destroyed Hansaray (the 
palace of the Khans) and burnt the city to the ground. Once again in 1737, 
General Peter Lacy entered the Crimea. The spread of disease and lack of 
provisions forced the Russian army to retreat “having lost 30,000 men of whom 
only 2,000 were killed by the enemy.”15 However, this was a clear sign of what 
                                                 
13 For detailed information on the Battle of Prut see, Akdes Nimet Kurat, Prut Seferi ve Barışı 
1123 (1711) (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1953), Hakan Yıldız, Haydi Osmanlı Sefere! Prut 
Seferinde Organizasyon ve Lojistik (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2006), 
Yeniçeri Katibi Hasan, Prut Seferini Beyânımdır (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 
2008).  
14 For a detailed account of Ottoman Empire in this period see, Lavender Cassels, The Struggle for 
the Ottoman Empire 1717-1740 (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1967). 
15 Ibid, p. 110, L.S.Stavrianos, The Balkans since 1453 (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 
1961) p.184. 
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was to come half a century later. During the last year of the campaign, Russian 
armies captured Yaşi (Jassy), the capital of Moldavia. However, the war was 
concluded when Austria decided to make a separate peace with the Ottoman 
Empire in September 1739. Russia could not continue the fight under these 
circumstances. The treaty of Niş (Nissa) was signed on 3 October 1739. This 
treaty was not a decisive victory or defeat for either side. The fortress of Azak was 
returned to Russia only with the condition that it was to be demolished.  
 After the peace was concluded with the Porte, Russia chose to follow an 
active foreign policy in Europe.16 During the war of Austrian Succession (1740-
1748), Russia, allied with Austria and Great Britain, fought against France and 
Prussia. Simultaneously, Russia fought a new war against Sweden during the 
years 1741-1743 which was won thanks to the military brilliance of General Lacy. 
This victory helped Russia maintain its dominance in the Baltic Sea. Later, in the 
Seven Years War (1756-1763)17, Russia entered into an alliance with France and 
fought against Britain and Prussia of Frederick the Great (1740-1786). During the 
campaign of 1762, Russian armies were about to invade Berlin, if only Peter III 
(1762) who just succeeded Elizabeth (1741-1762), had not decided to make peace 
with Prussia.18 This fateful event was to be remembered as the “Miracle of the 
House of Brandenburg”.  
As an admirer of Frederick’s policies, Peter III tried to regulate the army 
according to the Prussian style. He also initiated some reforms which disturbed 
the status quo of the nobility. Catherine took the opportunity to depose her 
                                                 
16 For an account of the wars in eighteenth century Europe see; Edward Cust, Annals of the Wars 
of the Eighteenth Century vols.1-3 (London, 1862). The first three volumes of this series comprise 
the dates between 1700-1788.  
17 For a detailed account of the European scene of the Seven Years War see, Franz A. J. Szabo, 
The Seven Years War in Europe 1756-1763 (London: Pearson, 2008). 
18 Ibid, pp. 382-383. 
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husband and with the help of the Orlov brothers,19 she attempted a coup d’etat and 
succeeded in seizing the throne.20  
The very first years of Catherine the Great21 demonstrated her eagerness for 
power and unwillingness to leave any contenders to the throne. Her husband died 
after a few weeks of the coup, possibly murdered by Aleksey Orlov with orders 
from the Tsarina. She did not leave the throne to its actual heir, her son Paul 
(1754-1801), and also have Ivan (1740-1764). He was imprisoned by Elizabeth as 
an infant, murdered after a failed rescue attempt by Vasiliy Mirovich, who was a 
low-ranking army officer.  
Catherine II “had a superficial knowledge of the state of affairs in the 
empire, of her own governmental resources, and of the difficulties that awaited 
her.”22 As a result, “the weak position of Catherine resulted with the people who 
helped her achieve the crown trying to abuse their support. She was in a helpless 
position in which she had to give all sorts of concessions to the nobles.”23 
Catherine the Great, who posed herself as an “enlightened autocrat” in the 
initial years of her reign regarding domestic affairs, continued to follow an active 
                                                 
19 Grigory Orlov (favourite of Catherine II), Aleksey Orlov (Chesmensky), Ivan Orlov, Fyodor 
Orlov, Vladimir Orlov. 
20 Yekaterina Romanovna Vorontsova-Dashkova, Memoirs of the Princess Dashkow, Lady of 
Honour to Catherine II: Empress of All the Russias vol. 1 (London, 1840), ed. Mrs. W. Bradford, 
pp.75-80. Princess Dashkova’s memoirs, published in two volumes, is one of the important 
sources to understand this period since she was one of the prominent actors of the period and, 
although she was the little sister of Peter III’s mistress Elizabeth, she was very close to Catherine 
the Great.   
21 For detailed information on the history of the Russian Empire in this period and the personality 
of Catherine the Great and see, Vasili Osipovich Kliuchevsky, A Course in Russian History: The 
Time of Catherine the Great (London: M.E.Sharpe, 1997) trans. and ed. Marshall S. Shatz, 
Aleksandr Gustavovic Brickner, Istoriia Ekateriny Vtoroi (Moscow: Izdatelstvo Astrel, 2005), 
Isabel de Madariaga, Russia in the Age of Catherine the Great (London: Phoenix, 2003), John T. 
Alexander, Catherine the Great: Life and Legend (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 
Marc Raeff (ed.), Catherine the Great: A Profile (New York: MacMillan, 1972), Jean Castera, The 
Life of Catharine II: Empress of Russia 3 vols. (London, 1800), William Tooke, View of the 
Russian Empire During the Reign of Catharine the Second, and to the Close of the Eighteenth 
Century 3 vols. (London, 1800), Brenda Meehan-Water, “Catherine the Great and the Problem of 
Female Rule,” Russian Review, vol. 34, no. 3 (July, 1975). 
22 Kliuchevsky, pp. 58-60.  
23 Ibid. 
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foreign policy in Europe. She interfered with the elections of the King of Poland 
and succeeded to impose her candidate, Stanisław August Poniatowski (1732–
1798) on the throne, who was one of her old favourites. She also continued her 
husband’s Prussian policy and, with the initiatives of Count Panin, an alliance was 
formed between Russia and Prussia in 1764. Later in 1766, tension rose in Poland 
when Russia tried to enforce certain regulations regarding the rights and equality 
of the Orthodox subjects of Poland. On 9 July 1766, letter of Poniatowski to the 
Sultan arrived in Constantinople, in which he was asking for the friendship of the 
Porte and trying to get Ottoman support against Russia.24  This conflict over 
Poland was to become a cause of the Russo-Ottoman war of 1768-1774.25  
 
 
2.3 The Ottoman Empire during the 18th century26 till the Russo-Ottoman 
War of 1768-1774 
 
After the treaty of Karlowitz (1699), which was a major blow to the 
Ottoman power in Central Europe, there was still an optimistic mood among the 
                                                 
24 Mustafa Kesbî, İbretnümâ-yı Devlet (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2002), pp. 305-306. 
25 For an account of Russian policies towards Poland in this period see, Jerry T. Lukowski, 
“Towards Partition: Polish Magnates and Russian Intervention in Poland during the Early Reign of 
Stanislaw August Poniatowski,” The Historical Journal, vol. 28, no. 3 (Sep., 1985), pp. 557-574. 
26 For detailed information on the history of the Ottoman Empire in this period see, İsmail Hakkı 
Uzunçarşılı, Osmanlı Tarihi vol. 4, 2 parts (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1995-2003), Nicolae 
Jorga, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Tarihi vol. 4 (İstanbul: Yeditepe Yayınevi, 2005), trans. Nilüfer 
Epçeli, pp. 235-415, Caroline Finkel, Osman’s Dream: The Story of the Ottoman Empire 1300-
1923 (New York: Basic Books, 2005), pp. 321-412, Stanford J. Shaw, History of the Ottoman 
Empire and Modern Turkey Volume I: Empire of the Gazis: The Rise and Decline of Ottoman 
Empire, 1280-1808 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976), pp. 223-258, Mufassal 
Osmanlı Tarihi vol. 5 (İstanbul: Güven Yayınevi, 1962). For the social and economic history of 
the Ottoman Empire see, Yücel Özkaya, 18. Yüzyılda Osmanlı Toplumu (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi 
Yayınları, 2008), Şevket Pamuk, Osmanlı-Türkiye İktisadî Tarihi 1500-1914 (İstanbul: İletişim 
Yayınları, 2005) pp. 131-177, Bruce McGowan, “Âyanlar Çağı, 1699-1812,” in Halil İnalcık and 
Donald Quataert (eds.), Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun Ekonomik ve Sosyal Tarihi vol. 2 (İstanbul: 
Eren Yayınları, 2006), pp.761-865. 
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Ottoman dignitaries and chroniclers of the time, who contended that the Ottoman 
Empire would be victorious once again once it recovered its former strength. This 
peace treaty gave breathing space for the Ottomans, albeit a temporary one.27 
However, the defeats suffered against Austria, at the hands of Prince Eugene of 
Savoy, during the 1716-1718 campaign resulted in the capture of Oltenia (Little 
Wallachia) by the Habsburg Empire. On the other hand, the Porte managed to 
recover Morea from Venice in 1715 and also re-captured Belgrade and Oltenia 
from the Habsburgs with the Treaty of Belgrade, signed on 18 September 1739. 
The Ottomans were once again victorious and self-confident. This was evident 
“during the negotiations that issued in the Belgrade treaty, [when] Hekimoğlu Ali 
Pasha was able to boast, as well as threaten, that the road to Vienna was open and 
he knew the way”.28 
After 1739, excluding the wars against Nadir Shah of Persia during the 
beginning of 1740s, Ottoman Empire experienced a considerably long period of 
peace. This was “one of the longest periods of peace for the Ottoman Empire in its 
entire history.”29 Until 1768, no major wars were fought and the Ottomans had 
chosen to remain neutral during the European conflicts of this period. 
Relieved of the huge military expenses of wars, the Ottoman Empire also 
managed to recover economically during this period. According to Faroqhi, the 
false confidence of the Ottomans before the Russo-Ottoman war of 1768-74, was 
not only a result of long-lasting period of peace but also the developments in 
production and economy. Ironically, it was the war which caused the end of this 
progress. The Porte was satisfying its military needs by purchasing supplies in 
                                                 
27 Norman Itzkowitz and Max Mote (eds. and trans.), Mübadele: An Ottoman-Russian Exchange of 
Ambassadors (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1970), pp.1-2. 
28 Ibid, p. 2. 
29 Virginia Aksan, Ottoman Wars 1700-1870: An Empire Besieged (London: Pearson, 2007), p. 
130. 
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cheap prices from wholesalers instead of from the small-sized manufacturers. As a 
result, neither wholesalers nor small manufacturers were able to develop 
themselves and contribute to general progress.30  
The Ottoman Empire began to lose control of its periphery during the 18th 
century, as local landlords and warlords (the âyâns and derebeys) increased their 
authority. In many cases, these influential and wealthy people were able to please 
the local governors and kadıs, further increased their wealth and managed to leave 
their position to someone from their line.31 One of the reasons of this loosening 
was the Porte’s fiscal policy. Unable to collect taxes from its subjects, Ottoman 
administrators preferred to sell the farming of the annual taxes of the provinces to 
individuals, who were called mültezim.32 Both as a result of this fiscal policy and 
lack of communications and poor transportation, in the far corners of the Balkans, 
such as Bosnia and Montenegro, and especially the North African shores, became 
almost independent of the central rule.33 
During this long period of peace, the Grand Vizier Koca Mehmed Ragıp 
Pasha (1757-1763), who was also the architect of this pacific policy, can be 
regarded as one of the few talented statesmen of the Porte. Ragıp Pasha tried to 
strengthen the army in spite of the state of peace. He used to encourage soldiers to 
drill, not only in Constantinople but also in the other provinces, and wanted to 
                                                 
30 Suraiya Faroqhi, The Ottoman Empire and the World Around It (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2004), 
pp. 70-71. 
31 Mustafa Nuri Paşa, Netayic ül-Vukuat: Kurumlarıyla ve Örgütleriyle Osmanlı Tarihi vol.3-4 
(Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1992), p.283. For further information on the âyâns during the 
eighteenth century see, Yücel Özkaya, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda Âyânlık (Ankara: Türk Tarih 
Kurumu, 1994), Yuzo Nagata, Muhsin-zade Mehmed Paşa ve Ayanlık Müessesesi (İstanbul: 
Akademi Kitabevi Yayınları, 1999), Deena R. Sadat “Rumeli Ayanları: The Eighteenth Century,” 
in The Journal of Modern History, vol. 44, no. 3 (1972), Canay Şahin, “The Rise and Fall of an 
Ayân Family in Eighteenth Century Anatolia: The Caniklizâdes (1737-1808),” Ph.D Dissertation, 
Bilkent University (Ankara, 2003), Robert W. Zens, “The Ayanlık and Pasvanoglu Osman Paşa of 
Vidin in the Age of Ottoman Social Change, 1791-1815,” PhD. Dissertation, University of 
Wisconsin-Madison (Madison, 2004). 
32 Aksan, Ottoman Wars, p.130.  
33 Matthew Smith Anderson, The Eastern Question 1774-1923 (London: MacMillan, 1966), pp. 
xiii-xxi. 
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keep them in shape for a possible outbreak of war.34 During this period, there 
were still no major efforts for reform because of the faith in the classical ways of 
statehood and the belief in the golden age of the Empire would flourish once 
again. It was exactly this kind of attitude of the Ottomans which resulted in a state 
that could not be modernized and remained obsolete until 1774. Thus, its chances 
of survival seemed to be very unlikely in the eyes of its European rivals.35 
There is an important factor, which should be kept in mind while trying to 
understand the policies and attitudes of the Ottoman Empire towards Russia 
especially during this period. The Ottoman Court was separated between the 
conservatives and the reformists.36 People such as Ahmed Resmî Efendi37 or the 
new Grand-vizier Halil Hamid Pasha were on the reformist wing. Starting with 
the Ottoman-Russian war of 1768-1774, and especially after the Treaty of Küçük 
Kaynarca, they defended the idea that Ottoman Empire urgently needed military 
and administrative reforms. There was almost no possibility of winning victory 
against Russia. On the other hand, the conservatives were very much offended by 
the humiliation of the Porte against Russia and the diminishing prestige of the 
Ottoman Empire in Europe. They argued that the Ottoman Empire could not 
tolerate the loss of a Muslim inhabited territory, in this case the Crimea. As it will 
be presented, the periods during which the debate ended in favour of the 
reformists, the Porte chose the way of diplomacy and mediation of the European 
powers. However, when the conservatives got to hold the power, they 
                                                 
34 Joseph Von Hammer Purgstall, Histoire de l’Empire Ottoman vol. 16 (1757–1774) (Paris: 
1829), trans. J. Hellert, pp.52-53. 
35 Anderson, The Eastern Question, pp.xiii-xxi. 
36 Alan Fisher, The Crimean Tatars (Stanford: Hoover Institution Publication, 1978), p.58. 
37 Ahmed Resmi Giridi is an important diplomat of this period. He was sent to Austria and Prussia 
by Mustafa III as an envoy, participated in the talks and signing of the Küçük Kaynarca Treaty. He 
is the author of Hülasatü’l-İtibar which is a primary source for the Ottoman-Russian war 1768-
1774. For detailed information on the career of Ahmed Resmi, see Virginia H. Aksan, An Ottoman 
Statesman in War and Peace: Ahmed Resmi Efendi 1700-1783 (Leiden: E.J.Brill, 1995). 
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immediately promoted military action against Russia and followed an aggressive 
policy. 
 
 
2.4 The Russo-Ottoman war of 1768-1774 
 
It was the First Ottoman-Russian War,38 which had started in 1768 and 
lasted for six years that seriously weakened and challenged the regional power of 
the Ottoman Empire at the end of the 18th century. The treaty of Küçük Kaynarca 
which ended this war is frequently remarked as one of the turning points in the 
course of the history of the Ottoman Empire and it is also referred as the initiation 
of the infamous “Eastern Question”.  
When a small Russian force (the Zaporozhian Cossacks) chased the Polish 
confederates into the town of Balta, which belonged to the Crimean Khanate, they 
slaughtered the subjects of the Porte and set the village on fire. Though this was 
the instant cause of the declaration of war on 8 October 1768, there was a much 
broader background of this struggle.  
Catherine II was admitted as the follower of an old tradition regarding her 
foreign policy decisions which was inherited from Peter the Great.39 The general 
aim was to reach the Black Sea through the Crimea and establishing Russian 
influence over the Christian subjects of the Sultan.40 While there were some 
                                                 
38 To distinguish between the two Ottoman-Russian wars during the reign of the Catherine the 
Great, there is a common usage in the English literature to call the 1768-1774 war as the First 
Ottoman-Russian War, and 1787-1792 War as the Second Ottoman-Russian War.  
39 For a detailed analysis of the connection between Peter I and Catherine II see, Karen 
Rasmussen, “Catherine II and the Image of Peter I,” Slavic Review, vol.37, no.1 (Mar., 1978), 
pp.51-69. 
40 Itzkowitz and Mote, pp. 36–37. 
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economic interpretations of Catherine’s motivations, such as securing free 
navigation for Russian ships on the Black Sea, this war was also an effort on 
Catherine’s side to prove herself to her nobles and subjects.41 In addition to these 
long term plans, an immediate concern of Catherine was to ‘secure’ the Polish 
frontier.42  
On the Ottoman’s side, the feckless policies of the high officials are one of 
the causes of outbreak of the war.43 Certain dignitaries, who knew about the 
attitude of Mustafa III toward Russia, supported the idea of declaring war to gain 
the favour of the Sultan.44 The efforts of the French Ambassador at 
Constantinople, Saint-Priest (1763-1784), should also not be overlooked since 
France was trying to divert Russia’s attention by encouraging the Porte to declare 
war against Russia although it was well aware of the weakness of the Ottoman 
Empire45. As well as French diplomatic pressure and the Polish question, the 
internal dynamics of the Ottoman Empire and the Principalities also played a 
major role at the declaration of the war.46  
Although, Frederick the Great remarked that this was a war in which “one-
eyed men who have given blind men a through beating”47, the Russian armies 
inflicted heavy defeats on the Ottomans on a number of occasions.48 There are 
                                                 
41 Kliuchevsky, p.69-70. 
42 Madariaga, Russia in the Age of Catherine the Great, p. 206. 
43 Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire vol.1, p.247. 
44 Mustafa Nuri Paşa, pp. 56-57. 
45 Castera, pp. 422-423. 
46 Aksan, Ottoman Wars 1700-1870, pp.138-139. 
47 Albert Sorel, The Eastern Question in the Eighteenth Century (New York, 1898), quoted in 
Virginia Aksan, “The One-Eyed Fighting the Blind: Mobilization, Supply, and Command in the 
Russo-Turkish War of 1768-1774,” The International History Review, vol. 15, no.2 (May, 1993), 
p.224. 
48 For a detailed account of the course of the war see, A.N. Petrov, Voina Rossii s Turtsiei i 
pol'skimi konfederatami s 1769-1774 god. 5 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1866-1874), Elena Ioasafovna 
Druzhinina, Kiuchuk Kainardzhiiskii Mir 1774 goda: Ego podgotovka i zakliuchenie (Moscow: 
Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1955), Sadullah Enverî, Târih-i Enverî vol.1, transcribed by Muharrem 
Saffet Çalışkan, “Vekâyi’nüvis Enverî Sadullah Efendi ve Tarihinin I. Cildi’nin Metin ve Tahlili 
(1182-1188 / 1768-1774),” PhD. Thesis, Marmara Üniversitesi (İstanbul 2000), Ahmed Vasıf, 
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many reasons as to why the Porte performed so badly against the Russians. First 
of all, the Ottoman Empire did not have the huge army it supposedly had in the 
records,49 mostly because many janissaries, although on the payroll, were not 
actually in the army service.50 The Porte had also pursued a policy of non-
interference in European affairs for almost thirty years, which resulted in a certain 
increase in welfare and prosperity of the Empire. This situation created a sense of 
false confidence on the side of the Ottomans in regards to their own strength. 
Consequently, the Sultan and some members of the Divan over-estimated the 
strength of the army against the Russians.51 On the other hand, Grand Vizier 
Muhsinzade Mehmed Pasha, who tried to point out the unprepared condition of 
the army and the border defenses, was ousted from their position.52 Another 
repeated reason of the Ottoman failure in this campaign was that while Russia had 
brilliant Generals such as Aleksandr V. Suvorov53, Pyotr A. Rumiantsev and 
Grigorii A. Potemkin54, the Ottoman army was directed by the aging and 
                                                                                                                                     
Vasıf Tarihi 2 vols. (İstanbul, 1804). Şem’dânî-zâde Fındıklılı Süleyman Efendi, Mür’i’t-Tevârih 2 
vols. (İstanbul: Edebiyat Fakültesi Matbaası, 1978). For the situation of the Ottoman 
administration during the war see, Metin Bezikoğlu, “The Deterioration of Ottoman 
Administration in the Light of the Ottoman-Russian War of 1768–1774” Master’s Thesis, Bilkent 
University (Ankara, 2001). 
49 According to some sources, the Porte was able to place 600,000 men on the field. Madariaga, 
Russia in the Age of Catherine the Great, p. 207. 
50 McGowan, “Âyanlar Çağı 1699-1812”, p.839. 
51 Mustafa Nuri Paşa, p.57. 
52 Şem’dânî-zâde Fındıklılı Süyleman Efendi, vol. 2, part 1, pp. 112-113. 
53 Suvorov was one of the main actors of the Russian army during the second half of the eighteenth 
century. As a result of his achievements, mainly against the Turks and Poles, he earned the title of 
Generalissimo of the Russian armies. He had also written a valuable military handbook, Nauka 
Pobezhdat (The Art of Victory). There are several biographies of Suvorov, and some of these 
works date to a few years after his death; see Aleksandr Fomich Petrushevskii, Generalissimus 
Knyaz Suvorov (St. Petersburg: Russkaia Simfoniia, 2005) this is a reprint of the original version 
published in 1900, Sergei Tsvetkov, Aleksandr Suvorov 1730-1800 (Moscow: Tsentrpoligraf, 
2005), Oleg Mikhailov, Suvorov (Moscow: Molodaia Gvardiia, 1973), Frederic Anthing, History 
of the Campaigns of Count Alexander Suworow-Rymnikski (London: W. Green and T. Chaplin, 
1813), Leger Marie Philippe Laverne, The Life of Field Marshall Souvarof (Baltimore: 1814), 
trans. from French, W. Lyon Blease, Suvorof (London: Constable and Company, Limited, 1920), 
K. Osipov, Suvorov (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1945), Philip Longworth, 
The Art of Victory (London: Constable, 1965). 
54 After 1776, Potemkin became the most important statesman of Russia until his death in 1791. 
There are numerous accounts of Potemkin; see, Simon Sebag Montefiore, Potemkin: Catherine the 
Great’s Imperial Partner [Previously published as Prince of Princes: The Life of Potemkin] (New 
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incapable Grand Viziers, many of whom had little or no military experience.55 
During the reign of Catherine the Great, open-minded and progressive generals 
helped to improve the army by introducing principles such as the humane 
treatment of the soldiers by Potemkin.56 In addition to the effects of leadership, 
levying was a cheaper method of conscription and a Russian soldier had no 
excessive expenditures. Most of the services a soldier was offered, such as regular 
food, uniform and accommodation had been perceived as a privilege instead of a 
right. Thus, the cost of maintaining the Russian army was considerably less than 
the European armies.57 
During 1769, the Crimean Khan Kırım Geray led an expedition against the 
Russian armies, commanding the Tatars of Bucak and the Crimean army. 15,000 
Russians were captured and Kırım Geray victoriously returned to Kavşan in 
Bessarabia. However, with the unexpected death of Kırım Geray,58 the tide of war 
also reversed.59 In late 1769, Ottoman forces were defeated and forced to retreat, 
while the Russian army captured the fortress of Hotin and invaded Moldavia and 
Wallachia.60 
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The Battle of Kagul and Larga were instances in which the ineffective 
organization of the Ottoman army can be clearly observed. Fought in 1 August 
1770, Battle of Kagul was one of the turning points of the war. Numerically 
superior but poorly mastered Ottoman forces were routed by the much smaller but 
disciplined forces of Field-Marshall Rumiantsev.61 When the army of the Grand 
Vizier Halil Pasha cornered Rumiantsev’s forces, instead of attacking the 
numerically inferior enemy at once, he ordered the army to make defensive 
preparations which gave the Russians sufficient time to regroup and attack with 
heavy artillery support. As a result, Ottoman forces were utterly defeated, leaving 
30,000 casualties on the battlefield.62  
Simultaneously, another major blow came from the sea, when the Russian 
navy under command of the Aleksei Orlov, reached the Aegean and destroyed the 
Ottoman navy at the bay of Çeşme in October 1770. This was the first time a 
Russian navy fought in the Mediterranean.63 While “a protest to the Doge for 
allowing ships from the Baltic to enter the Adriatic at Venice suggests a basic 
ignorance of Europe’s geography”64 of the Ottoman bureaucrats; this episode was 
a clear sign of Russia’s future intentions in this region. It is important to note 
however that this expedition could be realized only with the cooperation of 
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Britain.65 There were fractions in England whether this was a threat to the English 
dominance over the open waters however more significant view was that 
development of Russian navy did not pose a threat to England. It was in the 
benefit of Her Majesty as long as the French interests were disturbed because of 
this expedition.66 Russian navy’s expedition in the Mediterranean did not end with 
the Battle of Çeşme.67 Although Russian attempts to break the Dardanelles 
defenses failed, thanks to the dexterity of Baron de Tott and Gazi Hasan Pasha, 
operations of the Russian navy continued until 1774 without any fruitful results.68    
During this naval episode, a small force also dispatched to Morea to 
encourage the Greeks to rise against their “infidel” masters. Although they 
succeeded in flaming the uprising, sufficient support could not be sent to the 
Greeks and they became the victims of Ottoman reprisal later.  
In 1771, Russian armies had already invaded Yaşi (Jassy) (capital of 
Moldavia), Bucharest (capital of Wallachia) and most importantly the Crimea; but 
it was not an easy year for Russia either. There was an epidemic which killed 
1,000 people daily in Moscow.69 It lasted from August until December 1771, 
killing 55,000 people in Moscow and 120,000 people in total. During an uprising 
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in Moscow in October, the Archbishop was murdered by an angry mob.70 “Peace 
was indeed beginning to seem desirable.”71 
Furthermore, Russia was facing a growing international criticism. In the 
case of Prussia, although it needed Russian support against Austria and financed 
the Russian war effort as a necessity of 1764 alliance, Frederick the Great did not 
want to see the Russians capturing Constantinople and wanted to preserve the 
Ottoman Empire as it had been.72 France was also alarmed because of the 
Ottoman weakness and Russian military victories. Although England remained 
indifferent, since there was no danger for India and it had established good trade 
relations with Russia, the trade in the Levant was very important for the French.73 
On 6 July 1771, fearing of the Russian advance for the expense of the Ottoman 
Empire in the Principalities, Austria concluded a defensive alliance with the 
Ottoman Empire. Frederick of Prussia, perceiving the possibility of a war between 
Austria and Russia, tried to lure both Empresses with the offer of the participation 
of Poland between the three.74 Once the Ottoman-Russian war had started, after a 
short while, Prussia offered the participation, but it was rejected by Catherine the 
Great. This time, Austro-Ottoman rapprochement was a major factor in Russia’s 
acceptance of the project.75 As a result, the first partition of Poland occurred on 2 
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August 1772. Thus, Poland was sacrificed to stabilize Eastern European power 
politics and to prevent a major war between the Great Powers.76 Commenting on 
the partition of Poland, English traveler Cox wrote;  
“it is extremely worthy of remark, that one of the partitioning powers, 
Prussia was formerly in a state of vassalage to the republic; Russia once saw 
its capital and throne possessed by the Poles; and Austria, scarcely a century 
ago, was indebted to a sovereign of this country for the preservation of its 
metropolis, and almost for its very existence.”77  
 
Altough there were rumours of a possible armistice, the Ottoman Empire 
was anxious about the Russian intentions and orders were sent to Grand Vizier to 
remain prepared for the possibility of a fresh start of hostilities.78 In 1772, after 
the armistice of Yergöğü (Giurgiu) on 30 May 1772, with the mediations of 
Prussia and Austria, belligerents met first in Focşani, on the borders of Wallachia 
and Moldavia, in 19 August and later in Bucharest, the capital of Wallachia, 29 
October. Both sides decided to cease hostilities until the spring of 1773.79 
However, because of Russia’s unbearable demands these negotiations did not 
result with a peace treaty.80 Catherine the Great insisted on having an Aegean 
island as a military base in the Mediterranean, and she would continue to try until 
March 1774, to impose the Porte the right to free passage for Russia’s man-of-war 
through the straits.81 The main point of disagreement, however, was over the 
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independence of the Crimean Khanate.82 The Russian argument was that as long 
as the Crimean Khanate was not an independent state separate from the Porte, 
Russia would not feel safe regarding its southern borders, as the Tatar raids would 
continue to disturb the local population of that area.83  
As negotiations failed, military conflict started once again during 1773, 
without any decisive victory for either side. Although Russian officers were 
against the continuation of hostilities, Russian armies were saved from disaster 
thanks to the inability of the Ottoman Grand Viziers. Russians crossed Danube on 
25 March 1773 and separately from the advance of the Russian army in the 
Balkans, Russian navy was continuing its operations and Sakız Island was also 
besieged on 23 June 1774.84  
Both belligerent parties were finally exhausted by the summer of 1774. 
There was a poor harvest in 1774 in Russia. There was also a peasant rebellion in 
the Volga basin of Russia, led by a Don Cossack named Yemelyan Pugachev, an 
imposter of the late Peter III.85 Despite Russia’s apparent strength on the 
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battlefield, a peace was preferred to continuing hostilities.86 The Ottoman Empire 
was also in a difficult situation both in economic and military terms. Ottoman 
forces were in dissolution, most of the soldiers were exhausted from continuous 
fighting, and a considerable number of them deserted the army.87 According 
Sofroni, who lived in a Bulgarian village during these years, some officers were 
entrusted with protecting the village from the army deserters and an Albanian 
Pasha was sent to cover a mountain pass to prevent further deserters.88 Moreover, 
because of the significant military expenditures, Ottoman finances had collapsed.  
Sultan Mustafa III had died in late 1773 and was succeeded by Sultan 
Abdulhamid I.89 The inexperienced Sultan mistakenly attributed the peace offer of 
the Russians as their weakness and ordered the army to break the Russian 
defenses on the Danubian front. When this last assault was broken by the military 
brilliance of Suvorov, the Ottoman Empire had no choice left but to return to the 
negotiation table and agree to the terms demanded by Russia. 
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2.5 The Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, its ratification and implications 
 
The place where the treaty was signed (in today’s Bulgaria, south of the 
Danube River) is a good indicator of how far the Russian forces advanced into 
Ottoman territories when the Ottomans had to ask for peace negotiations. Ahmed 
Resmi Efendi and Reisülküttab90 İbrahim Münib Efendi were representing the 
Porte, while Prince Rumiantsev was Catherine’s delegate. The treaty of Küçük 
Kaynarca, with its 28 clauses, was signed on 21 July 1774.91 The news of the 
peace treaty reached Istanbul on 30 July 1774.92 
This treaty was a turning point in Ottoman-Russian relations. It shook the 
Ottoman power in the region. It was also accepted as the beginning of the so-
called “Eastern Question”. On the signing of the Küçük Kaynarca treaty Catherine 
expressed that “I consider this day one of the most fortunate in my life, when the 
Empire has obtained the peace it so badly needed.” A grandiose Roman-style 
triumphal arch greeted Field Marshall Rumiantsev outside Moscow.93 
It would not be mistaken to say that the most important article of the treaty 
was regarding the independence of the Crimea. Ottoman suzerainty over the 
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Crimean Khanate was terminated and the security of the Black sea, the Caucasus, 
and the Balkans were seriously threatened. The Ottomans were concerned about 
the attempts of Catherine the Great to manipulate the Nogay tribes and the mirzas 
in the Khanate for the benefit of Russian interests and to further Russian influence 
in the Black Sea.94 Another major setback for the Ottomans was to let the 
Russians have the right to free access to the straits and free trade in both Black 
Sea and the Mediterranean. In addition to these; Russia gained (a) the right to 
intervene in the Ottoman policies on behalf of the Principalities, (b) the right to 
open consulates in anywhere of the Ottoman Empire, (c) a foothold on the Black 
Sea, between the rivers Dnyepr and Bug, and (d) Kerch and Yenikale, allegedly, 
to protect the independence of the Crimean Khanate. 
The details of the treaty, especially those regarding the rights of Russia over 
the Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire, caused many debates. This 
interpretation can be observed in the later accounts of the Küçük Kaynarca treaty, 
and one of the main comments on the issue was that this treaty was a result of the 
Ottoman folly.95 The Russians also wanted to abuse the articles of the treaty with 
a political tactic, which aimed to increase their influence over the Christian 
subjects of the Sultan. However, as Roderic H. Davison clarified, this 
misunderstanding was a result of false translation and the Russian Empire did not 
gain extensive rights over the Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire in 
general, but only the protection of a single church, which was to be built in 
Galata, Constantinople. In addition to this, although the Khanate would become 
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politically independent, the Ottoman Empire would have the spiritual allegiance 
of the Crimean Khanate and its Muslim population.96 
Before the negotiations, Ottoman delegates were given permission by the 
Sultan to offer at most 40,000 keses97 to meet the Russian demands for war 
reparations. However, they were expected to make an arrangement of around 
20.000 keses.98 According to the treaty, the amount of war reparations was set on 
4.500.000 rubles (7.500.000 kuruş or 15.000 keses).99 This amount covered 
almost all the expenses of the Mediterranean expedition of Russia.100 From the 
Ottoman point of view, it was almost equal to the half of the annual income of the 
Empire, which was recorded as 14.539.938.5 kuruş in 1762 and 14.742.715101 
kuruş in 1785. This huge amount of payment was planned to be paid to Russia in 
three equal installments, of which the first was due on 1 January 1775.102 The 
Russians were aided once more by the English and an English banker George 
Abbot helped Russia to prevent losing almost twenty percent of this amount in 
transactions until they reached the banks in Amsterdam.103 
In spite of these favourable terms to Russia, Kliuchevsky harshly criticizes 
the war and its consequences. While both the Greek and Romanian independence 
from the Porte were about to be accomplished with the help of Russia, both were 
abandoned, since the former could not be supported any further and the latter 
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would antagonize Austria. “The end result was a third, the liberation of Moslems 
from Moslems, of Tatars from Turks, which had not been contemplated when the 
war began and which absolutely no one needed, even those who were being 
liberated.”104 Kliuchevsky further commented that the Crimea, which was once 
occupied by the armies of Empress Anna, “was not worth [sic] even a single war 
but had been fought over twice.”105 This criticism however is highly motivated 
with sentiments of religious idealism, which became relatively irrelevant in 
Russia’s foreign policy. Furthermore it would be a gross oversight to ignore the 
significance of the independence of the Crimea which prepared the ground for the 
Russian annexation of the Khanate. Direct access to the Black Sea and to prevent 
the Tatar raids in the southern Russia was one of the main goals of the Russian 
Tsars and the independence of the Crimean Khanate was a major step forward for 
the realization of this policy.   
 
  
2.5.1 Ratification of the Treaty (1774-1775) 
 
Since the peace treaty was signed on the battlefield and under heavy 
military threats, the Ottomans did not want to ratify it and would have liked to 
moderate the clauses which were unfavorable to the Porte.106 When the 
Şeyhülislam commented on the inevitability of the treaty he was deposed. During 
July 1774, an Ottoman force under the command of Canikli Ali Pasha, the 
Governor of Trabzon, was still in active duty in the Crimea. Considering this 
threat, Rumiantsev refused to pull back his forces from Wallachia.  
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Although the Crimeans agreed on a separate peace with Russia in 1772, one 
year later they asked for Ottoman support to relieve them off the Russian forces. 
In 1773, The Porte commissioned Canikli Ali Pasha, with 20,000 men at his 
command to sail from Sinop to Crimea.107 Devlet Geray IV with some mirzas 
under his command had arrived in Taman where he gathered Nogay and 
Circassian tribes and landed in Aluşta in the Crimea. Together they fought against 
the Russian forces that were already stationed in the Crimea. Although the joint 
Ottoman-Crimean forces had achieved some successes in the Crimea against the 
Russians, news of the peace treaty had arrived. Thus, Ali Pasha and the Khan had 
to retire to Kefe. Consequently, this expedition did not bring a fruitful result 
because of the lack of cooperation between the Sultan and the Khan.108 
The treaty arrived in St. Petersburg in August 1774 and Catherine 
immediately ratified it. In Constantinople, the French Ambassador St. Priest was 
trying to convince the Porte to delay the ratification. There was a major 
disappointment in Paris about the situation. The French expected that Russia 
would be forced into a very moderate treaty since it needed peace to suppress the 
Pugachev rebellion, which reached its climax during the summer of 1774.109 After 
the treaty was signed in July, the Ottomans attempted to convince Frederick the 
Great through his Ambassador Zegelin, to express their wish to Catherine the 
                                                 
107 Şem’dânî-zâde Fındıklılı Süyleman Efendi, vol. 2, part 2, p.102. 
108 Halim Giray Sultan, p.274, Nicolae Jorga, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Tarihi vol.5 (1774–1912) 
(İstanbul: Yeditepe Yayınevi, 2005) trans. Nilüfer Epçeli, p. 24–25. 
109 Anderson, The Eastern Question, pp. 1-2. Although Pugachev could not capture major cities, he 
was terrorizing the urban areas with the guns and provisions he managed to gather from minor 
strongholds. Kazan was burnt to the ground by the rebels though it could not be captured. In 
Pushkin’s words, Pugachev was fleeing but at the same time it was an invasion. Catherine was 
aware of the fact that this was a war between “haves” and “have-nots”, namely nobles and 
peasants. Her regulation which favored the nobility and granted them absolute authority over their 
serfs was also a reason of this rebellion. After the death of General Bibikov, Bashkirs also joined 
the rebellion and during this period almost one third of the rebels were Bashkirs under the 
command of Salavat Yulay. In August, Suvorov was also commissioned to this task under 
command of Pyotr I. Panin who was coordinating the Russian forces. Relieved of the war against 
the Porte, Russian armies could finally concentrate on this matter and in November 1774 
Pugachev was captured and executed by quartering. Avrich, pp. 216–245. 
 31
Great with regard to amending some clauses of the treaty. The Ottomans wanted 
to have religious suzerainty over the lost territories besides the Crimea, to reduce 
the amount of war reparations, the return of Kerch and Yenikale in exchange for 
Kılburun (Kinburn). However, these demands were rejected by Russia and 
Frederick was kindly requested to convince the Porte to comply with the terms of 
the treaty.110 England was still indifferent to the Russo-Ottoman relations. Since 
there was no threat perceived to its navy and maritime dominance, it was not 
significant how major a land power Russia had become.  As a result, London did 
not “care whether some thousand acres of Tartary, more or less, belong to the 
Grand Signior, or the Czarina.”111 Consequently, deprived of any further hopes of 
modifying its terms, the Ottoman Empire had to ratify the treaty of Küçük 
Kaynarca in January 1775. After the treaty was ratified, prisoners of war, who 
were kept in Constantinople, were also sent to their countries. The total number of 
the Russian captives that were released on 13 March 1775 was 513.112 
According to the 27th clause of the treaty, both empires sent emissaries to 
deliver the ratified copies of the treaty. Again, as a condition of this clause, both 
sides had to present gifts of which amounted 102,400 kuruş in the case of 
Ottoman’s gift to Catherine the Great.113 On behalf of the Ottomans, Abdülkerim 
Pasha114, a career bureaucrat, was commissioned with this task on 3 October 
1774,115 while Catherine the Great sent Prince Repnin to represent her interests in 
Constantinople as her Ambassador extraordinary on 18 November 1774.116 Since 
the treaty has not been ratified by the Sultan until January 1775, Abdülkerim 
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Pasha could have left Constantinople for Russia on 2 February 1775. On 13 July 
1775, there was an exchange ceremony on the Dnyestr River, near Hotin.117 
Abdülkerim Pasha could finally reach Russia on 18 October 1775 while Prince 
Repnin also arrived in Constantinople on 18 November 1775 and presented 
Catherine’s letter to the Grand Vizier.118 During their return journey, on 30 June 
1776, Abdülkerim Pasha and Prince Repnin affected a ceremonial exchange on 
the Dnyestr River.119 Abdülkerim Pasha returned to Constantinople on 17 August 
1776 after almost one and a half year.120 Both of them left behind a detailed 
description of their journeys and missions to Moscow and Constantinople.121 
 
 
2.5.2 Austrian annexation of Bukovina (1775-1776) 
 
Another major aspect of this war and the treaty is, as Jorga states, that it was 
not only the loss of Crimea and its surroundings but fighting against the Ottoman 
Empire and annexing its territories no longer needed proper justification, just as it 
was in the case of Poland. Later, von Kaunitz, the Austrian Foreign Minister, 
stated that although it was important for Austria that the Ottoman Empire 
survived, it did not seem very likely at the end of the 18th century.122 
According to Faroqhi, Austria offered to have the Ottoman Empire as a 
member of the European Society in 1774. As a custom of the 18th century 
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international relations, this would require compensation for the territory of the 
Ottoman Empire which was occupied by Russia. However, Russia declined this 
offer with the reservation that the Balkan Christians could not be left to the mercy 
of the Sultan.123 Although Austria signed a defensive alliance with the Ottoman 
Empire in June 1771, it had deserted the Ottomans during the partition of Poland. 
Later, in spite of this initiation in 1774, Austria once again turned against the 
Porte and annexed Bukovina in September 1774 claiming that it was for 
improving connection between Transylvania and the recently annexed Galicia. 
When the Ottomans protested this fait accompli, Austria responded by threatening 
the Porte with 60,000 Habsburg troops stationed in Hungary.124 Since the 
Ottomans had to conclude the peace with Russia in July, they could not resist the 
Austrian annexation of Bukovina, which was planned and prepared two years 
before the Küçük Kaynarca Treaty was signed. Russia and Prussia chose to 
remain silent about the annexation, while Austria sent an official note to the Porte 
in December 1774, declaring that the Austro-Ottoman border had reached its 
neutral status. A treaty was signed on 7 May 1775 in Palnmuk by Tahir Aga, who 
was accused of accepting bribes from the Austrians.125 Reisülküttab İsmail Efendi, 
confessed that this concession had to be made to please Austria to have a better 
chance against Russian demands.126 Finally, this treaty and the loss of territory 
was ratified by the Sultan on 17 May 1776. 
 
 
                                                 
123 Faroqhi, pp.68-69. 
124 Itkowitz and Mote, p.42. 
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126 Anderson, The Eastern Question, pp. 4-5. 
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2.5.3 Long-term implications of the treaty 
 
To compensate the huge economic burden on the Empire, which was a 
result of the long-lasting war against Russia and the peace treaty afterwards, The 
Ottoman Empire had to make regulations regarding its fiscal policy. This policy 
mainly aimed to satisfy the need for cash deposits. Thus, Esham (meaning shares) 
policy was introduced. In this system, a mukataa was sold to someone for a price 
five times more than its actual value.  As a result, while the state had a great 
amount of cash income, the person who bought this Esham had a five year 
guaranteed annual income.127 The territorial losses were also of serious nature for 
the Ottoman economy which depended mainly on the tax incomes. During the 
mid-1770s, the Ottoman treasury was in such a miserable condition, since there 
was no support from the local wealthy aristocrats; the Porte had to look for 
foreign lending. Although this was a common practice in Europe in this period, 
this was the first time for the Ottoman Empire. In 1775, a loan was offered from 
Morocco.128 
In accordance with the terms of the treaty, Russia desired to have consulates 
in cities such as Sinop and Symrna, which was interpreted by the Sultan as an 
effort to interfere with the affairs of Anatolia. In another case, the Russians had to 
agree the Ottoman demands regarding their wish to open a consulate in Mikenos, 
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which was a Greek populated island. The Ottomans had referred to another island 
for the Russian ships to anchor.129  
The right of free-trade in the Black Sea and the Mediterranean had both 
commercial and political motivations. Although in 18th century, men-of-war were 
constructed in a different way from the commercial ships, the latter could be 
reverted into the former with some modifications. Russian delegates refused these 
kinds of plans for the future. Russian trade ships, however, always posed a 
military threat for the Ottoman Empire.130 During 1775, some Russian merchant 
ships were not allowed free passage through the straits because the Ottomans 
regarded these as man-of-war. Russian Ambassador at Constantinople threatened 
the Porte with declaration of war; however this was prevented by the “reformist” 
wing of the Ottoman statesmen.131 In fact, Russia was also exhausted after 
fighting for years against Poland, Ottoman Empire, and lastly Pugachev. So it was 
also not in a position strong enough to renew hostilities. 
 
The deficiencies of the Ottoman Empire, especially against Russia, 
became obvious with the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca. Russia consolidated its 
power from the beginning of the 18th century vis-à-vis the Porte. The course of the 
Ottoman-Russian war of 1768-1774 together with the treaty signed afterwards 
was a clear indication of this progress. After 1774, the Ottoman-Russian relations 
entered into a new phase during which the Porte remained defensive and struggled 
to preserve the status quo while Russia followed an aggressive policy to expand 
its territories and influence further at the expense of the former. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
THE OTTOMAN-RUSSIAN RIVALRY OVER THE 
CRIMEAN KHANATE:  
INDEPENDENCE AND ANNEXATION INTO RUSSIA 
 
 
 
3.1. The Crimean Khanate in the Eastern European Politics 
 
The Crimean Khanate was the last successor of the Golden Horde.1 
Although Russia conquered the Khanates of Kazan and Astrakhan in mid-16th 
century, the Crimean Khanate remained to be one of the major rivals of the 
Russian Empire until the 18th century. This is evident from the fact that until 
1700, when the Istanbul Treaty was signed between Russia and the Porte, the 
                                                 
1 For the early history of the Crimea and the Crimean Khanate see, Abdülgaffar Kırımî, Umdetü’l-
Ahbar (1747), recently transcribed by Derya Erin, “Abdülgaffar Kırımî’nin Umdetü’l-Ahbar’ına 
(Umdet’üt-Tevarih) Göre Kırım Tarihi,” Master’s Thesis, Ankara Üniversitesi (Ankara, 2003), 
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veka (St. Petersburg, 1887), Vasiliy D. Smirnov, Krymskoe Khanstvo pod verkhovenstvom 
Otomanskoi Porty v XVIII stoletii (Odessa, 1889), Halim Geray Sultan, Gülbün-i Hânân Yahud 
Qırım Tarihi (Aqmescit: Dolya, 2004), Anthony Grant, An Historical Sketch of the Crimea 
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Russian Empire continued to pay annual tribute to the Crimean Khanate.2 
Nevertheless as an inescapable consequence of the distance between St. 
Petersburg and Bahçesaray, the region where continuous conflicts had occurred 
remained isolated from the center of the Russian Empire.3 In the 18th century, the 
pivotal role of the Crimean Khanate gradually diminished as a consequence of 
both evolving international politics of the Eastern Europe and the internal reasons 
such as the weakening of the economy.4 
 The first attempt of the Russians to invade the Crimea was put into action 
by Prince Vasily Golitsyn in the late 17th century. He marched on the Crimea 
twice in 1687 and 1689, but failed in both campaigns.5 The Russian campaign of 
1736 proved to be successful in penetrating the defenses of the Peninsula. 
Although this was a destructive episode, the Khanate was soon able to recover its 
former strength.  
Although the nature of the Ottoman-Crimean relations is a problematic 
one, it is clear that the Crimean Khanate had never become a part of the Ottoman 
Empire. Rather, the Sultan only had the authority to confirm (tasdik) the Khan 
                                                 
2 For the detailed account of the evolution of the relations between Russia, the Porte and the 
Crimean Khanate until 1700 see, Halil İnalcık, “Power Relationships Between Russia, The Crimea 
and the Ottoman Empire as Reflected in Titulature,” Turco-Tatar Past Soviet Present: Studies 
presented to Alexandre Bennigsen, eds. Lemercier-Quelquejay, G. Veinstein, S. E. Wimbush 
(Paris: Peeters, 1986), pp. 175-211.  
3 For a brief evaluation of the Crimean Khanate and its role as a regional power see, D. 
Kolodzeichik, “Krymskoe Khanstvo Kak Faktor Stabilizatsii na Geopoliticheskoi Karte 
Vostochnoi Evropy,” Ukrania i sosednie gosudarstva v XVII veke Materialy Mezhdunarodnoi 
Konferentsii (St. Petersburg, 2004), pp. 83-89. Later, the Ottoman Sultan also had the authority to 
dismiss the Khans of the Crimea. This was later manipulated by the Russians to convince the 
Crimean Tatars to be seperated from the Porte. Alan W. Fisher, “Şahin Girey, the Reformer Khan, 
and the Russian Annexation of the Crimea,” Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas (Wiesbaden: 
Osteuropa-Institut München, 1967), p. 343. 
4 Edward Lazzerini, “The Crimea Under Russian Rule 1783 to the Great Reforms,” in Michael 
Rywkin (ed.), Russian Colonial Expansion to 1917 (London: Mansell Publishing Limited, 1988), 
pp.123-124. 
5 Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi (Ottoman Archives of Prime Ministry of 
Turkey, hereafter cited as; BOA), Name-i Hümâyûn Defteri, no.5, pp.19-22, 25-28, 83-84. 
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who was chosen by a committee of nobles.6 There were four major noble families 
who can be regarded as the actual rulers of the khanate,7 and they used to elect a 
member of the Geray8 family to rule as the khan. Their struggles among each 
other to install a khan favorable for themselves continued until the annexation of 
the Khanate into Russia. This struggle is one of the central issues that should be 
taken into account to understand the annexation of the Crimea into Russia. 
Another aspect of the power politics in the Khanate was the Nogay tribes, the 
nomadic subjects of the Khan, living in the northern step areas and the Kuban 
region of the Khanate. Allegiance of these tribes to the Khan had a fragile nature 
and they frequently caused unrest by playing between the Porte and the Khanate. 
They were to be one of the key assets for the Russians to dissolve the Crimean 
Khanate during the last quarter of the 18th century.  
 
 
3.2. The Crimea during the Ottoman-Russian War of 1768-1774 and the 
Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca 
 
Although there was not any apparent Russian preparation or activity to 
attack the Crimea until the autumn of 1769,9 later in December of the same year, a 
dispatch from the Crimean Khan to Constantinople reveals the concern for a 
possible Russian offensive during the spring of 1770. There was already an 
                                                 
6 For detailed information see Halil İnalcık, “Yeni Vesikalara Göre Kırım Hanlığının Osmanlı 
Tabiliğine Girmesi ve Ahidname Meselesi”, Belleten, vol. 8, no. 31 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 
1944), 185-229. 
7 These four families were namely Şirin, Argın, Bargın, and Kıpçak. Especially Şirin family was 
the most prominent one among them. Nicole Kançal-Ferrari, Kırım’dan Kalan Miras: Hansaray 
(İstanbul: Klasik Yayınları, 2005), p. 18.  
8 For a brief description of the Geray family see, Alan Fisher, The Crimean Tatars (Stanford: 
Hoover Institution Publication, 1978), pp. 17-20. 
9 BOA, HAT, Dosya No: 8, Gömlek No: 288. 
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Ottoman garrison stationed in the Crimea during 1769;10 however The Khan was 
pointing out the Russian reinforcements in the border asking for more 
reinforcements.11 The plans of a Russian invasion of the Crimea had come to 
surface in the third year of the war, since the invasion of the peninsula would give 
Russia a strong hand at the negotiation table. In 1770, Selim Geray Khan III, 
together with all the sultans12 residing in Rumeli, joined the main the Ottoman 
army in Babadağ. Thus, while Selim Geray Khan III and his army was pre-
occupied assisting the Ottoman army in Wallachia, the Crimea was left 
defenseless and a Russian army under the command of Prince Vasiliy Dolgorukii 
commenced their attack during the spring of 1771. Initially, Serasker İbrahim 
Pasha was able to defend the isthmus of Orkapı. However during the autumn of 
the same year, after a heavy defeat, during which Serasker was captured, Russian 
armies managed to invade the peninsula. Vezir Abaza Mehmed Pasha fled to 
Sinop with the remaining of his soldiers and The Khan had to leave the Crimea 
for Constantinople to reside in his estate.13 In 1772, Sahip Geray became the new 
Khan and his brother, Şahin Geray, who became kalgay14 of his brother, was sent 
to St. Petersburg on a diplomatic mission to negotiate with the Russians. 
Consequently, in an occupied Crimea, the Russians dictated a separate agreement 
                                                 
10 The Khan sent a complaint to the Grand Vizier in May 1769, about the janissary corps which 
was sent to Crimea earlier since they harassed the local population and caused trouble in the 
Crimea. BOA, HAT, Dosya No: 8, Gömlek No: 273. 
11 BOA, HAT, Dosya No: 8, Gömlek No: 272. Once again in 13 January 1770, defterdar 
Abdürrahim Ağa was sent to the Porte to ask for further reinforcements to be stationed in Kefe, 
Kırım, Özü, and Bender. BOA, Cevdet-Hariciye, Sıra No: 432. During 1771, 30,000 soldiers were 
gathered in the port cities of Sinop, Samsun and Trabzon. Osman Köse, “18. Yüzyılın İkinci Yarısı 
Osmanlı-Rus Savaşlarında Liman Kenti Samsun,” Geçmişten Geleceğe Samsun vol.1 (2006), 
p.275. 
12 The Crimean dynastical princes. 
13 BOA, HAT, Dosya No: 8, Gömlek No: 262 and 262-A, Halim Geray Sultan, p.270. For a 
detailed account of the Crimean front of the Russo-Ottoman War of 1768-1774 see, Necati Efendi, 
Tarih-i Kırım (1776), transcribed by Erhan Afyoncu see, Erhan Afyoncu, “Necati Efendi: Târih-i 
Kırım (Rusya Sefâretnâmesi),” Master’s Thesis, Marmara University (İstanbul, 1990). 
14 In the Crimean state structure, kalgay was the person who comes next after the Khan. Usually 
Kalgay is a brother of the ruling Khan. Nureddin was only second to the Kalgay. 
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to the Crimean Khanate regarding its independence from the Ottoman Empire, 
and signed the Karasubazar Treaty on 1 November 1772. In the second half of 
1772, while the Crimea was already under the Russian military control, the 
Ottoman Empire and Russia tried to negotiate and come to an agreement to end 
hostilities. However, the Ottomans did not comply with the Russian demands 
regarding the Crimean independence and hostilities continued until the summer of 
1774.15 
As it was mentioned in the previous chapter, one of the most important 
clauses of the Küçük Kaynarca treaty was the independence of the Crimea. The 
Ottoman Sultan maintained a religious suzerainty over the Muslims of the 
Khanate; however a politically independent Crimea, deprived of “sultanic 
protection”16, would inevitably result with a Crimea under Russian political 
influence. Considering this outcome, the Ottomans were reluctant to obey the 
terms of the treaty, especially regarding the independence of the Khanate.  
 
 
3.3. The Crimea during the first years of its independence (1774-1777) 
 
The end of the Ottoman-Russian war did not bring peace to the Crimean 
Khanate. “[The] years between 1775 and 1779 can be perceived as an extended 
negotiating period between Russia and the Ottoman Empire to resolve the 
                                                 
15 Matthew Smith Anderson, Europe in the Eighteeth Century 1713-1789 (New York: Longman, 
1987), p. 276, Akdes Nimet Kurat, Türkiye ve Rusya (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı, 1990), p.27.  
16 Donald Quataert, The Ottoman Empire 1700-1922 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
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ultimately irresolvable.”17 For almost nine years, a continuous period of turmoil 
had begun for the local population of the Crimea, since “neither Russia nor the 
Porte believed in or intended to respect the complete independence of the Khanate 
of Crimea, and the ink was no sooner dry on the treaty than a struggle for 
influence began.”18  
In the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca it was agreed that the Khan should be 
elected independently by the Crimean nobility, and Sahib Geray became the first 
Khan of the new state.19 However, the public opinion in the Crimea was against 
the separation from the Porte and they asked from the Sultan to reverse the 
situation. Although the Porte was also not content with the independence of the 
Crimea and regarded it as illegitimate,20 however the Ottomans did not dare to 
risk a new war with Russia by violating the newly signed treaty.21 To justify their 
reluctance to comply with the terms of the Küçük Kaynarca, the Ottoman 
bureaucrats made the example of Peter the Great and his attitude after Prut. They 
made it clear that since the Crimean Tatars were not easy with their own 
independence they also would not respect the terms of the treaty and look for 
French assistance in this matter.22  
After a year from being elected legally as the Khan, Sahib Geray had to 
escape from the Crimea as a result of an uprising, which was led by Devlet Geray 
IV, who was pursuing policies contrary to the Küçük Kaynarca Treaty.23 
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Although Catherine II recognized Devlet Geray as the legitimate Khan, she was 
waiting for the opportunity to act, which occurred a year later in November 1776. 
The Ottoman Empire was at war with Persia, while Russia had suppressed the 
Pugachev revolt and found the opportunity to focus its attention on the Crimean 
affairs.  
After becoming the state secretary in 1775, Aleksandr Bezborodko drafted 
a report on the history of the Russo-Tatar relations and recommended an offensive 
policy towards the Crimea. He stated that “it is abundantly clear, how necessary it 
is to adopt the right measures against these our eternal enemies, so as to lead 
ourself into security from them once and for all, and thereby to obtain for our 
fatherland a reliable peace forever.”24  
On 21 November 1776, army of General Aleksandr Prozorovskii, 14,500 
men strong, had captured Orkapı without facing any serious resistance.25 
Although the pretext of this intervention was to protect the position of Devlet 
Geray, Catherine II decided to interfere with the elections of the Khan, wishing to 
place her own candidate, Şahin Geray, on the Crimean throne.26 The Ottomans 
threatened Russia with sending forces to Taman, which was evacuated after 
Küçük Kaynarca, unless Russian forces did not evacuate the Crimea. As a 
response, Catherine asked from the Sultan to recognize the full independence of 
the Khanate.27 At the end of 1776, the British Ambassador at the Porte, Sir Robert 
Ainslie, advised Reisülküttab Atıfzade Ömer and Gazi Hasan Pasha that they 
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should avoid disputes with Russia or else their situation would get only worse and 
Russia would make further demands.28 
 
  
3.4. The first period of Şahin Geray’s rule (1777-1778) 
 
Previously, while the war was going on with the Porte, in 1773, Catherine 
wanted to install Şahin Geray as the Khan of the Crimea. However, when she 
came to realize the unstable condition in the Khanate, she sent Şahin Geray to 
Poltava to keep him safe.29 After the Küçük Kaynarca, Catherine II financed 
Şahin Geray with an amount of 150,000 ruble, to gain the support of the 
Nogays.30 Şahin Geray’s subsequent attempt to seize the throne also failed when 
he was defeated in 1775 by the forces of Devlet Geray.  
Learning from these experiences, Catherine II did not want to take the last 
step until enough support had been achieved for Şahin Geray to be elected 
legitimately as the Khan. During late 1776, once again the Nogays were 
convinced and agreed to give their support. However, Devlet Geray was still in 
the Crimea expecting Ottoman support against Russia. In 1777, “three years after 
the peace treaty, matters had come to such a pass that a fresh outbreak of 
hostilities was both feared and expected.”31 Suvorov was able to disperse Devlet 
Geray’s forces near Karasubazar without any heavy fighting and afterwards in 
February 1777, he was sent to meet with Şahin Geray to bring him to 
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Bahçesaray.32 In April 1777, Devlet Geray had to leave the Crimea for 
Constantinople, and the first reign of Şahin Geray had begun.33 Şahin Geray sent 
his envoys, four Crimean Tatars and a Russian with them, to ask for the 
recognition of the Porte of his legitimacy but to no avail.34 Upon hearing the news 
of Şahin’s accession, Abdulhamid I commented that Şahin Geray was only a tool 
at the hands of the Russians whose ultimate aim was to annex the Crimea.35 As it 
is apparent from the Sultan’s words, while the Porte was already aware of the 
Russian intentions, it was powerless to prevent the coming of the inevitable. 
At this point, understanding the personality of Şahin Geray is crucial to 
further comprehend the remaining years of the independent Crimean Khanate.36 
Şahin Geray was a young, mild-natured person who received his education in 
Venice. He was a reform-minded man who actually wanted to realize in the 
Crimea what Peter the Great had achieved for Russia. Şahin Geray met Catherine 
the Great for the first time during his mission to St. Petersburg in 1772. He 
instantly gained the favor and trust of the Tsarina with his manners and ideas. In 
her correspondence to Voltaire, she was praising Şahin Geray. Catherine II saw 
the potential of the young kalgay, and began to depend on him to rule the newly-
independent khanate. However, things did not go as planned for Catherine and 
Şahin Geray. 
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Since Şahin believed that the only way to regain the important position of 
the Khanate was possible by modernization, after he became the Khan in 1777, he 
wanted to put his reform program into affect immediately. These reforms included 
building of a new army,37 centralizing state authority by abolishing feudal system, 
and introducing certain tax regulations. In a way, Şahin Geray tried to adopt the 
ways of St. Petersburg to his Palace. Thus, he tried to initiate some new methods 
regarding casual habits, ideals, attitude and actions, and even regarding the 
administrative issues. These included eating meals on table, dressing like a 
Russian officer and trying to form a new guards division imitating the Russian 
army. Besides, he shifted the ownership of vakıf from the ulema and left it at the 
hands of new administrative assembly. These reforms and regulations were 
destructive instead of constructive, and also they were mere imitations of the 
Russian model rather than authentic and suitable for the dynamics of the 
Khanate.38 
Şahin Geray’s westernized and reformist ideas were not welcomed in the 
Muslim and Tatar tradition of the Crimean people and elite. What Şahin Geray 
could not calculate was the reaction of the nobles, the ulema and the ordinary 
people who were guided by them. While the nobility and ulema opposed these 
reforms to preserve their influence and power, common people were not ready for 
such radical changes in their way of living. In addition to these, Khan’s attitudes 
                                                 
37 Although Şahin Geray wanted to establish a regular army of 20,000 men strong, Prozorovskii 
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which are not conformable with the Islamic way of life caused great disturbance.39 
Consequently, disturbances started to arise within the Khanate. 
The first revolts began in late 1777, as a result of the settlement of 
Christian Greeks into Russian controlled areas of the Crimea. Some of these were 
the Greeks who were afraid of Ottoman reprisals since they rebelled against the 
Porte during the Mediterranean expedition of Aleksei Orlov.40 Although there was 
fear among the locals that these new colonists were to be used for political 
purposes, Potemkin and Catherine had in their mind domestic and economic 
reasons in the first place. Their goal was to flourish trade and profit from this flow 
of income. However Russia would not hesitate to use these colonists for political 
purposes as soon as the opportunity arrived.41 
The local population of these areas sent petitions to the Russian 
commander, stating that these settlers attacked them.42 The disturbances spread 
and a popular uprising started against Şahin Geray. In the initial phase, 
Rumiantsev did not want to use Russian forces, and leave the matter to be solved 
by Şahin and his newly built army.43 However Şahin Geray’s army also joined the 
rebels.44 Powerless to suppress the revolt, Şahin Geray abandoned his palace and 
asked the Russians for help to secure him in Yenikale. The Russian army, under 
the command of Prozorovskii once more invaded the peninsula, and subdued the 
rebellious population. In December 1777, Selim Geray was sent to the Crimea but 
he had to flee after he was refused to be recognized as the legitimate khan by the 
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Russians because of the apparent Ottoman support.45 At the same time, Şahin 
Geray traveled the shores of the peninsula and with the help of Russian navy and 
his personal bodyguards, coercively collected declarations from the people of the 
Crimea stating that they desired him as their Khan.46 The Russians manipulated 
popular support in this way to legitimize their invasion. They argued that this was 
a necessary move to protect the legitimate Khan who was popularly supported. As 
a result, Şahin Geray was once more re-instated as the Khan in February 1778.47  
 
 
3.5. The Canikli Ali Pasha and Gazi Hasan Pasha Mission (1778) 
 
After this period, beginning from 1778, for all practical purposes the 
Crimea lost its independence. Russian armies were staying ready to intervene in 
the case of any possible uprising and Şahin Geray was almost reduced to a puppet 
of Russia and Catherine the Great.  
In late 1777, the Ottoman Empire attempted to support the rebellious 
Crimean Tatars against Russia and Şahin Geray.48 However, the Sultan’s Black 
Sea fleet proved to be incapable of any kind of logistic or military help. It took so 
long for the admirals to prepare, that they could not even land on the Peninsula, 
and arrived there only to return to the port of Sinop because of the weather 
conditions.49 The Ottomans also hesitated to intervene directly on the affairs of 
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the Crimea, since they could not face a fresh start of hostilities against Russia.50 
Thus, the Russians repulsed the Ottoman fleet while the revolt was already 
suppressed and Şahin Geray was re-instated in February.51 After the first failed 
attempt of the Porte, Catherine sent a letter to Potemkin on the plan of actions in 
the Crimea against the Porte.52 Suvorov was entrusted with the command of the 
Crimean army briefly for this period. Abdürrezzak Pasha, tried to achieve the 
mediation of Prussia against Russia and informed Gaffron, Prussian Ambassador 
at Constantinople, of the anxiety of the Porte about the Russian backing of Şahin 
Geray. However his efforts resulted in vain.53 
The conservatives were not satisfied with the results and demanded another 
campaign in August, which proved to be as unsuccessful as the previous one.54 
Canikli Ali Pasha55 and Gazi Hasan Pasha were ordered to make a major 
offensive to the Crimea in the summer of 1778. The Ottoman navy, 15,00056 men 
strong, reached Kefe during August, after having anchored in Soğucak for a few 
days.57 Suvorov was able to disperse this expedition, just like the first one during 
the early 1778. He erected redoubts around possible landing locations and 
installed batteries which endangered the position of the Ottoman navy.58 Although 
the Ottomans regarded these activities contrary to the independence of the 
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Crimea, Russians did not respond to Ottoman accusations. 59 Suvorov legitimized 
these precautions with the excuse of protecting the integrity of the Crimea. During 
September, although the Ottoman navy appeared before the shores of Kefe with 
over 100 ships, Suvorov appointed patrols to guard the shores and did not let the 
Ottomans to go ashore even for fresh water.60 Suvorov presented the quarantine 
regulations as an excuse, but still the plague that was seen in Constantinople 
during the same year spread to the Crimea.61  
After these failed attempts of the Porte to remove Şahin Geray from 
power, he sent an envoy to Constantinople and requested that the Sultan recognize 
him as the legitimate Khan. Instead of recognizing Şahin, the Ottomans arrested 
his envoys. Şahin protested this attitude of the Porte, claiming that it was not 
appropriate to behave the emissary of an independent state in such a way.62 
Actually, this was not a strategic move on behalf of either side. As a result of his 
attitude, Şahin Geray lost potential Ottoman support, while the Ottomans isolated 
themselves from the Crimea and left it to the hands of Russia.  
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3.6. The exodus of the Christians (1778) 
 
After Şahin Geray was re-installed as the Khan in February 1778, he did 
not change his internal policies and radical reform program at all. He was 
confident that Russia would back his khanate and his reforms in the Crimea with 
their military presence. During the period following the first rebellion, although 
Catherine II did not lose her hope in Şahin Geray; she was planning with 
Potemkin and Rumiantsev to evacuate the Christian population of the peninsula. 
One reason for the evacuation was the role of these minorities in slaughtering the 
local Tatar population when the Russian army had invaded the Crimea. They were 
afraid of possible retributions after the departure of the Russian army.63 Catherine 
II, unaware of the Tatar opposition to the Khan, also thought that removing the 
Christian population would reduce the tension within the Crimea. Lastly, this was 
an attempt both to colonize the empty steps on the Northern shores of the Black 
Sea and to deprive the Crimea of its prosperous subjects. Prozorovskii, did not 
support this exodus for he believed that Russia should annex the peninsula 
immediately and he considered the Christian population a necessary component 
after the annexation.64 Potemkin and Rumiantsev had something different in their 
minds. The Christians of the Crimea were the wealthy portion of the population. 
These people were also mostly craftsmen or merchants, and paid large amount of 
taxes. As a result, an exodus of the Christians would not only leave Şahin Geray 
with the Tatar element of his subjects, who were antagonistic towards his policies, 
but it would also be a major blow to the economy of the Khanate.65 So, while 
Catherine II thought that she was supporting her protégé, Potemkin and 
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Rumiantsev were trying to force the position of Şahin Geray, with the expectation 
that he would act more rationally and less radically to avoid popular opposition.  
In her order to Potemkin dated 9 March 1778, Catherine II agreed with the 
plan of the exodus of the Christians from the Crimea.66 Suvorov was once again 
appointed to the Crimea in April 1778 in place of Prozorovskii. The exodus was 
completed on 29 September and 31.386 people had been transported, leaving only 
288 behind with their own consent.67  These people were settled “to the districts 
between the rivers Berda and Kalmyus, around the Sea of Azof, and along the 
banks of the Don.”68  Furthermore, this was a difficult situation not just for the 
Crimean population and the Khan but the deported Christians also experienced all 
sorts of hardships after being relocated to a tabula rasa without enough financial 
assistance while the winter was coming.69  
To compensate the exodus of this population Şahin Geray was well-paid 
by the Russians. However, after considering the negligent policies initiated by 
Catherine II, he decided to step down believing that Catherine was no longer on 
his side.70 As a protest, he left Bahçesaray and resided in somewhere near 
Akmescit. Suvorov was reporting to Catherine II the uneasiness of the Khan. He 
even recommended that since Şahin Geray was no longer a use for Russia and it 
would be better to replace him with Gazi Geray.71   
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3.7. Aynalıkavak Convention (1779) 
 
As a result of the naval expeditions undertook during 1778, a declaration 
of war was imminent on both sides. Still in January 1779, there was tension 
between the Ottoman navy and the Russians. Abdulhamid I had ordered the 
necessary provisions to be sent immediately to Crimea while the Ottomans were 
still arguing that the Russian activity in the Crimea was not conformable with the 
peace treaty of 1774.72   
Although, according to the treaty, Russian merchant ships had the right to 
pass through the straits, Ottoman sailors were highly disturbed by the Russian 
presence in the straits and the Black Sea. As a reaction to this situation, during 
early 1779, two sailors had tried but failed to assassinate the Russian Ambassador 
at Constantinople. At the same time, intervention of Russia to the internal affairs 
of Wallachia and Moldovia increased the tension between the two empires. When 
the Porte perceived that a new breakout of hostilities was not a distant possibility, 
all the Russian ships, which were still anchored at the ports of the Ottoman 
Empire, were detained as a precaution.73 Although this was a casus belli, Russia 
also did not have the necessary strength and energy to fight another war.  
During this period, international politics was also in favour of Russia. 
England and France were engaged in a war against each other over the colonies 
and all Louis XVI wanted was to prevent an outbreak of hostilities in the 
continent which would directly or indirectly include France. Vergennes (French 
Foreign Minister 1774-1787) sent instructions to his Ambassador St. Priest at 
Constantinople to persuade the Turks to accept the independence of the Crimea 
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for he knew that a new war against Russia would be nothing but disastrous for the 
Porte.74 Frederick the Great had chosen to renew his alliance with Russia in 1777. 
Since Maximilian Joseph died on 30 December 1777, Prussia needed Russian 
support against Austria in the forthcoming war of Bavarian Succession.75 
In 1779, the reformists were once again in power in the Ottoman Empire. 
France became the benefactor of this conflict and tried to gain the support of 
Russia against England by meditating between the two empires to prevent a 
possible war, which the Ottomans were also reluctant to fight.76 Thus, to find a 
common ground about the Crimea without resorting to war the two empires 
signed the Convention of Aynalıkavak on 10 March 1779.77 This convention was 
ratified by the Porte on 5 July 1779 and letters of confirmations were exchanged 
through their envoys.78 According to the convention, the Ottoman Empire was 
going to recognize Şahin Geray as the legitimate Khan for the rest of his life, and 
in return, Russia would evacuate its army from the Crimean peninsula and 
Kuban.79 
After the signing of the convention, Suvorov left the peninsula leaving 
behind a small force of 6,000 men in Yenikale and Kerç.80 On the other hand, 
while Russia had the right to send its consul to the Crimea, the Ottomans were 
deprived of this right. Russia had gained the right to trade with its own ships in 
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the Mediterranean under the same regulations with other European powers, with 
the condition that Ottoman subjects (mostly Greeks from the Aegean islands) 
were not to be employed in these ships. The Crimea remained under the spiritual 
leadership of the Ottoman Empire. In addition, Özi Kırı was left to the Ottoman 
Empire, which strengthened its relative position against Russia by fortifying these 
areas.81 The Ottoman Empire was relieved of the possibility of a new war against 
Russia, for which preparations were being made since 1777, and Russia had given 
up its excessive rights over the Principalities.82 Although Russia had complied 
with this territorial concession, it was clear that this convention was a sign of 
increasing Russian political control over the Crimea.  
Şahin Geray did not recognize the article which seeded Özi Kırı to the 
Porte. Later he even claimed rights over the lands to the Danube, comprising 
Bessarabia, Wallachia, and Moldavia, claiming that these were the traditional 
territories of the Crimean Khanate. Even the Russian Ambassador at 
Constantinople, Stakhiev, reported to Catherine II that the Khan must be 
persuaded to back down on this issue.83 In response, the Ottomans reinforced Özi 
Kırı and rejected Şahin Geray’s demand after accusing him of cooperating with 
the infidels and causing trouble on the Muslims.84 
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3.8. The last years of independence in the Crimea (1781-1782) 
 
After his position was secured politically, Şahin Geray claimed 
sovereignty over the lands of the Kuban and the North Caucasus in addition to the 
Crimean peninsula itself. The Porte did not welcome this kind of attitude. As a 
result, both states gradually isolated from each other. Although he was recognized 
as legitimate khan by both Russia and the Ottomans, there was a significant 
opposition to his rule inside the Crimea and that is why he was anxious about the 
departure of the Russian army. He felt considerably insecure against his own 
subjects without the military support of the Russian Empire. Şahin Geray 
continued his efforts to build a stronger Crimean Khanate and once again tried to 
initiate a series of reforms. He bypassed the nureddin and the kalgay and 
attempted to build a new army, approximately 6,000 men strong, with the help of 
two adventurers, Robinson and Walpergen. These efforts were a heavy burden on 
the state budget and he was heavily indebted to Russia.85  
As a combination of these reasons, in the middle of 1781, a new uprising 
began in the Kuban region when a group of Nogays attacked the Don Cossacks 
and killed a great number of them. Şahin Geray tried to reconcile the Nogays; 
however, his attempts to calm the uprising failed. Ironically, the Nogays were the 
first to accept him as their Khan and their attitude actually proved to Şahin and 
Russia that any policy built on the loyalty of the Nogays would be a fragile one. 
When he understood that there was no other choice, he asked for the Russians to 
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help to suppress the revolt. Although the Russians answered his plea for help, 
another uprising occurred later in 1781.86  
In the Ottoman Empire, once again, the hawks were in control of the 
administration. They tried to use this uprising to divert the attention of the people 
of Constantinople who were having problems with the Armenians. As a result, 
Bahadır Geray, who was then living among the Circassians, was sent to the 
Crimea with his brother to claim their own legitimacy. Bahadır Geray was elected 
the khan while his brother Arslan Geray became his kalgay.87 Şahin Geray had to 
flee to Kerch, which was under Russian control.88 He had no supporters within the 
Khanate and once again his newly-built army joined the enemy and left Şahin 
utterly defenseless.89 
When the Ottomans faced Russian protest for their efforts on behalf of 
Bahadır Geray, they claimed that this was an internal issue of the Khanate and the 
Porte had nothing to do with it. Nevertheless, Catherine perceived the situation as 
a personal insult and decided to re-install Şahin Geray as Khan by taking the risk 
of war against the Porte.90 She still supported Şahin Geray and could not see how 
Şahin lost the particular support he had in the first part of his reign both from the 
Crimea and Russia. Catherine wrote to Potemkin to protect the Khan as they 
promised to him earlier and entrusted him to solve this conflict.91 In his response 
to Catherine, Potemkin was defending the idea that the Ottomans were concealing 
the truth that they were provoking the Crimean Tatars on the one hand and also 
sending one of their high-ranking pashas to Taman. Although Potemkin heard 
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from Yakov Ivanovich Bulgakov, the Russian Ambassador at Constantinople, the 
complaints of the Porte, he was claiming that the main inconvenience of the 
Ottomans was the allegiance of Şahin Geray to Catherine. Thus, he was also in 
favour of military operations to protect the Khan, who was tried to be killed 
before. Besides, Potemkin argued that to secure the Khan, Russian armies should 
stay in the Crimea as long as it needed.92  
As the revolt spread through Kuban throughout the spring and summer of 
1782, Russian troops once more intervened to restore Şahin Geray.93 In 
September 1782, Potemkin ordered General de Balmain to enter the Crimea and 
the Russian forces defeated the rebels, killing 400 people before entering 
Bahçesaray to restore the Khan.94 Bahadır Geray and Arslan Geray were 
captured.95 Russians were aware of the Ottoman efforts to reinforce their 
fortifications. Although the declaration of war by the Ottomans was not expected, 
Catherine was still cautious.96 After the final invasion of the Russian forces during 
late 1782, the Ottomans were already suspecting a total annexation of the 
Crimea.97 Fearing the possibility that this conflict might lead to a war with Russia, 
the Ottomans started to take precautions. The garrisons of Bender and İsmail were 
reinforced. Certain strongholds in Hotin, Moldavia and Wallachia were repaired 
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and strengthened. Besides, the fortifications on the Black Sea shores were 
reinforced together with some new ones built to protect Constantinople from a 
possible naval attack.98  
  
 
3.9. The annexation of the Crimean Khanate into Russia (1783) 
 
The idea of annexing the Crimea into Russia was not a new idea in 1783. It 
was first mentioned by an early pan-Slavist, Juraj Križanić, who argued that as 
long as the “infidel” Khanate existed, Russia and its people would not be free of 
its threat. When Catherine came to power, her foreign policy advisor, Mikhail 
Vorontsov, prepared a detailed report on what to do with the Crimea. He 
suggested building a strong line of defense on the southern borders and then 
proceeding to the annexation of the Khanate.99 Although there were other people, 
like Potemkin, who also supported the annexation, Nikita Panin, on the other 
hand, had tried to avoid a possible conflict with Prussia and Austria due to the 
expansionist southern policies of Russia.  
On 15 March 1770, a council was gathered to decide Russia’s policy 
regarding the fate of the Khanate. It was resolved that the Crimea should be 
separated from the Ottoman Empire, and the Russian forces should garrison 
certain strongholds in the peninsula to protect the status quo after the 
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independence.100 This plan had been achieved with the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca 
in 1774. Following the independence of the Khanate, until its final annexation into 
Russia, Catherine entrusted Şahin Geray with controlling and managing the affairs 
in the Crimea, while the Russian armies manned certain strategically important 
places such as Kerch and Yenikale. However, they did not hesitate to interfere 
with the internal affairs of the Crimea and the elections of the khan with the 
pretext of protecting the independence of the Khanate. 
The policies of Catherine II were also debated, whether she really wanted 
the annexation in the first place or ordered it as a last policy choice. The most 
convenient argument about this policy would be that Russia tried to create a new 
Crimea which was dependent on Russia and separated from the Porte. The ways 
and means of creating such a Crimea was one of the major foreign policy 
questions of Russia during the second half of the 1770s and the initial years of 
1780s.101 Consequently, it can be argued that the independence of the Crimea in 
1774 was only a stepping stone for the ultimate control of the island which could 
only be achieved by annexing the Khanate into Russia.  
During the eight-year period after the independence of the Khanate until 
1782, Russia had to spend more than 7,000,000 rubles to protect the status quo in 
the island.102 When it came to the end 1782, Şahin Geray’s incapability to govern 
the Khanate became obvious, and Catherine finally lost her faith in him. In 
addition, Panin, once “the most skilled, the most intelligent, the most diligent man 
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at [Catherine’s] court”103, was no longer the foreign minister, and Potemkin and 
Bezborodko, especially the former, were the main foreign policy decision-makers 
and had great influence over Catherine the Great. 
The close circle of Catherine, especially Potemkin, was not supporting the 
independence of the Khanate and supported the idea of the complete annexation 
of the Crimea to the Russian Empire.104 In late 1782, Potemkin advised Catherine 
II that the time had come for Russia to annex the Khanate completely into the 
Empire. He argued that the sooner the job was done the easier and less costly it 
would be. To implement any further plans of expansion towards Kuban, Bug or 
further south at the expense of the Ottoman Empire, Potemkin argued that it was 
imperative to annex the Crimea in the first place. Kuban was already protected 
with the help of Don Cossacks. Since, Russia was to become direct neighbour to 
the Porte after the annexation of the Crimea, there was not going to be any need to 
maintain the interior fortifications of the Empire. Lastly, Black Sea was to be 
come open to Russia like never before.105  
In late December 1782, Catherine secretly ordered Prince Potemkin to 
annex a certain part of the Crimea.106 However, this was just the beginning of the 
final annexation. Disturbances continued throughout the first half of the 1783 both 
in the Crimean peninsula and Kuban. Some of the Crimean Tatars who fled to 
Constantinople reported the invasion of the Crimea by the Russian forces and that 
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Şahin Geray remained passive.107 Russia had more than 50,000 soldiers in the 
Crimea during this period and more reinforcements were on their way.108  
After being re-instated in late 1782, Şahin Geray sent an emissary to 
Taman. However, Ferah Ali Pasha’s kethüda had him killed and gave an excuse to 
the Russians to intervene.109 The Ottomans protested that a single event could not 
be a pretext for a major intervention.110  
At this point, it was Potemkin’s task to convince Şahin Geray to step down 
without any further ado. Thus, he lured the Crimean khan by promising him a new 
khanate on the Persian/Caucasian lands.111 During the spring of 1783 Potemkin 
spent his efforts on certain military arrangements and measures for a possible 
reaction of the Ottoman Empire after the declaration of the annexation.112 He 
advised Catherine II to send the Baltic navy once again to threaten the Porte in the 
Mediterranean just like she did in 1770. However this proposal was not put into 
effect.113  
In an intelligence report to the Porte, in March 1783, it was stated that 
Şahin Geray had virtually no authority over the affairs of the state and, in fact, the 
Russian General de Balmain was in control. There were plans of settling Russian 
families from other parts of the Empire into the Crimea.114 During this period, 
plague spread among the Russian soldiers. Russia stationed 120 battalions from 
the borders of the Crimea to Hotin. The purpose of this was perceived by the 
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Ottomans as to install Şahin Geray to Bucak after the affairs of the Crimea could 
be put into order.115  
 
Finally, on 19 April 1783, Catherine II signed the manifesto of the 
annexation of the Crimea, the Kuban, and the Taman into her domains, though it 
was not made public immediately.116 In May 1783, Potemkin sent a secret order to 
Veselitsky, the resident of Russia in the Crimea, to persuade the Khan and to 
prevent any entanglement that would delay the annexation. Simultaneously, a 
small Russian navy which was built in Kherson blockaded the Akyar port to 
coerce Şahin Geray.117 However, Potemkin’s plans were further delayed when 
Şahin Geray was not convinced with the Russian offer and decided to wait a 
reaction either from the Porte or the European powers. Instead of giving up, Şahin 
Geray demanded economic assistance from Catherine II to improve the situation 
in the Crimea.118 In June, reports of the Ottoman fortification of Ochakov have 
reached the Russians and Rumiantsev reminded Catherine about the possibility of 
war against the Porte.119 Simultaneously, Şahin Geray finally left the Crimea. As a 
reward, he was bestowed with the order of St. Andrew and various gifts were sent 
to the Crimea to gain the loyalty of the local mirzas. The reason behind 
Potemkin’s patience was to present the annexation like it was done with the 
consent of the people, which was not possible as long as Şahin Geray remained 
khan in the Crimea.    
The annexation of the Crimea into Russia triggered the migration of the 
Crimean Tatars to the Ottoman Empire in large numbers. After 1774, until the 
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annexation, there were some instances of migration, however usually the numbers 
of the immigrants were minor and they were mostly from the nobility.120 There is 
report of a major migration, 1,000 families, during late 1782 from Kuban to 
Bucak.121 Approximately 10,000 families are suspected to have left their 
homeland for the Ottoman Empire during this period through Kılburun to Özi.122  
Ahmet Cevdet Paşa points out the difficulties of migration from the Crimea 
because of the lack of proper transportation.123 In addition to these, the Sultan sent 
orders to Anatolia regarding the approaching immigrants to the Black Sea ports 
and wanted them to be prevented from coming to Constantinople and instead to be 
looked after properly where they had arrived.124 
In her correspondence to Potemkin in June, Catherine ordered him to 
complete the annexation as soon as possible. However, she was also aware of the 
spreading plague in the Crimea and wanted Potemkin to take necessary 
precautions to prevent it.125 The Tsaritsa was anxious about the reaction of the 
local population and the preparations of the Ottoman Empire for a possible 
outbreak of hostilities since she had learnt that the news of the annexation had 
reached Constantinople.126  
In late June, a strategy to attack Sinop was being formulated in St. 
Petersburg in case of a declaration of war by the Ottomans. However, according 
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to Catherine II, the Ottomans were prevented by their allies from declaring war on 
Russia.127 In July, Potemkin reassured Catherine II that the Porte was fearful of a 
Russian offensive and all of their garrisons were in stationed in defensive 
positions. The Crimean Tatar mirzas already swore allegiance to Catherine and 
the process of annexation was almost complete.128 Nevertheless, the tension did 
not drop and Russia was still expecting a declaration of war by the Ottomans 
during October 1783.129 
In July, it was reported from Özi that Russia heavily reinforced Kherson 
and Kılburun. He also mentioned the presence of Potemkin and Şahin Geray in 
Kherson and added that the Russian soldiers were prepared to fight to protect 
Şahin Geray while Russia assigned one of the major men-of-war to the Khan.130 
In this period, a certain Tatar mirza, Yakup Ağa, deserves special 
attention. He collaborated with the Russian army, when they first invaded the 
Crimea in 1771, and helped them convince the Tatar mirzas about the Russian 
proposal regarding their independence. Later, he continued to provide valuable 
information to the Russian forces in the Crimea. In 1782, he reported to Potemkin 
that a part of the population was so much exhausted because of the endless 
conflicts and hostilities that they would not oppose a Russian annexation. He also 
mentioned the discussions among the other major noble family leaders about the 
prosperous life of the other Muslim inhabitants of the Russian Empire.131 After 
the Russian rule was established in the Crimea, he was converted to Christianity 
and changed his name to Jan Rudzevich, becoming an important local official of 
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the Russian Empire.132 Although no other mirza was committed to the new 
patrons as Yakup Ağa, some of them were willing to cooperate with Russia to 
preserve their status.133 
 
 
3.10. The Nogays and Kuban after the annexation of Crimea (1783) 
 
In May of 1783, Pavel Potemkin and Suvorov were sent to Kuban and 
Taman to persuade the Nogays to accept Russian suzerainty.134 Suvorov 
organized a major festival for the Nogay mirzas and declared that Şahin Geray 
gave up all his rights over the Crimean Khanate and the Crimea has been annexed 
into the Russia Empire. Suvorov invited the Nogays to be the subjects of the 
Tsaritsa while at the same time he ordered his forces to be stationed in the Nogay 
settlements for the next step of action.135 
After the Nogay mirzas accepted Suvorov’s proposal, the plan to resettle the 
Nogays in the steps of the Caspian region, was put into action. While Suvorov 
was acting on the orders of Potemkin to lead the Nogays to the north, a rumour 
has spread among the people that Şahin Geray was in Taman.136 Some of the 
Nogays escaped and wanted to join Şahin Geray. Meanwhile, Ferah Ali Pasha 
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reported that the Russians crossed the river Kuban with more than 500 men and he 
was asking for necessarry provisions to stop the Russians.137 In August, Russian’s 
defeated and massacred 3,000 Nogays, who were desperately fighting for their 
freedom.138 Some of them managed to escape towards south and with the aid of 
the Circassians they were settled in the town of Yeisk.139 However, Suvorov 
managed to defeat them in another major battle on 13 October of the same year.140 
During December 1783, against all odds, almost 4,000 Nogay families were 
reported to be migrating to the Ottoman territories, fearing further Russian 
aggression.141 All these massacres and migrations that entailed them practically 
ended the Nogay presence in the Kuban region.142 
 
 
3.11. The Porte’s recognition of the annexation of the Crimea (1784) 
 
After the military invasion of Russia during the end of 1782, Russia and 
Austria sent a joint note to the Ottoman Empire demanding the non-intervention 
of the Porte in the Crimean affairs, neutrality of the Black Sea, and treating the 
Principalities according to the terms of Küçük Kaynarca.143 On 28 November 
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1782, Ainslie advised the Porte, not to enter a new war against Russia over this 
issue.144 
During the meeting of the Divan on 30 July 1783, the idea of annexation 
of the Crimea was not accepted since it would give Russia such a favourable 
position even to threaten Constantinople. Halil Hamid Pasha and Ahmed Resmî 
tried to delay the response, and expected international reaction to the Russian 
policy while the conservatives were insisting on a declaration of war.145 As a 
result, they only agreed to send an official note, to protest the Russian activities in 
the Crimea.146 Although the Grand Vizier was reluctant to drag the Empire into a 
new destruction, he started to make preparations for a possible war any way.  
At the end of July, Potemkin recommended Catherine to finalize the 
annexation towards autumn so that the Ottomans could not declare war and start 
hostilities immediately even if they were planning to do so, since the holy month 
of Ramadan was approaching and the Porte had to prepare its navy.147 Catherine 
was still anxious about the Ottoman reaction and she told Potemkin that 
everything would be clear after the Bayram (Holiday).148 However, the Ottomans 
had neither the strength nor the will to declare war on Russia.  
Finally, the news of the official annexation of the Crimea by Russia had 
reached Constantinople. Moreover rumours were circulating to the effect that the 
Porte would cede Bucak territory to Russia. These rumours, which were carried 
by some of the immigrants from the Crimea, were interpreted as the sinister 
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policies of Russia.149 British Ambassador Ainslie’s instructions, arrived on 18 
October 1783, were also clear that he should persuade the Ottomans to preserve 
peace. On 23 October, at Scutari, Reis Efendi Mustafa, Defterdar, Feyzi Efendi 
and a dragoman of the Porte met. Ainslie transmitted the instructions from 
London in this meeting. Two days later, Halil Hamid Pasha called Pisani, the 
dragoman of the Ambassador, and thanked him for his friendly intervention.150  
The Hospodar of Wallachia informed the Porte that following the 
annexation of the Crimea, since this was a casus belli, Russia asked for the French 
mediation. He added that since Russia did not inform Austria previous to the 
annexation, their alliance was in tatters.151 However, there was no significant 
opposition to the annexation of the Crimea. Both Austro-Prussian and Anglo-
French rivalries neutralized the possibility of intervention of these states on behalf 
of the Ottoman Empire.152  On 3 September 1783, England and France terminated 
hostilities and signed a peace treaty in Paris. While Catherine was highly 
uncomfortable about this, the Ottomans perceived these two powers as a potential 
source of balance against the Russo-Austrian alliance. In addition to the alliance 
with Spain that was concluded in 1782, the Ottoman Empire finally had a 
breathing space after the French diplomacy against Russian policies. Potemkin 
informed Catherine about the preparations of the Porte and advised her not to 
back down against French protests to the annexation.153 The Ottomans, by the 
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way, sent both men and provisions to İsmail, one of the important fortified 
positions on the Danube.154 
Gaffron, the Prussian Ambassador at Constantinople, who was accused of 
advising the Porte to delay the submitting of the document that ratified the 
annexation of the Crimea, was called back and Prussia, denied the claims that it 
was provoked the Ottomans against Russia.155 According to Diez, who succeeded 
Gaffron as the Prussian Ambassador at Constantinople, the Ottoman Empire was 
in a difficult situation; the reforms were a failure while treasury was experiencing 
hard times. The only thing that would recover the Empire would be radical 
reforms and a genius to perform them. Frederick, on the other hand, defended the 
idea that although France let its ally down against Russia on the annexation of the 
Crimea, this had prevented a destructive war for the Ottomans and now they still 
have a chance to recover their strength.156 
France could not make any allies while there were thoughts of invading 
Austrian-Holland in the case of Austrian intervention into the Principalities.157 
Morever, as one Russian diplomat reminded, France was out money and army, 
thus it would take at least 2-3 years to recover its strength. He also commented 
that if Russia could not accomplish the annexation in this period, then it should 
never have started it. Even then, in France there were some voices whispering the 
idea that it was not very rational at all to preserve the Ottoman Empire. Vergennes 
was the Ambassador at Constantinople during the years 1755-1768 and he knew 
how hard it would be to modernize the Ottoman Empire. Furthermore, Saint-
Priest drafted a report and advised his government to take its share, which were 
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Crete and Egypt, if the Ottoman Empire was partitioned.158 Charles James Fox, 
who became the Secretary of Foreign Affairs in England, was conservative 
regarding foreign affairs and perceived Russia as one of England’s indispensable 
allies against the Bourbons.159 Although Russia was suspected from a possible 
French protest; England on the other hand wanted to be on the side of Russia in a 
probable new Ottoman-Russian war.160  
On 21 November 1783, Bulgakov asked the Ottomans to recognize the 
annexation, after communicating both with Ainslie and Saint-Priest, who were on 
the same side regarding this issue.161 The Porte, despite the opposition of the 
ulema, was going to recognize the annexation, especially as a result of the efforts 
of Halil Hamid Pasha and Gazi Hasan Pasha to avoid war against Russia. For this 
end, on 14 December 1783, Bulgakov was summoned and he was told that the 
Porte would pursue a pacific policy. Although the Ottomans wanted the mediation 
of England and France, Bulgakov did not accept this proposal.162 During the 18 
December 1783 session of the Divan, Gazi Hasan and Halil Hamid Pasha 
convinced the other members of the Divan to comply with their decision. On 22 
December 1783, Austria declared that in a possible war between Russia and the 
Porte, it would definitely side with Russia.163 Bulgakov and Herbert-Rathkeal of 
Austria were waiting for the Ottoman response to the annexation. Finally, on 8 
January 1784, the Ottomans, “weak, isolated, and bewildered”164 recognized the 
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annexation of the Crimea into Russia. The southern part of the river Kuban was 
left to the Ottoman Empire.165 
Catherine had to settle for the Crimea only and could not continue her 
expansionist policies any further. If only she could have persuaded Prussia 
together with Austria against the Ottoman Empire, she might have pressured the 
Porte for acquiring more than the Crimea. However, Prussia did not want to side 
with Catherine this time.166 Gustavus of Sweden could have invaded Denmark in 
case of a possible Russo-Ottoman war, but as the war did not occurr Sweden also 
did not offer any help to the Ottomans.167 
This was a result of the “Russian cleverness, greed and ambition of a small 
portion of the Crimean ruling elite, and growing inability of the Ottoman 
government to understand the realities of the shifting balance of power.”168 
Aleksandr Bezborodko, who replaced Panin in 1780, was also heavily under the 
influence of Catherine II, and he was also one of the supporters of the annexation 
from the beginning. However his note in his diary about the annexation is clear 
sign of the irony of the perceptions between the Porte and the Russians; 
“The Porte has not kept good faith from the very beginning. Their primary 
goal has been to deprive the Crimeans of independence. They banished the 
legal khan and replaced him with the thief Devlet Geray. They 
consistently refused to evacuate Taman. They made numerous perfidious 
attempts to introduce rebellion in the Crimea against the legitimate khan 
Şahin Geray. All of these efforts did not bring us to declare war…. The 
Porte never ceased to drink in each drop of revolt among the Tatars…. Our 
only wish has been to bring peace to the Crimea….and we were finally 
forced by the Turks to annex the area.”169 
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Although the Ottomans were not content with the loss of such an important 
asset of the Empire, all kinds of efforts were performed not to provoke a new war 
against Russia over the Crimea.  It was the Russians who installed Şahin Geray 
over and over again although every time he became Khan there was a popular 
uprising against him. Russian armies never left the Crimea completely and were 
constantly stationed in the fortresses of Yenikale and Kerch. An army was ready 
to act through the Orkapı pass anytime it was needed. The Times issued an article 
on the fate of the Crimean Khanate during the last quarter of the 18th century 
which summarizes the sets of events during those years.  
By the peace of Kainardgi, in 1774 Russia made the Crimea “independent” 
of Turkey, and then plotted against this independence, having debauched its 
Khan Shahim Gherai, whom she pensioned for a short time in Russia, then 
abandoned to the eleemosynary favours of the Poles, and at last unfeelingly 
saw return to Turkey, ultimately to meet the fate of his apostasy, namely, 
poison or the bow-string. The Crimea, thus so generously made independent, 
was soon, by the forced cession of the Turks, converted into a Russian 
possession; and its native inhabitants were nearly all massacred or expelled 
by their good brothers the Russians, in order to furnish a clear field, a fort of 
tabula rasa, for the adventurers to settle there, under the Russian auspices.170 
 
As it can be seen, what happened was a gradual shift from the Ottoman 
suzerainty towards a Russian one, and unfortunately it was a bloody episode 
during which the local population of the Crimea suffered the most. 
 
 
3.12. Şahin Geray’s fate 
 
After he was convinced to give up his rights over the Crimean Khanate, 
Şahin Geray received a handsome annual income from the Tsaritsa.171 Having 
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realized that his role in the Crimea had come to an end, this time Şahin Geray 
invoked resistance against Russia among the tribes of the Caucasus. He joined the 
Tamganoğlu tribe and his foster brother Narcu Mehmed Geray in Taman,172 but 
only to cause dissension among the other tribes of the Caucasus.173 They sent 
petitions to Ferah Ali Pasha of Soğucak to resolve this issue or else they would 
enforce the Tamganoğlu tribe to expel Şahin Geray. Although Ferah Ali Pasha 
acted on this request, in the summer of 1784, Şahin Greay was captured by the 
Russian commander of Yenikale and sent to the inland Russia.  
In January 1787, Şahin Geray was released with his own request and asked 
for asylum in the Ottoman Empire. His wish was granted and he arrived in Hotin. 
On 1 May 1787, Şahin Geray left Hotin for Larga.174 From there, he was brought 
to Edirne with all his belongings in July 1787 and was granted a large estate.175 
Later, he was arrested and sent to the island of Rhodes as an exile. During his stay 
in Rhodes, when the order of his execution was received, Şahin Geray escaped to 
the residence of the Russian176 consul. However, the residence was raided and 
Şahin Geray’s sentence was executed in the inner fortress of the city.177 
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3.13. Catherine II’s Southern Journey and the Crimea in 1787 
 
The great southern journey of Catherine II was the last, but one of the major 
provocations of the Ottomans by the Russians. Although it was planned in 1786, it 
had to be postponed for a year.178 The Times was informing its readers about the 
possible cancellation of the journey; 
The famous Journey of the Imperial Catherine seems to be entirely laid 
aside. Great preparations were talked of a few months back and now all the 
Russian letters are as silent upon the subject as if there was no such an 
expedition in agitation.179  
 
Finally on 18 January 1787, Catherine left St.Petersburg for her great 
journey to the south.180 She had envoys of Britain, France and Austria with her 
while Stanisław Poniatowski, the King of Poland, and Joseph II of Austria had 
joined the trip later. During May she arrived at Kherson and later in June the 
Tsaritsa was in the Crimea, the last stop of her journey. This journey was a 
triumph for Catherine II but more to Potemkin.181  
Having received the news of this journey, Bulgakov was summoned to the 
Divan and he was told that Russia should leave the Crimea for good, together with 
some other conditions. As it was expected, Bulgakov refused the demands of 
Grand Vizier Koca Yusuf Pasha. Once again, after thirteen years the two empires 
were about to fight another major and long-lasting war. The Times was informing 
its readers on the fragile situation between the two empires as a result of the 
Journey of Catherine II to the Crimea and although it was commented that the 
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fact this journey was just a pretext for reinforcing the Russian forces in the Crimea. Ahmet Cevdet 
Paşa, p.749.   
179 The Times, Thursday, August 17, 1786; p.3; issue 516; col. A. 
180 For further details on the Southern Journey of Catherine see, Montefiore, pp. 351-379, 
A.G.Brickner, Istoriia Ekateriny Vtoroi (Moscow: Astrel, 2005), pp. 347-356. 
181 Madariaga, Russia in the Age of Catherine the Great, pp. 370-373. 
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Ottomans appeared to be braver than it was thought, a new war against Russia 
would be ruinous for the Ottomans.182  
 
As it was expressed during these thirteen years of relative peace, the 
Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca started a fierce struggle over the Crimea. It was 
apparent from the beginning that Russia would triumph in this contest. Although 
the annexation of the Khanate into Russia in 1783 did not lead immediately to a 
new war, the Ottomans were aware that the balance of power between the two 
empires shifted significantly to the benefit of Russia. After the hawks took over 
the administration in Constantinople, they started to look for a pretext to declare a 
new war on Russia with the aim of reversing the situation. The opportunity they 
sought appeared in August 1787 and Grand Vizier Koca Yusuf Pasha dragged the 
Ottoman Empire into a new war against Russia. 
                                                 
182 The Times, Monday, May 28, 1787; pg.1; Issue 758; col. C., Kamenskii, p.257. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
BEGINNING OF THE RACE FOR THE CAUCASUS: 
THE RUSSIAN ADVANCE AND THE ROLE OF THE 
OTTOMAN EMPIRE IN THE LOCAL RESISTANCE 
 
 
 
4.1. The Caucasus between the Ottoman Empire and Russia  
 
The Russian involvement in the Caucasian affairs dates back to the time of 
Ivan the Terrible when one of the notable families of the Kabarday1 tribe asked 
protection from Russia. In a traditional way, to form a mutual bond, Ivan married 
a Circassian princess, daughter of Prince Temriuk.2 However, the first major 
military expedition to the Caucasus was realized by Peter the Great. In 1720s 
Peter the Great crossed the mountains through the Derbend pass and invaded the 
                                                 
1 A predominant group among the various Adyge tribes, these people were inhabiting the 
territories located on the south of the Terek River and comprised most of the central and 
northeastern part of the North Caucasus. Michael Khodarkovsky, “Of Christianity, Enlightenment 
and Colonialism: Russia in the North Caucasus, 1550-1800,” The Journal of Modern History, vol. 
71, no. 2 (June, 1999), p.400. 
2 Ibid, p.395. 
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Persian lands on the shores of the Caspian Sea.3 Although the position of Russia 
was soon to be disturbed by the conquests of Nadir Shah, Peter I’s encroachment 
anticipated the future Russian penetration into Caucasus. Until the 1768-1774 
Ottoman-Russian war, Russia was pre-occupied with European affairs. 
Consequently, no major effort was spent for new expeditions towards the south. 
Besides, as long as the Crimean Khanate existed, Russia’s way to the north-
western part of the Caucasus was blocked.  
The Ottomans perceived the Caucasus as a part of the Crimean Khanate 
and they dealt with the affairs of the local tribes through the Khan.4 There was an 
intense relation between the Crimean Khanate and the Circassian tribes. All the 
Khans, before they were promoted, were sent to a local tribe to receive their 
education. This tradition (called Atalık or P’vr) helped to form a strong 
connection between the Khanate and the Western Caucasus.5 
After the treaty of Belgrad in 1739, there was evidence of Russian 
suzeranity over parts of Kabarday in the correspondence between the Sultan and 
Tsar Ivan VI.6 However, the Russian invasion of this region could not be realized 
until the last quarter of the 18th century. In 1761, Russia started to build a fortress 
in Mozdok. In 1763, fortification of Mozdok was finalized, a church was erected 
and Don Cossacks were settled to protect this new settlement.7 In a sense, for the 
time being it became the jumping stone of Russia in the Caucasus. The 
commander of Kızlar, Major General Potapov was assigned with the further 
                                                 
3 For detailed information on the Russian involvement in the Caucasus during Peter the Great’s 
reign see, V.A.Potto, Kavkazskaia Voina vol.1 (Stavropol: Kavkazskiy Kray, 1994), pp. 23-34,  
4 Ahmet Cevdet Paşa, Tarih-i Cevdet vol.2 (İstanbul: Üçdal Yayınları, 1983), pp. 705, 707. 
5 Mustafa Kesbî, İbretnümâ-yı Devlet (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2002), p.11-12 
6 M. Sadık Bilge, Osmanlı Devleti ve Kafkasya: Osmanlı Varlığı Döneminde Kafkasya’nın Siyasi-
Askerî Tarihi ve İdarî Taksimâtı (1454-1829) (İstanbul: Eren, 2005), p.120. 
7 More than 200 men and women were settled in Mozdok during 1764 and a further 500 were 
settled between Mozdok and Kızlar. H. M. Dumanov (ed.), Iz dokumentalnoy Istorii Kabardino-
Russkikh Otnosheniy: Vtoroia polovina XVIII – Pervaia polovina XIX v. (Elbruz: Nalchik, 2000), 
pp. 68-69. 
 78
strenghtening of the city.8 Although the Porte protested the building of Mozdok, 
Russia was claiming that the territory where Mozdok was built belonged to the 
Russian Empire according to the Treaty of Belgrade. However, it was clear that 
the main purpose of the Russians was to intervene into Kabarday affairs.  
In 1767, King Solomon of Imeretia asked for Russian protection from the 
local tribes. A traveler called Emin, however, notes that in most cases the leaders 
of these raids were Georgians who lead the Lezgis against their oppressor princes 
and masters.9 In any case, Imeretia was an Ottoman territory in this period and 
Russian intervention to the Polish affairs had already disturbed the Ottomans. 
Thus, Catherine the Great rejected Solomon’s request not to provoke the Porte. 
However, on 30 April 1767, she promised to protect Solomon in case of a future 
war against the Ottoman Empire. 
 
 
4.2. The Caucasus during the Ottoman-Russian War of 1768-1774 and the 
Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca 
 
During the Ottoman-Russian War of 1768-1774, the Caucasus also became 
a battlefront. A joint Ottoman, Kabarday and Chechen force under the command 
of Kazbulatoğlu Ali Sultan, captured Kızlar and put the inhabitants to the sword.10 
In 1769, Kabardays besieged Mozdok and although they failed to capture the 
fortress, they pillaged the outer parts of the city. In July, General Medem 
                                                 
8 The establishment of this settlement and fortress is accepted as the official beginning of the 
Russo-Caucasian war. V.A.Potto, p.138. 
9 William Edward David Allen, A History of the Georgian People: From the Beginning Down to 
the Russian Conquest in the Nineteenth Century (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1932), 
p.199. 
10 Dumanov, pp.70-71. 
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assaulted and defeated the Kabardays with the support of Kalmuk forces.11 
Consequently, to further develop the defenses of this settlement, Russia settled 
Volga Cossacks on the banks of the Terek River under the command of General 
Savailev.12  
Although, on 25 September 1768, Sultan Mustafa III declared that he 
forgave Solomon of Imeretia and recognized him as the King, Solomon had 
already set his mind against the Porte.13 Russia entered into alliance with both 
Solomon and Irakli of Kartli-Kakheti.14 Catherine II was expecting a total force of 
65,000 men from Irakli and Solomon to open a rear front to force the Sultan’s 
position. As Catherine later described her strategy, “I have fallen upon Turkey 
from four sides; from the Danube, from the Crimea, from Morea (Greece), and 
even from Georgia.”15 United Russian and Georgian forces achieved some 
success against the Ottomans, in 1772, however, when Catherine II perceived that 
no conclusive result could be achieved in the Caucasus front, she pulled her 
armies back to the Mozdok line.16 Although the Georgian envoys came to St. 
Petersburg to ask for support in 1773, by then Catherine II was already trying to 
finalize the war against the Porte and no further protection was provided to 
Georgia.17  
“The Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainarji was merely an armistice in the mighty 
conflict which was continued between Russia and Turkey during the six decades 
between 1768 and 1829, and in this conflict the fate of Georgian Kingdoms was 
                                                 
11 Bilge, pp. 132-134. 
12 Tarık Cemal Kutlu, Çeçen Direniş Tarihi (İstanbul: Anka Yayınları, 2005), p.123., John F. 
Baddeley, The Russian Conquest of the Caucasus (Wiltshire: Curzon Press, 1999), p.34. 
13 Nikolas K. Gvosdev, Imperial Policies and Perspectives towards Georgia, 1760-1819 (London: 
MacMillan Press, 2000), p.30. 
14 Formal alliance was concluded in 16 December 1769. Gvosdev, p.33. 
15 Ibid, p.29. 
16 Allen, p.207.  
17 Gvosdev, p.42. 
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no more than a minor incident.”18 The Russians did not care much about the 
future of the Georgians and forsake all their territorial gains in the region. 
Catherine II claimed that the pressure on the Georgia was lifted thanks to the 
Russian intervention and this was the best result that could be achieved for 
them.19  
The article 21 of the treaty left the fate of the Kabarday region at the hands 
of the Crimean Khan and the local aristocracy. The Ottoman’s aim was to prevent 
the Russian influence over this region. A misinterpretation of this treaty resulted 
with the conclusion that the Ottomans left this region to Russia as if it was its own 
territory. However, the independence of the Kabardays was already recognized 
with the Treaty of Belgrade in 1739.20  
After the Ottoman-Russian war of 1768-1774 was over, although there was 
no direct pressure from the Ottomans over Georgia, the Porte was still supporting 
the local tribes in the region against Solomon and Irakli. Besides, the Persian Shah 
began to follow an aggressive policy and demanded submission to his 
sovereignity.21 In August 1774, Irakli sent words to Panin, complaining that while 
he was in fairly good terms with his neighbours, after he was involved in the 
Ottoman-Russian war, he was isolated in a hostile enviroment as the Russians 
deserted him.22 When Irakli’s diplomacy failed to obtain Russian protection, he 
turned his face towards the Porte and sent an emissary to Constantinople. In 1776, 
Kerim Khan Zend of Persia, declared war on the Ottomans and the Porte was in 
                                                 
18 Allen, p.208. 
19 Gvosdev, p.43. There was only an agreement about the release of the Georgian prisoners of war 
with the rest of the Russians. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi (Ottoman 
Archives of Prime Ministry of Turkey, hereafter cited as; BOA), Cevdet-Hariciye, Sıra No: 834. 
20 Bilge, p.135. 
21 Baddeley, pp.19-20. 
22 Gvosdev, p.44. 
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need of allies against a common enemy.23 Simultaneously, in order not to 
antagonize Kerim Khan, Russians assured him that the presence of the Russian 
forces in Georgia was a temporary one.24 Various gifts were sent to the Caucasian 
tribes to keep them away from the conflict between Persia and the Porte. Georgian 
Kingdoms were also important elements of the balance of power in the region. 
Consequently, the Porte accepted the offer and assigned Süleyman Pasha, the 
governor of Çıldır, to assist Irakli when neeeded. For the last time, Kartli-Kakheti 
accepted the Ottoman suzeranity in 1776.25  
 
 
4.3. Russian penetration into the Caucasus (1778-1785) 
 
Before continuing with the Russian penetration into the Caucasus it is 
important to point out some of the methods and strategies used by the Russian 
Empire in this process. One of the most usual methods was to buy out the local 
aristocracy with money and titles. Another way of gaining these local leaders was 
to take their sons as hostage (emanet). This resulted in both the loyalty of these 
people and the assimilation of the captive to the Russian system. In addition to 
                                                 
23 Kerim Khan Zend, trying to take advantage of the weakness of the Ottomans after the Küçük 
Kaynarca, sent his armies towards Eastern Anatolia and Basra in 1775. Basra was captured on 15 
April 1776 and parts of Eastern Anatolia were sacked. In May, the Ottomans declared war on 
Persia and begun their counter-attack. The Ottoman armies advanced through Kars and Kerkük. 
Persian army was defeated in 1777. Considering his options, Kerim Khan Zend offered Catherine 
II the partition of the Ottoman territories by a joint attack. However, with the death of Kerim Khan 
in 1779, this plan could not be realized and the Ottoman armies captured Basra. İsmail Hakkı 
Uzunçarşılı, vol.4, part 1, pp-458-463. 
24 Russia was involved in a conflict with the local tribes of Eastern Caucasus after Samuel Gottlieb 
Gmelin was abdicated and killed by the Haytaks in 1774. General Medem, the commander of 
Kızlar, was sent to Outsmi for reprisal. In March 1775, he raided the Haytak (Karakaytagans) 
territories and captured Derbend, which was Persian territory. However, a war against Persia 
would be risky for Russia and the Russian garrison in Derbend was called back in 1776. Baddeley, 
pp.37-38. 
25 Allen, p.208, Gvosdev, pp. 46-47. 
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these, the Cossacks frequently harrassed these people with expeditions from the 
fortified lines. The Punitive Expeditions (karatelnaya ekspeditsiya) and Punitive 
Units (karatelnaya otryad) were formed to achieve these purposes.26  
Since there was a vast ethnic and tribal varicosity in the Caucasus, 
Russians tried to turn these people on each other and break them one by one.27 In 
the Western Caucasus, while the Nogays inhabited the steps, the Circassians were 
living in the forested southern regions and these people were used to quarrel 
among each other frequently. As a consequence of the Russian harrassment of the 
Kabarday territories, Russo-Circassian struggle also begun in 1777.28 However, 
one of the weak aspects of their resistance was that it was not a joint effort against 
Russia.29 Although these peoples allied among themselves for a short period 
against the common enemy, when a definite result could not be achieved, once 
again they turned on each other. By taking advantage of this lack of cooperation, 
Russia easily increased its influence in the region with the aggressive policies of 
Potemkin.30  
 
 
                                                 
26 Kutlu, pp.125-127. 
27 Still in 1784 though, Pavel Potemkin was reporting that by sending the description of the 
Kabardays, he was actually describing all the peoples of the North Caucasus. This was a clear sign 
of his incomprehension of the peoples of the region. Khodarkovsky, p.400.  
28 For further details on the Russo-Circassian relations see, A. Chirg, “Cherkesy v Russko-
Osmanskikh Otnosheniiakh vtoroy poloviny XVIII v.,” and T. Feofilaktova, “Politicheskie 
Otnosheniia Rossii s Narodami Severo-Zapadnogo Kavkaza v Period Podgotovki vtoroy Russko-
Turetskoy Voiny II Pol. XVIII v. (1783-1787 gg.),” in Z. Y. Khuako (ed.), Rossiia i Cherkesiia 
(Vtoraia Polovina XVII-XIX vv.) (Maikop: Izdatelstvo, 1995), pp. 45-78. There is also a recent 
study on the Russo-Kabardinian relations which examines in detail the penetration of Russia into 
North Caucasus, see, Sean Pollock, “Empire by Invitation? Russian Empire-Building in the 
Caucasus in the Reign of Catherine II,” PhD. Dissertation, Harvard University (Massachusetts, 
2006). 
29 Cemal Gökçe, Kafkasya ve Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun Kafkasya Siyaseti (İstanbul: Has-
Kurtulmuş Matbaası, 1979), pp. 41-42.  
30 Baddeley, pp. 43-44. See also, Abdullah Temizkan, “Rusya ve Osmanlı Devleti’nin Kafkas-
Ötesinde Nüfuz Mücadelesi,” Türk Dünyası İncelemeleri Dergisi, vol. 6, no. 2 (2006), pp.447-462. 
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4.3.1. Fortifying the Caucasus line and the initial struggles between Russia 
and the tribes of Western Caucasus 
 
Potemkin established his headquarters in Yekaterinograd as the imperial 
namestnik and he was the director of the Russian advance in the Caucaus.31 In the 
autumun of 1777, the Caucasian army was divided into two and Suvorov was 
assigned to the Kuban army while General Yakobi became the commander of the 
Caucacus army. The front line was reinforced and a new line of fortified positions 
began to be constructed. These areas were also settled with Cossacks from Volga 
and other regions.32 While General Yakobi was occupied with fortifiying the 
Mozdok-Rostov line, Suvorov was completing the fortified line from Kerç to 
Kuban River.33 Suvorov reached Kuban in January 1778 and after having 
completed the military line built by General Brink, he further continued to erect 
fortifications between Mozdok and the Caspian Sea.34 These fortified lines pinned 
the local population and by settling the Cossacks, Russia aimed to change the 
demographic structure of the region.35 
When Russia intervened in the domestic affairs of the local aristocracy 
with the aim of protecting its gains in the region, disturbances arose. Kabardays 
argued that since the time of Ivan IV, they were treated as an ally of Russia rather 
than its subjects.36 In January 1778, 3,000 Kabardays were about to assault the 
Russian fortress of Petrovsk, but having learnt about their approach the Russian 
                                                 
31 İsmail Berkok, Tarihte Kafkasya (İstanbul, İstanbul Matbaası, 1958), p.368. 
32 Baddeley, p.39. 
33 Potto, p.102 
34 Philip Longworth, The Art of Victory (London: Constable, 1965), p.108. 
35 Kutlu, p.124. 
36 Khodarkovsky, p.408. 
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garrison escaped.37 Later in December, Kabardays managed to pillage a Russian 
fortress. In March 1779, Suvorov threathened the Circassian and Abaza tribes and 
he stated that unless they stop their raids to the Nogay territory, Russian military 
intervention would become inevitable.38 In August 1779, Kabardays attacked the 
Kuban line with an army of 14,00039 men. Although they initially succeeded in 
capturing some of the fortified positions, General Yakobi arrived in the scene in 
September 1779 and routed these forces inflicting 3,000 casualties. Russian forces 
invaded Little and Great Kabarda until the end of the same year.40 
In 1780, Russians intercepted a dispatch, carried by an Armenian courier, 
from Kartli-Kakheti to the Great Kabardays promising support against Russia and 
their freedom. As a result, Russia prohibited all kinds of border transactions with 
Kartli-Kakheti even for the clergy.41  
 
 
4.3.2. Daghestan 
  
Islam was very well established among the people of Daghestan and this 
fact made it easier for them to cooperate with the Porte in the first place. Russia, 
taking advantage of its victory over the Crimea, tried to increase its influence over 
the Caucasus through alliance with Kartli-Kakheti. As a reaction to this strategy, 
the Ottomans always urged its officials in the region to remain vigilant and spent 
                                                 
37 Dumanov, p.87. 
38 Longworth, p. 115. 
39 This number has been recorded as 7,000 by another author. Bilge, p.138. 
40 Dumanov, pp. 88-89.  
41 Kabardays had strong relations with the Georgian Kings. Kabardays, and in some cases other 
Circassians, used to fight as mercenaries in the Georgian army and a major portion of the Georgian 
army was composed of these mercenaries. However, when this relation continued after the 
uprising of the Kabardays, Russia accused Georgians of giving shelter to rebels and helping them 
to seek asylum in Ottoman territories.Gvosdev, p.47.  
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efforts to form a joint resistance.42 Russia was once again applying the divide et 
imperii strategy. A pro-Russian group was formed and the local conflicts were 
used as an excuse for intervention. In 1775, the Russians were claiming that it was 
their intention to help Feth Ali Khan, Khan of Kuba, who called for their support, 
when the Russian armies entered Daghestan.43 
A letter to Süleyman Pasha, the governor of Çıldır, expressed the anxiety of 
the local tribal leaders of the Russo-Georgian rapproachment in 1775. They 
invited the Ottomans to join the alliance against Russia and Kartli-Kakheti. One 
of these leaders, Surhay Khan, pointed out that only a joint attack on Georgia 
could succeed. However, it was not the intention of the Ottomans to provoke a 
war against Russia and the Porte considered it suffices to support the local tribes 
by sending gifts and titles.44 In spite of the fact that these local khanates were 
trying to form an alliance against Russia, they were also having troubles among 
each other. In 1778, Süleyman Pasha reported the tension between Feth Ali Khan 
and the other khans, and wanted the Porte to intervene. The Porte was concerned 
that Russia would benefit from this conflict. The news from Daghestan in 1778 
confirmed this fear. It was mentioned that Russia intended to send soldiers to this 
region.45 
In 1782, Russia tried but failed to invade Baku. The Russians appeared on 
the shores of Baku with twelve ships but could not break the resistance and had to 
retire. Simultaneously, a Russian force was on its way to Tiflis and the idea of a 
joint attack on Georgia by the Porte and the local khanates resurfaced. The locals 
were claiming that if a capable Ottoman officer was sent to Daghestan, Feth Ali 
                                                 
42 BOA, HAT, Dosya No: 4, Gömlek No: 94 A-J. 
43 Gökçe, pp. 106-107. 
44 Ibid, p.108. 
45 Ibid, p.109-110. 
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Khan and Usumi Khan would lead a 30,000 men army against Georgia through 
Kars, thus making it impossible for Russia to stay in the region.46  
The Russian advance into the Caucasus entered into a new phase after the 
annexation of the Crimean Khanate in 1783. Russia acquired not only the 
Crimean peninsula, but also the lands of Kuban located on the north of the Kuban 
River. The road that connects Mozdok and Tiflis was being improved and the 
fortress of Vladikavkaz “Master of the Caucasus” was built near the Daryal Pass 
in 1784.47 As a result, the struggle of the local population against the Russian 
advance had intensified.  
 
 
4.3.3. Treaty of Georgievsk with the Kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti (1783) 
 
In 1774, a European eye-witness to the events of the Ottoman-Russian war 
of 1768-1774 had commented that Russia would not return to the Caucasus in the 
near future.48 Of course, he was grossly mistaken. However, penetration into the 
Caucasus and Georgia required first the dismemberment of the Crimea. 
Furthermore, conquering Caucasus required “the bases on the Black Sea, secure 
river communications back to central Russia, and a settled agricultural population 
in New Russia from which to draw supplies.”49 
As it was mentioned earlier, relations between Russia and Kartli-Kakheti 
was on the decline during late 1770s. However, 1780s would witness a series of 
alterations in the Russian foreign policy towards Kartli-Kakheti. Old bureacrats 
                                                 
46 Gökçe, p.112. 
47 Montefiore, 291. 
48 Gvosdev, p.46. 
49 Dominic Lieven, Empire: Russia and its Rivals (London: Yale University Press, 2000), p. 212. 
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like Panin and Bestuzhev-Riumin were much more inclined to make Russia a part 
of the European system while the new ones like Potemkin and Bezborodko 
stressed the importance of the southern expansion and dominance in the Black 
Sea. Besides, Russia’s commercial relations with this region also increased and 
reached the annual amount of 1.8 million ruble.50 Considering these goals, 
Georgia was a very important asset for the Russian Empire. Especially after the 
annexation of the Crimea, Kartli-Kakheti became a very strategic point to protect 
the Russian gains in the Caucasus. In addition, Russia began to pursue an 
offensive policy at the expense of Persia, and Kartli-Kakheti would be a great 
asset for achieving this goal.51 
When the Ottoman-Persian war was over, the Porte once again tried to 
increase its influence over the Caucasus. In 1782, a new port was established in 
Faş (Poti). Although Solomon of Imeretia argued that this was a violation of the 
article 23 of the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, his protests did not bring any result. 
Earlier in 1779, the Khan of Revan refused to pay its taxes and rebelled against 
Irakli. Kerim Khan Zend was dead and a competition for succession started. When 
Ali Murad Zend finally claimed the throne, he turned against Kartli-Kakheti, a 
move which led Irakli to seek protection of Russia. The impact of the Lezgi raids 
on Kartli-Kakheti also affected this process.52 
On 3 October 1782, Irakli sent a petition to Catherine II, calling her the 
protector of all Orthodox Christians, he asked for protection. This letter was 
delivered to Potemkin on 29 October 1782. Irakli asked for protection against the 
Ottoman and Persian threat. He was troubled by both the Lezgi raids and 
                                                 
50 Gvosdev, p.48-49. 
51 Muriel Atkin, Russia and Iran, 1780-1828 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1980), 
p.37. 
52 Gvosdev, p.52. Bilge, pp. 144-145. 
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Aleksandr, who seek refuge in Feth Ali Khan of Baku. Irakli wanted Potemkin to 
deliver his request of protection to Catherine the Great personally.53  
Bezborodko drafted a report to Catherine II stating the benefits of forming 
an alliance with Kartli-Kakheti. He claimed that it would be crucial to form a 
barrier against the Muslims and establish new trade routes. Catherine promised to 
protect Kartli-Kakheti in return for military assistance in wartime against the 
Porte. Georgian clergy was encouraged to unite with the Russian church and the 
local aristocracy was granted titles of their equivalent ranking. On 29 December 
1782, Catherine made her final decision and Potemkin was sent to Georgia with 
full credentials. On 3 April 1783 a draft of the treaty was delivered to Irakli and a 
common ground was finally reached.54 
The Treaty of Georgievsk was signed on 24 July 1783.55 Two of the most 
senior officials on behalf of Irakli, namely Prince Ioann Bagration and Prince 
Garsevan Chavchavadze and Pavel Potemkin on behalf of Catherine II had signed 
the treaty. The news of the conclusion of the treaty reached Catherine II in 
August.56 
It was argued that a hierarchical sovereignty over Kartli-Kakheti by Russia 
was constructed with this treaty. On the other hand, Irakli only agreed to make 
foreign policy in line with Russia while retaining his royal titles.57 This duality 
was apparent on the coins of this period; one side of the coin has the Georgian 
                                                 
53 Gvosdev, p.53. 
54 Ibid, p.55. 
55 Douglas Smith (ed. and trans.), Love and Conquest: Personal Correspondence of Catherine the 
Great ad Prince Grigory Potemkin (Illinois: Northern Illinois University Press, 2005), p.148-149 
(letter 282-5 August 1783). For the articles of the treaty see, Ahmed Vâsıf Efendi, Mehasinü’l-
Âsâr ve Hakâikü’l-Ahbâr (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1994), pp.76-77. 
56 Baddeley, p.21. 
57 Russia did not interfere with the relations of Irakli with his neighbours as long as it was not 
contrary to the Russian interests in the region. Isabel de Madariaga, Russia in the Age of Catherine 
the Great (London: Phoenix, 2003), p.369. 
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sign while on the other side there was the two-headed eagle of Russia.58 Russian 
intention in this alliance was political rather than a religious one. The absence of 
such an agreement with Imeretia is a demonstration of this policy. Imeretia was 
not a politically stable country because of the struggles for succession. Besides, 
Imeretia was still theoretically an Ottoman territory and direct intervention would 
lead to a war against the Porte.59  
On 20 September 1783, the Treaty of Georgievsk was made public and the 
Russian officers who were commisssioned in the Caucasus line were informed 
about the alliance. Following the treaty, direct relations were established between 
Tiblisi and St. Petersburg. Irakli’s two sons were sent to St. Petersburg, while first 
Russian Ambassador, Stephan Burnashev reached Tiflis. In addition, Kartli-
Kakheti would not be in need of hiring mercaneries from the local tribes. In 
October 1783, two battalions and four batteries reached Tiflis under the command 
of General Samoilov.60 
The news of the Treaty of Georgievsk reached Constantinople through the 
Hospodar of Wallachia.61 The Ottomans tried to prevent the other khanates of 
Azerbaijan and Daghestan from forming alliances with Russia and from the 
corresponce of 1784, it is apparent that they succeeded in doing so. Süleyman 
Pasha informed Constantinople that for strengthening the connections with the 
khanates of Daghestan and Azerbaycan he sent messengers to the Khans and 
received positive replies.62  
The Porte was not content with the Russian policy and perceived it as an 
act contrary to the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca. After the meeting of the Divan in 
                                                 
58 Allen, p.210, Gvosdev, pp.56-57. 
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December 1784, Yakov Ivanovich Bulgakov, the Russian Ambassador at 
Constantinople, was summoned and informed about the protest of the Porte. 
Although the Ottoman Empire was not strong enough to risk a war against Russia, 
it did not refrain from provoking the local tribes against Russia in Daghestan. As a 
response to these raids, the Russian counter-attack was initiated in 1785. In 1786, 
to find a common ground, Süleyman Pasha and Irakli came together and agreed 
that the Porte would no longer provoke the local people against Irakli and in 
return, Russian forces in Georgia would not exceed 3,000 men and Irakli would 
not threaten the Ottoman territories.63 
 
 
4.4. The Ottoman role in the Caucasian Resistance and the Ferah Ali Pasha 
Mission (1781-1785) 
 
 After the independece of the Crimea, the Porte felt the need to deal with 
the local tribes of Circassia on its own, for there were no major Ottoman ports, 
except Sinop and Kili (at the mouth of Tuna), in the Black Sea. Besides, Russia 
sent its armies towards Taman and Kabarday, harrassed Dagestan and tried to 
establish its protection over Kartli-Kakheti. Ferah Ali Pasha advised the Porte to 
spend serious efforts to make loyal subjects out of the local population of this 
region.64 
During late 1770s, the Porte was already in trouble in the Crimea and in 
the East against Persia. Thus, no effective support was offered to the Circassians 
                                                 
63 Gvosdev, p.61. 
64 Ahmet Cevdet Paşa, pp.708-710. 
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in this period. The Ottomans were confident that the Circassians would always 
fight on their side against Russia. Although the Russian efforts to subdue the 
Kabardays temporarily succeeded, the Kabardays pointed out that they would side 
with the Sultan in case of the annulment of the peace between Russia and the 
Porte.65  
The first time an Ottoman army contacted the Circassians was when 
Canikli Ali Pasha and Gazi Hasan Pasha anchored in Soğucak in 1778 before the 
navy reached the Crimea. Although the Ottoman army was welcomed by the local 
people, at night some of the Circassians ambushed Ottoman soldiers. An 
equivalent of an ox was paid for each soldier to be freed and the Ottoman navy 
immediately left the shore.66 Later in 1779, Mikdad Pasha, son of Canikli Ali 
Pasha, was sent to Soğucak with 10,000 men to support the prespective Crimean 
expedition.67 
Beginning from the late 1770s the Porte tried and partially succeeded to 
establish a connection with the Ottoman culture through its commanders and 
governors among the Circassians, Lezgis, Chechens, and Abhazhas. However, it 
is important to mention the perceptions of the Caucasians of the Ottoman support. 
There was not a consensus among the different tribes regarding this issue. On the 
one hand there was the Zanıko tribe, whose leaders argued that it should be the 
Caliph who sends help to the Caucasus against the infidel enemy. On the other 
there was the Kalibaytyko tribe, whose leaders defended the idea that the Ottoman 
support would antagonize Russia and the Ottoman-Russian rivalry would directly 
                                                 
65 BOA, HAT, Dosya No: 22, Gömlek No: 1022.  
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be reflected on the Caucasus. However, both sides were anxious about the Russian 
advance and finally the Porte decided to take action.68 
Ferah Ali Pasha was assigned to Soğucak in late 1780. He was the first 
Ottoman officer who tried to spread Islam among the Circassians and gain the 
loyalty of these people. After he got the supplies for Soğucak from Sinop, he 
reached the fortress of Soğucak in 1781, only to find it in a desolated condition. 
However, he kept this secret and immediately started to gather information about 
the population of the area.69  
As a result of the Russian pressure in Taman, population of this area 
migrated to the Caucasus and Ferah Ali Pasha commissioned the old Serdengeçti 
Ağası Mehmet Ağa to deal with the settlement of these emmigrants. He also asked 
for financial support from Constantinople to gather and settle these people. When 
the supportive attitude of the Porte towards these emigrants was learnt, other 
dispersed emmigrants also arrived in Soğucak.70 The Nogays, who had caused 
trouble during the Ottoman-Russian war of 1768-1774 and came to the Kabarday 
region, asked permission from Ferah Ali Pasha to live in this region. Ferah Ali 
Pasha considered these people as an element of balance against the Circassians. 
An agreement was made and Nogays agreed to side with the Ottomans in a 
possible conflict against the Circassians or Russia. They were to be exempt from 
any taxes other than aşar.71 
                                                 
68 Gökçe, p.42-43. 
69 Ibid, p.45. Pshis (Princes) were the highest in the hierarchy of the Circassian society and their 
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were resulted with the spread of Islam among the Circassians, the traditions went deep with these 
people and always remained prominent. Ibid, p.46-47, 50. 
70 Ahmet Cevdet Paşa, p.712. 
71 Ibid, p.724. 
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Ferah Ali Pasha began to spread propaganda of the Porte. He took the oath 
of allegiance from the people of Soğucak and then invited the other Circassian 
tribes to recognize Islam and his vizierate. He also married the daughter of a tribal 
leader to strenghten his connection with the local population. The soldiers under 
his command followed his example.72 
Russia was disturbed by the spread of Islam and the Ferah Ali Pasha 
mission. In a report, dated 9 September 1782, there was mention of the North 
Caucasian tribal leaders offering their allegiance to the Porte and they were in 
close contact with the Pasha of Çıldır (Akhaltsikhe). King Solomon, in his letter 
dated September 1782, informed the Russian colonel Karl I. Mufel about the two 
of the Circassian tribes which directly contacted Ferah Ali Pasha and asked for 
protection. Once again, in a report dated 8 December 1782, the spread of Islam 
was perceived as a threat since it was manipulated as a tool to provoke the local 
peoples against Russia.73  
In 1781, Ferah Ali Pasha asked for provisions and reinforcements to 
strenghten his force of 100 men. The conscripts from Anatolia, 1,000 men in total, 
were sent to Soğucak.  Finally in 1782, there was was a strong tower, armory and 
a palace for the Pasha in Soğucak.74 To prevent the pirate activities, which even 
affected the Gazi Hasan Pasha and the Ottoman navy, Ferah Ali Pasha sent 
envoys with gifts to convince the so-called “Haçepa”75 pirates and partially 
succeeded in doing so.76 
As it was mentioned earlier, there were not many suitable ports for the 
Ottoman navy in the Black Sea. The search for a new port resulted in the building 
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of Gelincik located in the north of Soğucak and its command was entrusted to 
Narcu Mehmed Geray, who was a foster brother of Şahin Geray Khan.77 
Simultaneously, the fortification of Anapa had begun. It was located on the border 
of Taman and to the north-west of Soğucak and Gelincik. Thus, it was considered 
as a protection for both. When the fortification of Anapa was completed, orders 
arrived from Constantinople also to erect batteries on the banks of the Kuban 
River.78  
In 1783, when Şahin Geray Khan’s envoy claimed that the Ottoman 
Empire ceded Taman to Russia, Hacı Hasan Ağa, the kethüda of Ferah Ali Paşa, 
had him killed and diplomatic relations entered a deadlock. Following the 
annexation of the Crimea, Russia began to deploy soldiers to the Northern 
Caucasus. As a reaction to the Russian policy, the Circassian pshis met with Ferah 
Ali Pasha and informed him of their decision to resist against the Russian 
advance.79 
On 8 December 1783, after the annihilation of the Nogays in the region, 
Russia settled almost 60,000 Cossacks in the northern Kuban region. Later, 
Stavropol was to be opened for the German settlers. The Astrakhan and Stavropol 
gubernias were merged and in May 1785, the Viceroyalty (Namestnichestvo) of 
Caucasus was established. The first governor of this united province became 
Pavel Potemkin.80 
Bahadır Geray Khan, who was released from Russian captivity in 1784, 
caused trouble in the Caucasus. He gained the allegiance of 8,000-10,000 Nogays 
and refused to recognize the local authority of Ferah Ali Pasha. However, he was 
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defeated by the forces of Ferah Ali Pasha.81 Ferah Ali Pasha requested from the 
Porte to reside Bahadır Geray Khan to his estate in Rumeli and he received orders 
to take necessary measures. However, Bahadır Geray Khan could not be 
convinced.82   
In the spring of 1784, a crisis emerged in Imeretia. Although it was 
theoretically an Ottoman territory, Süleyman Pasha informed Constantinople 
about the plans of Solomon for a joint attack on the Ottoman Empire with Irakli.83 
When Solomon died on 23 April 1784, Lezgis attacked Imeretia together with the 
Acarans and pillaged the Georgian villages. Altough it was demanded from the 
Porte to prevent these raids, the Porte was not inclined to protect Georgia.84 
During 1784, Bulgakov sent several protests to the Porte because of the 
interventions of Süleyman Pasha.85 After they invaded the Imeretian territory, 
Lezgis arrived in Çıldır, but they were not welcome there. The Porte did not want 
these raids to cause a war against Russia.86 Although the Imeretians responded 
these raids with a counter-attack, they were ambushed by Abaza Mehmet Paşa 
and were annihilated on 8 May 1784.87 Following this battle, Mustafa Bey was 
sent to Faş with 500 soldiers to strengthen the Ottoman position.88 
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The hesitant policy of the Porte once again prevented the concrete results 
to be achieved. It was not the Georgian army or the King that the Ottomans 
feared; they simply refrained from provoking Russia which might lead to a new 
destructing war. However, Russia also was not in a position to intervene directly 
in this period. What the Ottomans did was to provoke the local people without 
giving any further support and this type of policy ultimately failed to achieve its 
goal, in preventing the Russian influence and advance in the Caucasus. 
 
 
4.5. Imam Mansur and first united Caucasian Muslim resistance against 
Russia 
 
The year 1785 can be regarded as a turning point in the history of resistance 
of the people of Caucasus against Russia. As a result of Imam Mansur’s efforts, 
for the first time, various peoples of the Caucasus joined under a single leader to 
fight against Russia. This also demonstrated the important role of Islam as a 
uniting force among these people.  
Imam Mansur’s real name was Ushurma and he was a Chechen89 born in 
Aldy in 1760. He was son of a middle-class family and did not receive any 
religious or higher education. An interesting aspect of Mansur is that very little 
                                                 
89 There were other claims about his origins that he was a Nogay or a Circassian. Even there were 
fantastic rumours about him being an Italian named Giovanni Battista Boetti. “Some Russians did 
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Sheikh Mansur,” Central Asian Survey, vol.10, no:1-2, pp.93-101, V.A.Potto, pp. 134-150. 
Nikolai F. Dubrovin, O Narodakh Tsentralnogo Severo-Zapodnogo Kavkaza: Ot Priniatiia Gruzii 
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information was known about his sudden appearance and his background.90 He 
claimed to have a vision of the Prophet and that he was assigned with the holy 
task of Jihad.91 One of the first Ottoman officials sent by Ferah Ali Pasha to 
investigate the situation, Gazioğlu Mehmed Ağa, reported that Mansur attributed 
himself a kind of religious leadership. There were even reports of his followers 
joining him from Antep and Sivas, who previously belonged to the Ottoman 
ulema. He addressed the Muslims of the Caucasus,  
O believers! Know that your life is full of ignorance, and that you 
have committed sins by drinking alcohol and smoking tobacco. Now 
you have an opportunity to rectify your mistakes and to find a way 
out. Give alms to the poor, and fight against the enemy. Anything 
Russian is forbbiden, as is any manner resembling that of the 
Russians. If you get ill do no go to a Russian physican, because you 
might end up befriending him.92 
 
On 8 March 1785, General Peutling drafted a report on Mansur. General 
Mattse, the commander of Vladikavkaz, confirmed the information that Mansur 
was searching allies to his cause and he communicated with Çupalov, a Kumuk 
Prince, and Dol Muradov, one of Little Kabardinian nobles. On 2 April 1785, 
Pavel Potemkin manifested a threatening message to the Chechen and Kumuk 
peoples regarding Mansur.93 The Porte was also not very much comfortable with 
the activities of Mansur, since his raids to the Russian territories caused tension 
between Russia and Constantinople. To prevent any further deterioration of the 
relations with Russia, Ferah Ali Pasha tried to convince Mansur side with him. He 
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also asked for certain gifts to present to the local leaders to prevent them from 
allying with Mansur.94 
On 7 May 1785, Grigory Potemkin ordered Pavel Potemkin to capture the 
“false prophet”. Potemkin estimated the strength of the rebels around 10,000 
while the Russian garrison in the Caucasus amounted to 27,000 men.95 Acting on 
this order, Pavel Potemkin sent General Pieri with 7,000 men to capture Mansur 
and the first major battle between Mansur and the Russians took place in Aldı on 
6 June 1785. Pieri, defying the state of peace between Russia and the Porte, began 
to bombard the village. Initially the Chechens suffered heavy casualties including 
Mansur’s elder brother. However, Mansur took command and cornered the 
Russian army.96 Almost 300 Russian soldiers were killed including General Pieri. 
Those who managed to escape took refuge in the Hacılar fortress.97 Among them 
was Pyotr Ivanovich Bagration, the Georgian prince, who would become one of 
the prominent generals of the Russian army in the struggle against Napoleon.  
When Mansur’s reputation spread, the number of his followers began to 
increase. Mansur’s next target was Kızlar. On 5 July 1785, he commenced an 
attack on the well-fortified Kızlar with insufficent forces and thus failed to 
achieve a major success. Although he managed to capture one of the outer 
defenses of the fortress, he had to retire after suffering heavy losses when the 
Cossacks attacked him from the rear.98 Later, on 26 July 1785, Imam Mansur 
joined Dol Muradov and together with the Kabarday cavalry, he organized a new 
attack on the Kumkalesi (Grigoriopolis) with a 15,000 men strong army. The 
commander of Kumkalesi easily surrendered and Mansur had gained a foothold 
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on the Vladikavkaz-Mozdok line.99 Encouraged by this achievement, Mansur 
besieged Kızlar for a second time on 19-22 August and failed once again.100 
During October, Mansur was looking for supporters to his cause in the Eastern 
Caucasus while he was once again defeated and routed by the 6,000-men strong 
force of Pavel Potemkin.101  
Süleyman Pasha informed Constantinople that Mansur would not be any 
sort of trouble to the Porte and that he only tried to warn people about obeying the 
Sharia.102 This time Gazi Hasan Pasha was sent for gathering detailed information 
about Mansur. This mission could arrive in Anapa after five months and Gazi 
Hasan Pasha reported the information to Constantinople which already had 
reached Ferah Ali Pasha. In addition to this, the kaftancı of Ferah Ali Pasha also 
brought news to the Porte about Imam Mansur.103 He reported that Mansur 
emerged victorious in both battles he fought against the Russians and that he had 
nothing against the interests of the Ottoman Empire in the region. On the contrary, 
he was ready to fight under the Ottomans against Russia.104 
The last of the series of defeats that Mansur had suffered was the Battle of 
Tatartüp. Considering the significance of this insurrection and encouraged with 
their victories over Mansur, Pavel Potemkin sent Colonel Nagel with 
reinforcements from the Crimea and Kumkale.105 On 2 November 1785, Mansur 
was defeated and suffered heavy casualties.106 However, Russians could not 
                                                 
99 Gökçe, p.121. 
100 Commander of Sohum, Keleş Bey, sent an envoy, Hasan Fehmi, with various gifts to the 
Chechen territory and for the first time this man was able to contact Mansur directly. Ahmed Vâsıf 
Efendi, Mehasin, p.364. Fehmi was reporting Mansur’s both attempts to capture Kızlar when he 
failed in both. BOA, HAT, Dosya No: 21, Gömlek No: 1011-B and 1011-D. 
101 Kutlu, p.135.  
102 BOA, HAT, Dosya No: 21, Gömlek No: 1011-E. 
103 BOA, HAT, Dosya No: 21, Gömlek No: 1011-A. 
104 BOA, HAT, Dosya No: 21, Gömlek No: 1011-B, Dosya No:27, Gömlek No: 1305-A. 
105 BOA, HAT, Dosya No: 18, Gömlek No: 801.  
106 Burke, p.145. 
 100
advance any further while Mansur remained in the Kabarday region to prepare for 
a future assasult.107 However, as a result of these series of defeats, Mansur lost his 
popular support and most of the nobles deserted him. At the same time, unable to 
capture Mansur, Prince Potemkin put a handsome price on the Sheikh’s head, 
either dead or alive.108 In St. Petersburg, there were rumours that Mansur was an 
emissary of the Porte rather than a mere fanatic, and he was manipulating the 
“peaceful souls” against Russia by using religion.109 
During 1786, Mansur managed to capture Aleksandrovskaya and a few 
other fortications in Kabarday. This allowed the Ottomans to communicate easier 
with the region because of the broken Russian influence. Mansur also continued 
his raids towards Kuban and in one case; two hundred Russian soldiers were 
captured with their commander.110 
One of the most prominent supporters of Mansur, Dol Muradov was 
captured by the Russians in early 1786. Although he was released in June 1786 he 
could not be effective any more and this resulted in some Ingush and Kabarday 
princes shifting their alligiance to Russia to fight against Mansur. On 17 January 
1787, a major Russian army entered Chechen territories under the command of 
Colonel Savelyev. In the Battle of Ghaçalq (Kachkalikov), Mansur ambushed this 
army with his cavalry but had to retire. Two days later, Colonel Retinder once 
again commenced a Russian offensive only to bombard the villages because there 
was no army to fight the Russians.111 
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It was even rumoured that Şahin Geray was allowed to go to 
Constantinople to prevent him uniting with Mansur. The kethüda of Ferah Ali 
Pasha was executed after his intention to join Mansur was learnt by Bicanoğlu Ali 
Pasha, who succeeded Ferah Ali Pasha on 16 November 1785.112 In 1786, when 
Mansur failed to achieve his goals, he sought refuge among the Lezgis. Bulgakov 
on the other hand demanded from the Porte to punish the Lezgis and recognize the 
Russian suzeranity over Kartli-Kakheti. However, the Porte received the news of 
any success of Mansur with joy. Thus, Grand Vizier Koca Yusuf Pasha ignored 
the Russian demands and declared that the Porte was going to support Mansur and 
his Lezgi followers.113  
 
 
4.6. The Caucasus in 1787 
 
  The successor of Ferah Ali Pasha, Bicanoğlu Ali Pasha, was not a very 
brilliant leader. The local population was not pleased of him either. He was too 
much involved in slave trade and disturbed the local people. Thus, he was 
replaced by Mustafa Pasha. The latter immediately declared his intention to 
follow Ferah Ali Pasha and he concluded a treaty, composed of nine articles, with 
the local tribes which remained valid until 1829. He aimed to convince the people 
that they had common enemies.114  
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The Russians believed that behind the attacks of the Daghestan tribes on 
Georgia were the Ottomans,115 and on 18 May 1786, Bulgakov sent a memorial to 
the Porte demanding Süleyman Pasha to be restrained from disturbing Kartli-
Kakheti. After Bulgakov submitted his memorial, Grand Vizier met with 
Ambassador Ainslee and wanted to learn where Britain stands but he did not 
receive a definite answer.116 As a response to the Russian demands, Koca Yusuf 
Pasha, on 14 July 1786, denied the accusations and protesting the Russian activiy 
in the Caucasus and especially Georgia, accused Russia with the violation of 
Ottoman territory.117 In the summer of 1787, when Russians responded this by 
accusing the Ottomans of provoking the local tribes against Russia, the Porte gave 
a final note to Russia demanding the evacuation of Georgia.118 The road to the 
Second Ottoman-Russian war was opened in August 1787. 
 
The Russian advance in the Caucasus had mainly a militaristic nature. The 
fortified lines, from Azak to the Caspian Sea, were established both to protect the 
Russian settlements and to organize new expeditions to expand towards the south 
further at the expense of the local peoples. The Russian penetration in the 
Caucasus was propped up with the independence of the Crimean Khanate in the 
first place and its annexation into the Russian Empire later in 1783. In addition, 
Russia also took advantage of the Christian population of this region to protect its 
interests. Although the complete annexation of the Georgian lands could be 
realized a few decades later, during this thirteen years period, Russia established a 
strong foothold in the Caucasus. These aggressive policies of Russia ignited local 
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resistance and the movement of Imam Mansur emerged as the first united Muslim 
resistance in the Caucasus. The failure of Mansur against the regular armies of 
Russia and increasing Russian presence in Kartli-Kakheti, at the borders of the 
Ottoman Empire seriously disturbed the Porte. The combination of these 
developments was to become a reason of the beginning of a new Ottoman-Russian 
war in August 1787. 
  
 104
 
 
CHAPTER V 
 
 
THE OLD BATTLEGROUND: 
INCREASING RUSSIAN INFLUENCE OVER 
THE BALKANS 
 
 
 
5.1. The Balkans between the Ottoman Empire and Russia 
 
The Balkans had a distinct place in the Ottoman-Russian relations during 
the 18th and 19th centuries.1 The main reason was the religious connection 
between the Russians and the Orthodox peoples of the Balkans living under the 
Ottoman rule. During the 18th century, religion was a strong motive in the policies 
of the Russian Empire. It was not primarily for the sake of religious affection, but 
instead the religious affiliation with the Balkan peoples was manipulated by the 
Tsars against the Porte. 
                                                 
1 For a further detailed account of the Balkans during this period see, Barbara Jelavich, History of 
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Russian interest and activity in the Balkans mainly dates back to the 
beginning of the 18th century. The increasing Russian involvement in the affairs of 
the Balkans was a direct result of Russian territorial expansion during the 17th 
century. The Ottoman Empire became one of the major opponents of Russia, thus 
the Orthodox inhabitants of the Ottoman Empire became an indispensable asset 
for the Russian rulers to use as a threat against the Porte.2  
For the first time in 1711, during the campaign of Prut, Peter the Great 
tried to turn the Christian population of the Balkans against their “infidel” 
masters. Peter the Great called the Balkan peoples to fight against the Ottomans,  
 
“for faith and fatherland, for your honor and glory, for the freedom 
and liberty of yourself and your descendants.” Thus would “the 
descendants of the heathen Mohammed be driven out into their old 
fatherland, the Arabian sands and steppes.”3 
 
Although both Constantin Brâncoveanu of Wallachia and Dimitrie 
Cantemir of Moldavia promised Russia military support, only Cantemir could 
remain true to his word but still no popular uprising had occurred.4 Defeat of the 
Russian army on the banks of the Prut River was also a major disaster for the 
Principalities.5 Since the Sultan perceived that he could not rely on the local 
boyars anymore, he decided to appoint the Hospodars himself from among the 
                                                 
2 For a detailed account of the Russian relations with the Balkan peoples see, Ariadna Pavlovna 
Bazhova, Russko-Yugoslavianskie Otnosheniia vo Vtoroy Polovine XVIII v. (Moscow: Izdatelstvo 
“Nauka”, 1982). 
3 Stavrianos, p.179.  
4 William Wilkinson, An Account of the Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia (New York: 
Arno Press, 1971), pp.33-36. After the defeat of the Russian army, Cantemir escaped to Russia 
with Peter the Great. In 15 August 1714, after peace was finally concluded with Russia, 
Brâncoveanu and his four sons were brought to Constantinople and executed. 
5 Among the Balkan countries, the principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia had a special 
administration. Since their annexation to the Empire in the 15th century, Ottomans favored an 
autonomous rule in these principalities. Governors of both Wallachia and Moldavia were chosen 
among the local elite. They were serving as a buffer zone against Poland and Habsburgs. Besides, 
they had to pay a certain amount of yearly taxation to Constantinople. Both sides were benefiting 
from this deal. Ottomans was free from dealing with administrative burden of Trans-Danubian 
areas, while the governors of the Principalities were free both in their domestic and foreign affairs. 
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Phanariotes6 of Istanbul. In 1715, Nicholas Mavrocordatos was appointed as the 
Hospodar of both principalities and thus begun the age of Phanariotes (1711-
1821).7 The English consul to the Principalities during the 1820s, have later 
remarked that the appointment of the Phanariotes was the worst thing that 
happened to the people of Wallachia and Moldavia.8  
Nicholas Mavrocardatos, was following policies contrary to the interests of 
the boyars in an arbitrary way. He used the authority of the Metropolitan to inflict 
death penalties for minor reasons.9 As a response to the harsh treatments of the 
Hospodars, Boyars made their intentions clear for establishing a Christian regime 
when the opportunity arose. During the 1739 campaign, boyar families sent 
petitions to the Tsaritsa to annex the Principalities into Russia. Thus, Russia once 
again called the Christians to rise against the Ottoman Empire.10 Ghica II escaped 
from Moldavia while General von Münnich was welcomed by the local 
aristocracy who wanted the Hospodar to be deposed. However, soon after the 
                                                 
6 For a definition and discussion of the Phanariots see, Christine M. Philliou, “Worlds, Old and 
New: Phanariot Networks and the Remaking of Ottoman Governance in the First Half of the 
Nineteenth Century,” PhD. Dissertation, Princeton University (New Jersey, 2004), pp. 8-11. 
7 Kurt W. Treptow (ed.), A History of Romania (Iaşi: The Center for Romanian Studies, 1996) 
p.194-195. For a general account of this period see, Andrei Otetea (ed.), The History of the 
Romanian People (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1970), pp.254-281. 
8 Wilkinson, p.95. The Phanariot regime was nothing but beneficial or favourable to the local 
aristocracy. As a result of this new regulation, the seat of the Hospodar was used to be sold to the 
highest bidder. During the mid-18th century, it took 30,000 golden pounds to be the Hospodar of 
Moldavia, while it was 45,000 for Wallachia. Their respective revenues were 180,000 and 300,000 
golden pounds. Jelavich, History of the Balkans, p.103. However, there was a constant fear of 
being deposed and executed, which resulted in the arbitrary rule of the Phanariots to please 
Constantinople at all costs. After having been appointed, these new governors tried to compensate 
their expenditures and please Constantinople with large sums of income. They squeezed the local 
people by increasing the taxes to achieve these goals. These carefree policies of the Phanariotes in 
the first half of the 18th century resulted with a huge population loss in the principalities. What the 
rulers could not comprehend was that the economy of the principalities depended on agriculture 
and heavy taxation on the villagers would cause reaction which would ultimately hurt the 
economy. This was evident especially during the mid-18th century when almost half of the 
population deserted the Principalities. George F. Jewsbury, The Russian Annexation of 
Bessarabia: 1774-1828, A Study of Imperial Expansion (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1976), p.13. 
9 Nicolae Iorga, A History of Roumania (London: Adelphi Terrace, 1925), trans. Joseph McCabe,  
p.192. 
10 Jewsbury, p.18, Jelavich, History of the Balkans, p.68. 
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Treaty of Belgrade was signed, the Russian armies left and Oltenia was also 
returned to the Porte by the Habsburgs.11  
It is important to point out that the Habsburg regime was not any lenient 
than the Ottoman. After Banat and Oltenia were ceased to Austria in 1718, the 
Habsburg authorities also ignored the local aristocracy and tried to establish a 
central rule to improve agriculture. Also in Morea, the Turkish rule was harsh but 
still not harsher than Venetian rule and under the Ottomans, for the most part the 
Greeks had the wealth of the country in their hands.12 
After the treaty of Belgrade till the Ottoman-Russian war of 1768-1774 
begun, the Principalities were no longer a primary political object of any 
neighbouring Empire. “At that stage, the suzerainty of the Porte was a shield that 
ensured their existence within a policy of balance.”13 During the period preceding 
the Ottoman-Russian war of 1768-1774, Russia tried to disturb the Ottoman rule 
in the Balkans through its agents in Greece, Bosnia, and Montenegro. The hope 
was embedded in the peoples of the Balkans, either Slav or Greek, that the old 
prophecy about the destruction of the Ottoman Empire was about to be 
accomplished.14 
 
                                                 
11 Following the treaty of Belgrade until the Ottoman Russian war of 1768-1774, Constantine 
Mavrocordatos was the most important actor in the principalities who initiated a series of reforms 
to improve the conditions of the people. Serfdom was abolished in both Principalities during 
1740s. However, these kinds of reforms were contrary to the interests of the nobility and as a 
result they continued to search for external support. Barbara Jelavich, Russia and the Formation of 
the Romanian National State 1821-1878 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp. 3-4. 
12 Franco Venturi, The End of the Old Regime 1768-1776: The First Crisis (New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1989) trans. Burr Litchfield, p.25. 
13 Gheorghe Platon, "The Romanians Caught Between the Turkish, Austrian and Russian 
Empires." In Romania: A Historic Perspective (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998) ed. 
Dinu C. Giurescu and Stephen Fischer-Galati, p.150 
14 J.A.R. Marriot, Anglo-Russian Relations 1689-1943 (London: Methuen & Co., 1944), p.45. 
There was an interesting prophecy from a 1769 dated gazette, according to which Ottoman Empire 
was destined to doom at the hands of the Venetians and Russians and when these two capture 
Constantinople, they would elect a Christian king. During the 18th century, this old prophecy was 
quite popular according the famous historian Rulhiere the author of Histoire de l’anarchie de 
Pologne. Venturi, p.27 
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5.2. The Balkans during the Ottoman-Russian War of 1768-1774 and 
Küçük Kaynarca 
 
In January 1768, after the Ottoman-Russian war broke out, Catherine the 
Great made a call to the “all Orthodox peoples groaning under the Ottoman 
yoke”15 to rise against their “infidel” masters. Some of the boyars invited the 
Russian invasion and the Russian generals established contacts with the nobility.16 
In 1770, Russian armies under the command of Pyotr Rumiantsev captured Iaşi 
and Bucharest. They were greeted by the local population as an army of 
liberation.17 During the long war, which lasted for six years, the Russian armies 
greatly benefited from the collaboration of the local people and received both 
military and logistic support. The victories of the Russian forces against the 
Ottoman armies entailed the increase of Russian influence in the region.18 
Nevertheless, the expected uprising of the Christian population did not occur in 
the Principalities.  
During the negotiations which took place in Focşani and Bucharest, the 
boyars of Wallachia and Moldavia wanted to regain their absolute autonomy 
under the guarantee of Russia, Prussia and the Habsburgs. The regime was to be 
either a monarchy or an oligarchy but their main goal was to get rid of the 
Phanariots.19 The boyars were comfortable even with uniting the principalities 
under the Russian suzerainty, only with the condition that a committee of boyars, 
                                                 
15 Venturi, p.35.  
16 Iorga, A History of Roumania , p.193. 
17 Gladys Scott Thomson, Catherine the Great and Expansion of Russia (London: The English 
Universities Press, 1966), p.138. 
18 Jewsbury, p.18. 
19 Treptow, p.212. 
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composed of twelve families, would retain its authority.20 However, in general, an 
important aspect of the petitions sent to Russia was that the local boyars or clergy 
was only asking the Tsaritsa to send them aid to free them of their problems rather 
than expressing a wish to be annexed into the Russian Empire.21  
Another major theatre of war during the Ottoman-Russian war was the 
Peloponnesian peninsula.22 The Greeks of Morea rebelled against the Porte in 
1770. They were encouraged by the Russians and received material support 
through the Mediterranean navy of Russia. Antonio Psaros, an important figure in 
the preparation of the insurrection, pointed out that unless Russia would not send 
a considerable force to support the Greeks, no conclusive result could be achieved 
with this rebellion.23  
The rumours were circulating about a united Russo-Greek army of 50,000 
was being formed and during the spring of 1770 there was an optimistic mood 
among the Greeks that they were about to be liberated from the Ottoman rule. 
However, the idea of liberation brought only a great deal of horrors and 
massacres. “This war will be the most atrocious ever seen, because the Turks will 
slaughter any Greeks they capture, and no quarter will be given by Greeks or 
Muscovites to Turks or Jews.”24  
When the Ottomans commenced their counter-attack by sending the 
Albanian irregulars, this time Greeks suffered massacres of the same kind which 
                                                 
20 Iorga, A History of Roumania, p.194. 
21 Jewsbury, p.21. Perhaps an exception to this would be Mihai Cantacuzino, who in 1772 asked 
for independence or else Russian protectorate for his lands. These petitions were used by the 
Russian diplomats in 1774 to demand certain rights on the principalities. 
22 For a further detailed account of the insurrection see, Venturi, pp.23-74. 
23 İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, Osmanlı Tarihi vol.4, part 1 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1995), pp. 
391-392, Venturi, pp. 28-29,38. Indeed the Russian expeditionary force was so small that it 
disappointed the Greeks and when they lost their will to fight against the Ottomans, the Russians 
interpreted the Greek attitude as treason. Stavrianos, p.189 
24 Venturi, p.41. 
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they committed earlier and the captives were sold as slaves.25 Since the Russian 
garrison in Morea was not strong enough to fight against the Ottoman forces, the 
newly arriving volunteers from other parts of Greece were sent to the front. After 
Aleksey Orlov and Dolgorukii were wounded in action, the Russian forces had to 
retreat. This was followed by the wrath of the Albanians. As a result of this 
continuous fighting, Morea turned into a wasteland while its population had fled 
to mountains, if they were not already sold as slave.26 
Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca is a major turning point regarding the Russo-
Ottoman relations in the Balkans. Although Russia gave up its conquests in the 
Balkans, namely Wallachia and Moldavia, it gained the right to intervene into the 
domestic politics of these Principalities. The Crimea became independent and 
Russia extended its borders to the banks of the river Bug. The vague rights that 
Russia had gained with the signing of Küçük Kaynarca over the Christian subjects 
of the Porte, was to become a reason to justify possible Russian interventions to 
the affairs of Balkan Christians. Last but not least, according to the Treaty of 
Küçük Kaynarca, Russia had gained extensive rights to open consulates in the 
Ottoman territories.27 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
25 Venturi, p.44. 
26 Ibid, p.46. 
27 For an account of the Russian consulates in the Balkans see, Osman Köse, “Balkanlarda Rus 
Konsolosluklarının Kuruluşu ve Faaliyetleri,” Turkish Studies, vol.1, no. 2 (Fall, 2006), pp. 153-
171. Russian ambassador was claiming that it was necessary for his country to open consulates in 
certain cities to protect the commercial interests of his country. Müntehabat, pp.503-505. 
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5.3. Russian penetration into the Balkans after 1774 
 
After 1774, Russia constantly tried to organize and support local partisans 
who were in favour of departing their ways with the Porte. The Russian consuls in 
Thessalonica, Cyprus, Rhodes, and Crete were mainly dealing with gathering 
intelligence and provoking the Christian population against the Sultan.28 Russia 
also had established consulates in several Balkan cities.29 These consuls were 
practically Russian agents who were spreading the ideas of revolt and discontent 
among the Christian subjects of the Sultan. According to the reports of Diez, 
Prussian Ambassador at the Porte, the Jesuit priests who were expelled from 
various countries of Europe were assigned by the Russians in the Balkans with the 
duty of provoking the Christian subjects of the Sultan.30 Russia was also 
supporting the Greek pirates in financial and military terms. These pirates were 
harassing the Ottoman sailors in the Mediterranean and the Aegean.31  
As long as the Ottoman authority diminished in this region, the Christians 
of the Balkans looked for cooperation and support from external powers. In 1781, 
deputies from Montenegro and in 1783 from Moldavia were asking for protection 
from the Habsburgs against the pressure from Constantinople. 
 
                                                 
28 Fikret Sarıcaoğlu, Kendi Kaleminden Bir Padişahın Portresi: Sultan I. Abdülhamid (1774-1789) 
(İstanbul: Tatav, 2001), p.206. 
29 Russia also established a consulate in Sinop. However the local people were not used to any 
kind of foreign represetatives and gave a hard time to the Russian consul who in February 1785 
had to fled to Crimea which resulted with a Russian protest through the Ambassador at 
Constantinople. Ahmed Vâsıf Efendi, Mehasinü’l-Âsâr ve Hakâikü’l-Ahbâr (Ankara: Türk Tarih 
Kurumu, 1994), pp.226-227. 
30 Kemal Beydilli, Büyük Friedrich ve Osmanlılar (İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Yayınları, 
1985), p.139. 
31 Stanford J. Shaw, Between Old and New: The Ottoman Empire Under Sultan Selim III 1789-
1807 (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp.24-25. For Russian efforts to increase 
its influence in the Mediterranean see, Thomas Freller, “In Search of a Mediterranean Base: The 
Order of St. John and Russia’s Great Power Plans During the Rule of Tsar Peter the Great and 
Tsarina Catherine II,” Journal of Early Modern History, vol. 8, no. 1-2 (2004), pp. 3-30. 
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5.3.1. Wallachia and Moldavia 
 
To expand its influence and territories further towards the Danube River, 
Russia first had to find a stable pro-Russian environment which required political, 
diplomatic, and military preparations. The opportunity presented itself to the 
Russian officials in Wallachia and Moldavia as the Ottoman weakness further 
increased during the last quarter of the 18th century.32 
The worsened condition of the Principalities during the course of the 18th 
century also worked for the benefit of the Russian rulers. The Christian population 
of the Balkans was frequently disturbed by the renegade janissaries. When they 
did not receive protection even though they paid heavy taxes, these people started 
to question the legitimacy of the Ottoman regime. Thus, these uncomfortable 
conditions prepared the ground for further Russian influence.33  
The article 16 of the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca was directly related to the 
Principalities. Russians gained the right to intervene in the domestic affairs of the 
Principalites which included investigating the Ottoman policies and receiving 
petitions from the Hospodars. The Ottoman Empire could not depose any 
Hospodar arbitrarily and should protect the rights of the Christians by allowing 
them to perform their religion and to build and repair their churches.34 Later, 
Russia did not hesitate to intervene on behalf of its Orthodox co-religionists and 
demanded from Constantinople to follow such policies to secure the stability and 
tranquility in the Principalities.35 
                                                 
32 Jewsbury, p.7. 
33 Suraiya Faroqhi, The Ottoman Empire and the World Around It (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2004), 
p.69. 
34 Jelavich, Russia and the Formation of the Romanian National State 1821-1878, p.5-6. Jelavich, 
History of the Balkans, pp.69-70. 
35 Jewsbury, p.23. 
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The Hospodars of the Principalities were one of the important sources of 
information for the Sultan, especially regarding the European affairs.36 The 
autonomous history of the Principalities produced local rulers who were 
experienced in diplomacy and relations with the Great Powers. Besides, they were 
used to be governed from a remote center and learnt to approach a new master 
when they realized the power of the old one was in decline. Rumiantsev 
commented that Russia’s supporters in Moldavia and Wallachia were “similar to 
Janus, having two faces and two heart, and both are cunning.”37  
After 1774, Russia got the upper hand in the affairs of the Principalities 
and it was difficult for the Porte to deal with Russian advance alone.38 Russia 
increased its pressure on the Porte, especially by using the partisan groups in Iaşi 
and Bucharest, and the Porte had to comply with this as long as no other great 
power interest was at stake. The Russians promoted the personal interests of the 
Boyars for the Russians knew that Boyars would cooperate with whoever offered 
the greatest benefit. During the late 18th century, the Russian role increased almost 
to a level of virtual protectorate.39 No matter how significant the religious 
brotherhood was presentet, in the worldly affairs of Catherine II, political interests 
were almost prominent.40  
Since the Phanariots ruled for short periods and did not have any 
connection with the local population, they presented a harsh regime by heavy 
taxation. “The weight of this system on the population can be appreciated by 
                                                 
36 Thomas Naff, “Reform and the Conduct of Ottoman Diplomacy in the Reign of Selim III, 1789–
1807, Journal of the American Oriental Society, vol. 83, no. 3 (Aug.-Sep., 1963), p.302, 
Sarıcaoğlu, p.225. For examples of reports from the Hospodars see, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti 
Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi (Ottoman Archives of Prime Ministry of Turkey, hereafter cited as; 
BOA), HAT, Dosya No: 171, Gömlek No: 7318-A and C. Dosya No: 9, Gömlek No: 326-E, Dosya 
No: 17, Gömlek No:744. 
37 Jewsbury, p.8. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid, pp. 17-18. 
40 Ibid, p.7. 
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noting the growth in the amount of tribute paid to the Sultan in the last part of the 
eighteenth century from one to six million kuruş. The Hospodar and his 
colleagues could take what was left over.”41 
In 1777, problems occurred in Moldavia. Grigore Ghica III, who was 
known to be pro-Russian, was executed and replaced with Constantine Demetrius 
Mourousis who was a dragoman of the Porte. The Russian Ambassador at 
Constantinople, Stakhiev sent a note to the Porte to protest this nomination, 
however, when the Ottomans proved that Ghica’s policies had been contrary to 
the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, Russia could not pressure the Porte any further.42 
In 1780, Russia wanted to assign Sergey Lazarevich Lashkarev as consul 
for Wallachia, Moldavia and Bessarabia. However, considering the personality 
and influence of Lashkarev, the Ottomans refused this offer and wanted him to 
reside in Silistre where intense commercial relations between Russia and the Porte 
existed. The Ottomans declared that, if Russia insisted on this appointment, they 
would interpret this as a hostile act. Finally, the French Ambassador Saint-Priest 
became the mediator, and in January 1780, both sides agreed on the opening a 
Russian consulate in Silistre.43 Yet, this was followed by the opening of Russian 
consulates in Iaşi and Bucharest in 1782. The activities of these consuls together 
with the ones located in the Greek islands disturbed the Porte significantly.44 
On 12 January 1785, the Hospodar of Moldavia Alexander Mavrocordatos 
(Delibey) was deposed and replaced with Alexander Mavrocordatos (Firaris). The 
Porte justified this change by claiming that the policies of the former were 
                                                 
41 Jewsbury, pp. 9-11. 
42 Nicolae Jorga, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Tarihi vol.5 (1774–1912) (İstanbul: Yeditepe Yayınevi, 
2005) trans. Nilüfer Epçeli, p. 28. 
43 İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, vol. 4, part 1, p.475. 
44 Matthew Smith Anderson, The Eastern Question 1774-1923 (London: MacMillan, 1966), p.13. 
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harmful both to the Porte and the peoples of Moldavia.45 Later on 7 April 1786, to 
counter-balance the activities of Russian consul Voinovich, Nicholas Mavrogenes, 
a dragoman of Gazi Hasan Pasha, was appointed as the Hospodar of Wallachia. 
The former Hospodar, Mihai Draco Suţu was caught in a serious illness which 
prevented him from performing the duties of his office.46 Although, this 
appointment was regarded by Russia as an act contrary to the terms of the treaty, 
the Ottomans did not consider this as a problem.47 Again on 14 December 1786, 
because of the “necessities of the period” the Ottomans deposed the Hospodar of 
Moldavia, Alexandru Mavrocordat Firaris, and replaced him with Alexander 
Hypsilanti, who was the Hospodar of Wallachia during 1774-1782, a man whose 
policies had already been tested by the Ottomans.48 
In 1786, when Alexander Mavrocordatos Firaris was deposed, Yakov 
Ivanovich Bulgakov, the Russian Ambassador at Constantinople, sent a note to 
the Porte condemning this act,49 while Mavrocordatos seek refuge in Russian 
territories. This situation was transformed into a crisis as both sides refused to 
give in the demands of the other, and this conflict was to become another cause of 
the second Ottoman Russian war in the following year.50 
 
 
 
                                                 
45 Ahmed Vâsıf Efendi, p.210. 
46 Ibid, p.332. Taylesanizade Hafız Abdullah Efendi, İstanbul’un Uzun Dört Yılı (1785-1789) 
(İstanbul: TATAV, 2003), p.142 
47 Jorga, vol.5, pp.53-56 
48 Ahmed Vasıf Efendi, p.372. “iktizâ-yı vakt ü hâl hasebiyle azli lâzım ve bu esnâda Boğdan’da 
mücerrebü’l-etvâr bir voyvodanın vücûdu emr-i mühimm olduğuna binâen...” 
49 Jelavich, Russia and the Formation of the Romanian National State 1821-1878, pp.5-6. 
50 Ahmed Vâsıf Efendi, pp.380-381 
 116
5.3.2. Greece   
 
In 1774, the situation of the Greeks differed from the other Balkan peoples 
since they had already rebelled against the Porte and caused serious problems 
during the war. So, they were not in a position to ask any concessions. The 
Albanian irregulars were still terrorizing Morea after the Ottoman-Russia war was 
over. Thanks to the efforts of Gazi Hasan Pasha, the Albanian rule over the 
Greeks ended and once again central authority was established in Morea in 
1779.51 Nevertheless, as a result of the population loss during these nine years 
which was estimated as 100,000,52 the Ottoman revenue from this region was 
decreased by half.53 Besides, according to the convention of Aynalıkavak, the 
Porte agreed to pay compensation to the Greeks whose lands were confiscated 
during these years.54 
Russia tried to form partisan groups also among the Greeks. The consuls 
who were commissioned to the Aegean and Mediterranean islands (Crete, Rhodes 
and Cyprus) were responsible for gathering all kinds of information and 
provoking the local Christians against the Ottomans. An eye-witness reported that, 
“there is not a rock in the Archipelago where there is not to be found a Greek in 
Russian uniform exercising an authority which is tyrannical towards the Turkish 
chiefs and insulting towards the agents of the Great powers.”55 These consulates, 
                                                 
51 İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, vol. 4, part 1, pp. 434-435. “That resolute commander defeated the 
Albanians in the plain of Tripolitsa, and erected there a pyramid of 4,000 heads as a trophy and a 
warning.” William Miller, The Turkish Restoration in Greece, 1718-1797 (New York: MacMillan, 
1921), p.28. 
52 Miller, p.30. 
53 Jorga, vol.5, p.32. 
54 Miller, p.30. 
55 Anderson, The Eastern Question, p.8-9, 55 Isabel de Madariaga, Catherine the Great: A Short 
History (London: Yale University Press, 1990), p.49. 
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like the ones in other Balkan cities, were used as centers for partisan groups to 
provoke the local Christians. 
 
 
5.3.3. Montenegro 
 
In 1766, an impostor of Peter III, Stefan the Little, managed to hold power 
in Montenegro.56 Although Stephen did not openly declared himself to be the 
exact personality of the deceased Tsar, he wanted to be called after him. He aimed 
to resolve the problems among the clans and after unifying his country he was 
going to concentrate his forces against his suzerain, namely the Ottomans.57 Since 
Catherine the Great tried to form alliances with the Balkan peoples, she sent 
Major-General Yuri V. Dolgurukii on a mission to Montenegro however the 
Russian mission could not achieve any major success.58 In 1773, Stefan the Little 
was assassinated. A Greek from Morea was hired either by the Turks or the 
Venetians. He served Stefan as his servant and then killed him by cutting his 
throat ear to ear.59 
During late 1770s, relations between Russia and Montenegro deteriorated 
and in 1777, Catherine II refused to accept an envoy from Montenegro. Russia 
                                                 
56 He was told to be an Italian whose name was Bandini and escaped Russia after he faced a 
criminal charge. Madariaga, Isabel de Madariaga, Russia in the Age of Catherine the Great 
(London: Phoenix, 2003), p.210. 
57 Venturi, p.10. 
58 Ibid, pp.12-13. For a detailed account of Catherine II and Stephen the Little see, Michael Boro 
Petrovich, “Catherine II and a False Peter III in Montenegro,” American Slavic and East European 
Review, vol. 14, no. 2 (Apr., 1955), pp. 169-194. 
59 Venturi, p.15. 
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was trying to be in good terms with the Venetians and remained indifferent to the 
affairs of the Balkans during 1780s.60  
The next challenge awaiting the Montenegrins was Kara Mahmud Bushati 
of Albania. He became the governor of İşkodra (Shkoder) in 1779 and was an 
ambitious leader. He defeated the Ottoman forces in the Southern Albania thus 
came into conflict with Constantinople. Aydoslu Mehmet Pasha was sent to 
handle the situation, however he also joined Kara Mahmud. As a result, 
Abdulhamid I ordered the executions of both unruly figures. Simultaneously, the 
Sultan also wanted his Grand Vizier to commission a Pasha to deal with the rebels 
of Silistre, since it would be beneficial for a possible future war against Russia.61 
Kara Mahmud’s opposition to the Ottoman Empire attracted the attention 
of Russia and the Habsburgs who wanted to use him against the Porte. Later in 
1785, Kara Mahmud invaded Montenegro and sent his words to Belgrade and 
Bosnia that he was willing to fight against the Habsburgs in the case of any 
conflict.62 Finally, Kara Mahmud was forgiven by the Sultan and became an ally 
of the Porte in the Ottoman-Russian war of 1787-1792.63 
 
 
5.4. The Greek Project  
 
After the infamous manifesto of Peter the Great, the Greek Project is the 
second project of a comprehensive Russian foreign policy in regard to the 
Balkans. In the case of Peter’s manifesto, there was an observable tradition, 
                                                 
60 Jelavich, Russia and the Formation of the Romanian National State 1821-1878, p.95. 
61 Sarıcaoğlu, p.186. 
62 Taylesanizade Hafız Abdullah Efendi, pp.104-105. 
63 Jelavich, Russia and the Formation of the Romanian National State 1821-1878, p.96. 
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lacking documentary evidence. Whereas, Catherine’s Greek project had a clearly 
authentic documentary foundation but a doubtful tradition.64 
The Greek Project, though mystical it may seem was a very much 
pragmatic asset for foreign policy-making. That Potemkin or Bezborodko were 
dedicated to the implementation of this policy, did not necessarily implicate the 
same thing for Catherine II, who was a realistic policy-maker. While Potemkin 
was dreaming of a Kingdom of Dacia to protect himself from the heir, Paul, 
Bezborodko’s dedication was a consequence of his hate towards the Ottomans. In 
addition, Bezborodko, who tried to emphasize his role in the decision-making 
process, claimed that Catherine II was devoted to the project. However, Catherine 
II was not looking forward to see the Balkan peoples falling under the suzerainty 
of the Habsburgs in place of the Porte. Her attitudes such as naming her 
grandchildren Constantine or changing some of the names of the cities on the 
Black Sea coast were affected partly from the pro-Greek trend of her age. 
Although these were causing anxiety in her enemies, at the same time she was not 
committed to any concrete policy decision.65  
The first mention of the Greek Project had appeared in 1779 after the 
naming of Catherine’s grandson.66 In 1780, Bezborodko drafted the Greek Project 
in three levels. According to the first possibility, Russia would annex the Crimea 
together with some Aegean Islands while the Habsburgs would claim parts of 
Serbia. The second option was the establishment of the Kingdom of Dacia over 
the lands of the Danubian Principalities which would be ruled by Potemkin 
                                                 
64 Hugh Ragsdale, “Russian Projects of Conquest in the Eighteenth Century,” in Hugh Rugsdale 
(ed.), Imperial Russian Foreign Policy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p.75. 
65 Muriel Atkin, Russia and Iran, 1780-1828 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1980), 
pp.23-24. 
66 Ragsdale, “Russian Projects..”, pp. 82-83. Potemkin adviced Catherine to assign Greek nurses to 
the boy. The coins that were struck for Constantine aimed to establish a connection between the 
Russian Prince and Constantine the Great. 
 120
independently. The last one considered the total annihilation of the Ottoman 
Empire and partition of its lands, while the old Byzantine Empire would be 
resurrected with its center at Constantinople and ruled by Catherine’s grandson 
Constantine.67 
Catherine and Joseph met in Mohilev during May-July of 1780.68 
Although Joseph II did not refuse the offer of Catherine, he still had some 
reservations about the practical applicability of the project.69 The death of Maria 
Theresa in December 1780 left Joseph II, who was defending expansionist 
policies, alone in his decision regarding the foreign policy which also enabled the 
Russo-Austrian alliance to be further developed.70 The discussions of a defensive 
alliance began in July of 1780 and finally in January 1781, with the efforts of 
Count Ludwig Cobenzl, the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg, a defensive 
alliance was drafted. Despite some complications, finally on 18 May 1781, the 
alliance was ratified. This provided the Habsburgs with Russian support against 
Prussia and the Russians with Austrian support against the Porte.71  
When an insurrection broke out in the Crimea against the Russian puppet 
Şahin Geray Khan, Catherine informed Joseph that she has to take necessary 
precautions on her borders to suppress this revolt. In return, Joseph II told 
Catherine II that he was supporting her decisions completely on this matter.72 As a 
result, on 21 September 1782, Catherine II, in her own hand-writing, sent a letter 
to Joseph II about the final plans regarding the Greek Project. Although in 
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principle there was nothing in disagreement, Joseph was anxious about the 
reaction of Prussia and France.73 After the Anglo-French rivalry over the colonies 
came to an end, France once again wanted to take an active part in the European 
affairs and as a reaction to the Austro-Russian plans, it refused to be a part of any 
kind of partition of the Ottoman Empire.74  
The Greek Project was also interpreted as a diplomatic game of the period 
which was ambitious but unrealistic rather than a “concrete plan of action.”75 No 
one but Bezborodko firmly believed in the feasibility of it. The Russian expansion 
and colonization towards the south was a more gradual one which necessitated the 
control of the waterways and cleaning the area from foreign threats.76 There was 
not any mention of this grandiose project in the correspondence of the Russian 
Ambassador at Vienna. However, this does not prove its inexistence. Rather, it 
shows that Catherine II wanted to keep this top-secret.77 
Gaffron, the Ambassador of Frederick at Constantinople, informed the 
Porte about the Greek Project.78 According to the detailed report of Frederick, 
Russian and Austrian armies were preparing for a new war against the Ottoman 
Empire.79 However, in 1787 chances of achieving a project such as this one was 
much less than it was in 1782. First of all, it was a necessary condition to provoke 
the Ottomans to war before going through with the rest of the plan. Russia failed 
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to achieve this goal in 1783, and when it came to 1787, the international politics 
had a much more different shape which would not let such a major downfall 
without any protest.80 Three main reasons can be stated why the Greek Project 
could not be realized; 
[First of all] the lenient reaction on the part of the Ottoman Empire to 
the Russian annexation of the Crimea, which did not lead to war; 
secondly, the end of the war of independence between Britain and 
United Colonies in North America together with the vain efforts by 
Spain to conquer British Gibraltar, which enabled the parties to press 
for the maintenance of the status quo in Eastern Europe, and finally, 
the quarrel of the allies over the spoils yet to be won.81 
 
  
5.5. The Balkans in 1787 
 
In late 1786, Catherine II gave full authority to Potemkin over the southern 
policies of the Russian Empire. With this authority, Potemkin informed Bulgakov 
about the military preparations of Russia and that he might call him back to St. 
Petersburg soon. He also wanted Bulgakov to report the military condition of the 
Porte.82 
The Porte accused Russia, to Prussia and England, of violating the terms of 
Küçük Kaynarca by giving asylum to the deposed Hospodar of Moldavia, 
Mavrocordatos, mistreating the Muslims in her territories and provoking the 
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Ottoman subjects against the Sultan. Catherine II replied these accusations in 
kind, only to increase the tension between the two empires.83  
Bulgakov’s request for a consulate in Varna was once more rejected on 22 
January 1787, when the Ottomans had learnt about the projected visit of Catherine 
II to the Crimea.84 Actually, during the negotiations with the Ottomans in the 
spring of 1787, Catherine II was more lenient compared to Potemkin’s aggressive 
attitude. She agreed with some of the demands of the Porte which would not 
directly harm the interests of her Empire like the change of the vice-consul of 
Moldavia or letting the Ottomans establish consulate in the Crimea. However, 
with the orders he received from Potemkin, Bulgakov rejected all these demands 
and paved the way for the Ottoman declaration of war in August 1787.85  
 
As it was the case in the Crimea and in the Caucasus, during this thirteen 
years period, Russia irreversibly got the upper hand in the Balkans against the 
Ottoman Empire. The efforts of the Russian consuls to provoke the Orthodox 
subjects of the Sultan, prepared the ground for the national awakening of these 
peoples in the 19th century. The Russian influence and the power of the âyâns 
increased at the expense of the central authority of the Ottoman Empire. Thus, the 
Ottoman Empire practically lost control over the parts of the Balkans. The 
inescapable rise of Russian role in the Balkans, especially in the Principalities, 
would become one of the causes of the Ottoman-Russian war of 1787-1792. 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
 
FROM 1774 TO 1787: SOME OTHER ASPECTS OF  
THE OTTOMAN-RUSSIAN RELATIONS 
 
 
6.1. Black Sea Trade 
 
Before the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, although the British and especially 
French had dominated the Mediterranean commerce, the Black Sea trade was 
compensating this loss for the Ottoman Empire.1 This intense and productive 
commercial relation also connected the merchants of the Black Sea to Anatolia 
and Constantinople which was neutralizing the effects of the military defeats.2 
However, the territorial losses that Ottomans suffered, negatively affected the 
Black Sea economy by disturbing the economic unity and commercial 
relationships which had been continuing for a long time.  
The Russian conquest of the northern Black Sea also falls into this 
category of territorial losses. Ottoman textile producers were one of the groups 
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which effected from this loss of territory. “Thereafter, the new imperial frontiers 
between Russia and the Ottoman Empire impeded or choked off altogether the 
longstanding flow of goods and peoples between two areas that had been part of 
one economic zone but now were divided between two empires.”3 
Although Russia had already acquired trade rights in the Black Sea with 
the Treaty of Belgrade in 1739, it was not allowed to anchor any commercial 
vessel or men-of-war even in the Azak Sea. Thus, the Russian presence in the 
Black Sea was very limited during this period.4 Still, it was beneficial to the 
Russian merchants. Article 11 of the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca allowed Russia’s 
commercial activities both in the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, which also 
meant unrestricted passage through the straits. Besides, the Russian merchants 
acquired the same rights with the merchants of France and England. 
Consequently, for the first time, Russia had the right for trade with its own ships.5  
Although the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca allowed Russian ships to trade in 
the Black Sea, the struggle over the Crimea was a major obstacle in this period. In 
1775, a Russian merchant who wanted to buy timber from Sinop had to leave the 
port as a result of the hostile attitude of the local merchants. There was also the 
problem of customs. In some cases the Ottomans charged the Russian merchants 
more than once with the same duty. The buyers were charged with another tax, 
masdariyye6, although it was abolished in the first place. As a result of this heavy 
taxation, Russian merchants were having difficult time selling their goods on an 
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appropriate price. Either the customers wanted the product cheaper to be able to 
pay taxes or they chose not buy in the first place. Later it was decided to abolish 
masdariyye tax completely.7 There were also environmental problems such as the 
storms in the Black Sea. However, the main issue was that the shipwrecks on the 
Ottoman shores were ravaged by the local people. In 1782, a Russian merchant 
ship was wrecked on the shores of the Danube and the question of the 
compensation of the property that was pillaged continued until 1787.8 
Not long after, the terms of the treaty of Küçük Kaynarca had to be 
reconsidered. Russia wanted all sorts of ships to be granted free passage through 
the straits. In 1776, four old men-of-war were demilitarized and wanted to be used 
for commercial goals but the Porte did not to consent this demand of Russia.9 
Another matter of conflict was the crew of these Russian trade ships. Since Russia 
did not have enough trained men to operate their ships, Russians tried to persuade 
the Ottoman subjects, in most cases Greeks residing in the Aegean islands, with 
concessions to settle in the Crimea in exchange for their services. In addition, 
Russia tried to hire foreign shipmen to its service.10  
In the correspondence between Catherine II and Potemkin during June 
1778, the plans for the construction of Kherson were mentioned and in July 
Catherine ordered the building of this new city for ship building and as a harbour 
at the mouth of Dnyepr.11 Destruction of the Zaporozhian Cossack Sech in 1775 
and the building of Kherson gave Russia a more secure and direct access to the 
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Black Sea which contributed to the Russian trade in the Black Sea immensely.12 
The increase of the agricultural production in the southern provinces of the 
Empire was followed by the construction of ports such as Odessa with the aim of 
exporting the grain to Western Europe.13  
In the Aynalıkavak Convention of 1779, the terms of the Treaty of Küçük 
Kaynarca were re-evaluated. According to the article 6 of the convention a limit 
was brought to the Russian ships that they should be between 1000-16.000 kile14. 
In addition, the employment of Ottoman subjects was prohibited without the 
consent of the Porte. Another important stipulation was that Russia could only sell 
its own products and only when there was no need for these products in 
Constantinople, Russia could export these to the other countries of the 
Mediterranean.  
After the annexation manifesto of the Crimea was drafted in April 1783, a 
commercial treaty was concluded on 21 June 1783, which was composed of 81 
articles. According to this treaty, the duty was reduced to 3% and Russia was 
going to benefit from the same trade privileges with other countries.15 Russian 
merchants gained extensive rights including the right of free trade in the Ottoman 
territories, and to anchor and repair their ships in the Ottoman ports.16 The right of 
free passage from the straits was granted also to England, France and finally 
                                                 
12 Matthew Smith Anderson, The Eastern Question 1774-1923 (London: MacMillan, 1966), p.6-7 
13 Richard Pipes, Russia Under the Old Regime (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1974), 
pp.147-148. 
14 Equals to a bushel, which is approximately 36.5 kg. 
15 Nicolae Jorga, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Tarihi vol. 5 (İstanbul: Yeditepe Yayınevi, 2005), trans. 
Nilüfer Epçeli, p.40. 
16 Ahmet Cevdet Paşa, Tarih-i Cevdet vol.1 (İstanbul: Üçdal Neşriyat, 1983), pp. 512-514. İdris 
Bostan, “Rusya’nın Karadeniz’de Ticarete başlaması,” p.289 
 128
Austria in 1784. As a result, the Black Sea was opened for international trade 
which further weakened the Ottoman economy.17  
Between the years 1774-1787, the total number of the Russian merchant 
ships in the Black Sea was 445 while Russian merchants using Ottoman ships for 
trade numbered 38. After 1782, there was a significant increase in the number of 
the Russian ships trading in the Black Sea and the Russians no more used 
Ottoman ships.18 During 1778-1779, when the Ottoman-Russian relations 
deteriorated over the Crimea, the Ottomans presented all kinds of difficulties to 
the Russian merchants, which resulted in the decreasing number of Russian 
merchant ships. However, after the Aynalıkavak Convention and especially after 
the trade agreement of 1783, Russian commercial activity in the Black sea 
intensified once again.19 Consequently, the Russian revenue from trade in the 
Black Sea rose from merely 400 rubles in 1776 to 2 million in 1796.20 
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6.2. The Balance of Power in Europe and its reflections on the Ottoman 
Empire and Russia 
 
After the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, the Ottoman Empire felt the need for 
establishing new alliances. During late 1770s, Abdürrezzak Efendi tried to form a 
triple alliance between the Ottoman Empire, Prussia, and Russia. Although he was 
able to convince Frederick of Prussia and Nikita Panin, the Foreign Minister of 
Russia until 1780, Catherine II was clearly against the possibility of an alliance 
with the Porte.21 In 1777, the Ottomans asked for 12 ships from Britain to protect 
the Muslim merchants in the Black Sea and Mediterranean however Weymouth, 
the British Foreign Secretary, rejected this offer not to offend Russia. Once again, 
the British administration made this decision with regard to their trade interests. 
England was trading with Russia especially raw materials, timber for the navy. 22  
The Ottoman Empire, continued its search for new allies during the 1780s, 
and a commercial alliance with Spain was concluded in 1782. Discussions for a 
commercial treaty had begun in 1779 by the Spanish envoy Juan de Bouligny and 
resulted with a trade agreement in 1782.23 As a result of this improved relations 
trade flourished between the two Empires and both sides sent their ambassadors to 
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each other.24 For the Spanish, the Ottoman Empire was no longer the feared 
enemy, but a market to sell the materials brought from the colonies.25 
Russian role in the European diplomacy increased in this period. Russia 
became the mediator between the Habsburgs and Prussia to end the Bavarian 
Succesion war and the Treaty of Teschen was signed in May 1779. Later on 28 
February 1780, Russia led the European states against the British supremacy over 
the open seas and gathered the league of Armed Neutrality.26 Later in 1782, 
Catherine II refused the British offer of Minorca Island in return for mediation 
between England, France, and Spain.27 Moreover, after rejecting the British 
request of military support in 1775, Russia projected military aid to Holland, a 
force of 20,000 men in 1782. This attitude of Russia caused a certain level of 
deterioration in Anglo-Russian relations during the initial years of 1780s.28 
Nevertheless, England remained silent to the Russian annexation of the Crimea in 
1783. Once again, the British administration made this decision with regard to 
their trade interests. England had a vast interest in trading with Russia especially 
raw materials, timber for the navy.  
Although France was one of the main allies and supporters of the Porte, 
beginning with the 1780s, some French officials began to have reservations about 
the traditional policy regarding the Ottoman Empire. It was argued that although 
the survival of the Ottoman Empire was crucial for the stability of Eastern Europe, 
they also started to realize that preserving the Ottoman Empire with its archaic 
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institutions was a heavy liability.  Hesitation on the side of the Ottomans to allow 
the French ships through the straits frustrated the French Ambassador and Foreign 
Minister. Thus, the Ottomans alienated their traditional ally in Europe. Choiseul-
Gouffier considered leaving Constantinople to express his government’s protest. It 
was obvious in 1786 that the Ottoman-French relations were deteriorating.29 The 
French military specialists were called back from the Ottoman Empire and a new 
commercial treaty was concluded with Russia which was a clear intention of the 
French during the last years of the Ancien Regime.30 
Segur, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, was against the protection of 
the Ottoman Empire. However, to represent the view of his government, in 
response to Potemkin’s aggressive comments on expelling the Ottomans from 
Europe, he argued that the destruction of the Ottoman Empire would result in war 
between the Great Powers and the end of Levant trade.31 However, the Russians 
were not comfortable with the French playing on both sides, both “a protector of 
the Turks and as a friend of the Slavs.”32 
In Russia there was not a united opinion over foreign policy either. In 
1786, the French Ambassador Segur was reporting that, some of the ministers did 
not share the enthusiasm of Potemkin since war and conquests did not offer them 
any personal benefit, but would cause complications in commerce and diplomacy. 
Bezborodko was advising Catherine II to deal with the Ottomans alone without 
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the mediation or intervention of any other foreign power.33 Besides, as it was 
noted earlier, Catherine bestowed Potemkin with full authority over Russian 
foreign policy and other ministers were anxious about his growing power.34  
Both Britain and France were aiming to conclude a commercial treaty with 
Russia during the 1780s. James Harris, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg 
(1777-1783)35 was trying to convince the Russians on the one hand, while Segur, 
French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, had achieved this goal in 1787.36 This treaty 
was interpreted as a part of the great project against the Ottoman Empire, which 
would prevent the French at Constantinople from provoking the Ottomans against 
Russia.37 In 1786, in his correspondence with the Crown Prince Selim, Louis XVI 
informed him that France would not provoke the Porte into war against Russia. He 
was pointing out the changing nature of the warfare and that a state with a weak 
army was destined to be defeated. To improve the military condition of the Porte, 
Louis promised technical support, but no further.38  
The Grand Vizier Koca Yusuf Pasha exaggerated the weaknesses of 
Russia and Austria and hoped for the Prussian support in case of a war against 
Russia in 1787. There was a fierce contest among the ambassadors of Austria, 
France and England. Choiseul-Goiffeur claimed that Ainslie was trying to 
provoke the Porte into war with Russia by presenting the Russo-French trade 
agreement in January 1787 as an alliance against the Porte. Potemkin and 
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Bezborodko sent a note Fitzherbert, the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to 
protest the attitude of Ainslie.39 
During 1787, a rapprochement was reached between the Porte, Prussia, 
and England. However, this was not resulted in an alliance. Both Prussia and 
England started to be worried about the advance of Russia at the expense of the 
Ottoman Empire.40 On the other hand, Frederick was still content with the status 
quo since Austria and Russia were drafting plans on the Ottoman Empire and 
neither of these was causing any trouble to Prussia.41  
 
The international politics was one of the factors which prepared the ground 
for the aggressive policies of the Russian Empire against the Porte during this 
inter-war period. Benefiting from the conflicts of the Great Powers of Europe, 
Russia was able to annex the Crimea without any major protest. In addition, the 
defensive alliance with the Habsburgs gave Russia a free hand to increase its 
influence among the Orthodox subjects of the Sultan. The other great powers of 
Europe were aware of the growth of the Russian Empire and many of them had 
vital trade interests in Russia. Thus, during this period, they preferred to be in 
good terms with Russia rather than preserving the Porte. In August 1787, even 
when the Ottomans declared war on Russia, the latter had a favourable position 
regarding international politics. 
                                                 
39 Bağış, pp. 38-39. 
40 Shaw, Between Old and New, p.23. 
41 Beydilli, p.140. 
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CHAPTER VII 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
The last quarter of the 18th century was one of most delicate and fragile 
periods in the history of the Ottoman-Russian relations. The conclusive defeat of 
the Porte at the hands of the Russian armies started a kind of chain reaction which 
had a major impact on the history of these Empires and the international politics 
in the following century. As a result of the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, at once, the 
superiority passed to the Empire of the Tsars over the Sublime Porte and remained 
so until both had collapsed as a result of the First World War.  
 The Ottoman Empire, before and after the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca was 
nothing but the same and it was not merely because of some territorial changes. 
Küçük Kaynarca was the second disastrous peace treaty the Ottomans had signed 
after the Carlowitz in 1699. However, there was a great difference of perception 
in the Ottoman statesmen regarding the causes and results of these two events. 
What differed 1774 from 1699 was that after the Küçük Kaynarca there was a 
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reformist group of Ottoman statesmen who believed in the need for urgent 
reforms and the necessity to modernize the Empire. 
 
The independence and separation of the Crimean Khanate from the Porte 
was a very significant fact of this period, it was a part of the reflection of a much 
broader fact. The independence of the Khanate remained only on the text of the 
treaty. What actually happened was that the Crimea was detached from the 
protection of the Porte, and was left open to all kinds of Russian intervention. It 
can be observed from the sequence of events after 1774 until 1783 that Russia 
wanted to create a new Crimea which would serve its own interests instead of 
being an obstacle on the way of its expansion. Any means to achieve this purpose 
was applicable for the Russians.   
The destruction of the Crimean Khanate occurred during a relatively long 
period, and was composed mainly of three stages. The first phase was the 
independence of the Khanate from the Ottoman Empire after the Küçük Kaynarca 
Treaty of 1774. Between the years 1774 and 1779, the Crimea experienced a 
certain level of independence; however, Russian influence and military 
intervention steadily rose during this period. The second phase began in 1779 with 
the Convention of Aynalıkavak, and lasted four years until the final declaration of 
the Russian annexation in April 1783. Between these years, although the Porte 
accepted Crimean independence, in practice, the Crimea was mostly under the 
occupation of Russian forces. For more than once, the Russian armies invaded the 
peninsula to suppress revolts and re-instate their candidate, Şahin Geray, as the 
Khan. After 1783, as the last phase of the annexation, Catherine the Great initiated 
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a well-organized plan for the colonization and the integration of the territories of 
the Khanate to the Empire.  
For the first time, a Muslim populated territory was separated from the 
Porte which resulted in the concept of Caliphate being used for the first time in a 
political context to influence the Muslim population outside the Empire. The 
annexation of the Crimea made Russia strategically advantageous when dealing 
with the Ottoman Empire. Now that the peninsula was under the direct control of 
Russia, Constantinople and the Black Sea shores of the Ottoman Empire were 
under constant threat. The Austrian Ambassador at Constantinople, Franz Thugut, 
noticed the level of the danger in his report dated 3 September 1774, by pointing 
out that whenever the Tsar wished he could mobilize an army from Crimea and 
reach the shores of Constantinople between 36-48 hours. In which case, the only 
thing the Sultan could do would be packing his bags and leave for Asia.1 
Although, a Russian naval attack to Constantinople seems to be possible as 
Thugut described, because of the fear of intervention of the Great Powers, the 
Russians, for a long time did not try to invade Constantinople.  
As a broader impact of the annexation, Russia became more and more 
dominant in the Black Sea, as Sevastopol become its major naval base. The 
settlement policy of Catherine the Great which aimed at the Christianization and 
Russification of the annexed territories, led to the settlement of large numbers of 
Russians, Greeks and Germans from foreign countries as well as from interior 
Russia. Although this was not the only cause, as a result of this change in the 
demographic structure, the Crimean Tatars began to leave their homeland for the 
                                                 
1 Joseph Von Hammer Purgstall, Histoire de l’Empire Ottoman vol. 16 (1757–1774) (Paris: 1829), 
pp.496-497. 
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Ottoman Empire a process which in the long run would make the Crimean Tatars 
a minority in their own homeland.  
 
The Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca was an important mark in the history of 
Caucasian resistance against the Russian Empire. Although there had already been 
a significant Russian presence in the Caucasus during the 18th century until 1774, 
especially after the annexation of the Crimea, Russia’s way to penetrate into the 
Caucasus and its beyond was opened and the resistance of the local people 
intensified parallel to the Russian advance and intervention into the affairs of the 
Caucasus. During this period, the Ottoman Empire faced a serious dilemma in its 
relations and policy regarding the Caucasus. On the one hand, the Porte was 
encouraging and supporting the resistance of the local peoples of the Caucasus 
against Russia. Sometimes this was done secretly but in other cases, like in Ferah 
Ali Pasha’s mission, deliberately. On the other hand, there was a constant fear of 
provoking Russia into a new war which prevented any further Ottoman 
intervention, either political or military, in the affairs of the Caucasus. This 
dilemma is one of the main reasons of how Russia could penetrate into the 
Caucasus much easier than it could have been. 
This period also witnessed the first united resistance against Russia under 
the leadership of Imam Mansur. Although Mansur fought against a common 
enemy of the Ottoman Empire, there was a constant anxiety among the Ottoman 
statesmen that Mansur might shift the allegiance of the Caucasian tribes from the 
Ottoman Empire to himself, thus gaining a regional authority. Apparently, Mansur 
and the Porte had the same goal, to expel Russia from the Caucasus. However, 
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they could not cooperate fully because of this mutual distrust and it ultimately 
worked in the benefit of Russia. 
 
The advantage shifted in favour of Russia also in the Balkans. The peoples 
of this region already had a spiritual bond with the Russian Empire through 
Orthodox Christianity and they were not bound to the Ottoman Empire with a 
sense of loyalty to its Islamic cause.2 Since the beginning of the 18th century, they 
witnessed the growing power of the Russian Empire while the central Ottoman 
authority gradually disappeared. The Ottomans suffered humiliating defeats at the 
hands of the Russian armies more than once during the 18th century, which gave a 
certain level of confidence to the Christian subjects of the Sultan that their 
liberation was on the horizon. One thing that should be kept in mind is that the 
idea of liberation from the Porte during this period was partly motivated by the 
worsened conditions of these people, especially the Principalities under the 
Phanariote rule, and partly by religion rather than by a sense of strong national 
identity, as was the case in the 19th century.  
 Another important outcome of the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca for the 
Balkans was the opening of Russian consulates in various important cities such as 
Iaşi, Bucharest, and Thessalonica. These consulates became centers for breeding 
discontent and resentment against the Ottoman rule. In addition to gathering 
information and regulating Russian trade in their region, the Russian consuls 
continuously tried to provoke the Christian subjects of the Sultan while making 
propaganda of the Russian rule. The Porte tried to balance and if possible to 
prevent the activities of the Russian consuls by appointing governors and 
                                                 
2 Dominic Lieven, Empire: Russia and its Rivals (London: Yale University Press, 2000), p.148. 
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Hospodars who were loyal to the central authority. Nevertheless, as a result of 
Russia’s policies, its influence in the Balkans increased significantly during this 
period. 
Last but not least, the international political environment was so ripe for 
Russia that it was left alone in its struggle with the Ottoman Empire. Furthermore, 
other European states spent so much effort to ally themselves with Russia against 
each other. France and England were drafted in a long struggle over the colonies 
while Austria and Prussia were checking each other’s growth in the continent. The 
decline of French power in the continent after Louis XIV, also reflected to its 
traditional client, the Porte.  
During this thirteen year period, from 1774 to 1787, the integrity of the 
Ottoman Empire was seriously at stake. If there was any suitable time for the 
realization of a plan like the Greek Project it was during this period, but Russia 
failed to achieve this grandiose goal. When it came to 1787, however, the 
circumstances were much more different and any further advance of Russia at the 
expense of the Ottoman Empire would not go unnoticed as it happened in the 
annexation of the Crimea in 1783.  
To conclude, the inter-war period after the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca till 
the declaration of war in August 1787, witnessed the shift in the balance of power 
between Russia and the Ottoman Empire in favour of the former. Russia 
established strong footholds both in the Caucasus and the Balkans, which 
prepared the grounds for the Russian expansion in these regions in the following 
century. After the annexation of the Crimea, the Black Sea was gradually 
transformed from “Bahr-i Siyah” into “Chernoye More”. As a result, this period 
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marked the beginning of the Russian superiority over the Porte, which proved to 
be an irreversible process. 
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